Unionization at Justice Canada: A Case Study by Kowalsky, Andrij Roman
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
PhD Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
7-6-2015
Unionization at Justice Canada: A Case Study
Andrij Roman Kowalsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in PhD Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kowalsky, Andrij Roman, "Unionization at Justice Canada: A Case Study" (2015). PhD Dissertations. 14.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/14
  
 
UNIONIZATION AT JUSTICE CANADA: CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
ANDRIJ KOWALSKY  
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW 
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL OF YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
JULY 2015 
 
 
 
© Andrij Kowalsky, 2015
ii 
 
     ABSTRACT 
 
Researchers of the Canadian legal profession know very little about lawyers unionizing 
and collectively bargaining.  A breakthrough for expanding this subject occurred in April 2005 
when non-management lawyers working at the federal Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) were 
recognized by the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) as employees.  This dissertation 
explores DOJ lawyers unionizing by addressing two research questions: (1) what led DOJ 
lawyers to unionize with the Association of Justice Counsel (AJC)? and (2) what was the AJC’s 
experience in negotiating a first collective agreement?   
 
The dissertation is organized using a conventional structure.  The literature review 
presented in Chapter 2 maps the academic study of lawyer unionization while also serving as a 
guide for framing the content of interview protocols.  Chapter 3 elaborates on the dissertation’s 
research design as a case study.  Chapter 4 explains DOJ lawyers’ exclusion from the Public 
Service Staff Relations Act, the DOJ’s administration of the individual employment relationship, 
as well as introducing the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (LOAC).  Chapter 5 provides a 
historical analysis of events leading to LOAC becoming the AJC, which is traced to June 1990, 
when lawyers employed at the DOJ’s Toronto office received an exclusive wage premium 
known as the “Toronto differential”.  The chapter describes how redressing the Toronto 
differential helped LOAC generate employee support for forming the AJC as a professional 
association, and, later, campaigning for union recognition under the PSLRA.  Chapter 6 presents 
the AJC’s negotiation and completion of a first labour agreement.  Chapter 7 concludes the work 
by assessing the study’s key goals and interpreting the overview in relation to the broader 
literature.  
 
Findings from the seven chapters are synthesized into a descriptive theory that addresses the two 
research questions.  Its thesis is that DOJ lawyers’ desire for workplace representation and 
improved wages, executive level support from the DOJ, and introduction of the PSLRA 
facilitated the creation and development of the AJC into a vehicle that directed the unionization 
process. At the same time, the argument holds that the AJC negotiated a first collective 
agreement with an employer who engaged in hard bargaining that resulted in deadlocked 
negotiations, but was conduct, nonetheless, the courts determined had allowed the AJC a 
meaningful process of collective bargaining prior to the imposition of wage-restraint legislation.  
The dissertation’s findings: (1) detail the establishment of a new professional union in Canada’s 
federal public service; (2) confirm the relevance of the processual model for understanding DOJ 
lawyers unionizing; and (3) suggest that litigation challenging legislation remains unpredictable 
despite jurisprudence that protects entitlement to the process of collective bargaining. 
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C H A P T E R 1: Introduction 
 
1.1   Overview 
This dissertation investigates the unionization of non-management lawyers at the 
Department of Justice Canada, and the attempt of their bargaining agent, the Association of 
Justice Counsel, to negotiate a first collective agreement.  Both stages of the unionization process 
(organization and bargaining) are interpreted from employee and union perspectives.  The 
inquiry adopts a qualitative case study methodology for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting 
findings.  Primary and secondary document review, twenty-three semi-structured interviews, and 
participant observation were the data sources used for the study.  
 
The goal of chapter 1 is to introduce and outline the key discussion points and format of 
the dissertation.  The first section, background to the study, presents the research problem that 
rationalizes the conduct of this project and that yields the study’s central research questions.  The 
next section, which deals with research aims, documents this investigation’s key objectives, and 
then a brief segment on the appropriateness of adopting a case study approach follows.  Chapter 
1 concludes by prefacing the remaining six chapters of the work, which cover the literature 
review, research design, findings, and conclusion.  
 
1.2   Background to the Study  
The Canadian legal industry is slowly, but surely changing.  Writing at the turn of the 
new millennium, futurists foresaw modernization altering the practice of law.  They identified 
progressive technology and the new economy as liberalizing the legal services market at the 
expense of softening lawyers’ practice monopoly.1  The corresponding evolution of the access to 
justice movement, advances in legal services production techniques, and practitioner and law 
student oversupply confirm observers’ speculations while also suggesting an impending 
                                                 
1
 H.W. Arthurs, “Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century” (1996) 15 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 202 at 
217; H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy” 
(1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 46; K. Roach, “The Changing Nature of the Legal Profession” in W.A. 
Bogart, ed., Access to Affordable and Appropriate Law Related Services in 2020 (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association, 1999) 77 at 81; R. A. Macdonald, “Let Our Future Not Be Behind Us: The Legal Profession in 
Changing Times” (2001) 64 Saskatchewan Law Review 1 at 18; D. Brusegard, Economic Implications and Realities: 
The Potential Economic Impacts of Demographic and Social Change in the Law Profession and Business of Law 
(Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 2004) at 7-8, online: Canadian Bar Association 
<https://www.cba.org/cba/futures/pdf/economic_implications.pdf> (last modified: 3 February 2004).  
2 
 
deprofessionalization of law.  Lawyers adopting collective bargaining to challenge how their law 
firm, in-house department, or government office exploits new practice trends to restructure 
operations may surprise readers.   
 
Canadian law societies, as overseers of a province’s legal profession, encourage a 
consumer friendly, access to justice movement in the name of the public interest that de-
emphasizes lawyers as exclusive providers of legal services and their maintenance of a closed 
practice domain.
2
  Serving middle-class and low-income people is synonymous with solo and 
small firm practitioners whose availability to the general public earns them the reputation as 
being the backbone of the profession.  Their inexorable reliance on a high-turnover, diverse, fee-
paying customer base exposes them to a broad range of potential clientele.  This clientele, 
however, is a wholly unstable lot, who are courted by, and can find better value for their dollar 
with, encroaching service providers.  Paralegals, prepaid insurance plans, and on-line, electronic 
unregulated providers fill a demand for affordable and basic legal services that influences the 
public perception that a lawyer’s services should be costly or even necessary.3  Competition 
among the bar for work where legal expertise is obligatory will reward those practitioners 
capable of stirring demand by aggressively advertising value-added services as their calling card 
for new clients.  This is a business model that favours established, financed, entrepreneurial, 
specialized, and lean law firms, and it has become a popular mode for mass marketing personal 
injury legal services in and around Canada’s largest population centre, the Greater Toronto 
Area.
4
  This ubiquitous legal advertising found atop of cabs, on the exteriors of public transit 
busses, on the walls of subway cars, and on many radio and television stations demonstrates both 
                                                 
2
 D.R. Mah et al., Alternate Delivery of Legal Services: Final Report (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 2012) at 10, 
online: Law Society of Alberta <http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/adls/ADLS_Final_Report.pdf> (last modified 
February 2012). 
3
 D. Pinnington, “The Future of Law: The Challenges and Opportunities of Practicing Law in a Global Village” 
LawPro Magazine 12:2 (September 2013) 25 at 26-27.  
4
 Statistics Canada estimated that in 2011, the census metropolitan area of Toronto, Ontario, which extends into the 
four outlining regional municipalities of Halton, Peel, York and Durham consisted of 5,583,064 people. Statistics 
Canada, 2011 Census of Population – Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-316-XWE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
2012), online: Statistics Canada  
<http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/pd-pl/Table-
Tableau.cfm?LANG=Eng&T=201&S=3&O=D&RPP=150> (last modified: 1 January 2013). 
3 
 
a merging of lawyer professionalism with commercialism and the measures plaintiff-side 
lawyers have taken to ply their trade.
5
  
 
Like solo and small firm practitioners, large law firm associates also face uncertain 
prospects.  Law firm associates work long and gruelling work hours and suffer from low job 
satisfaction and career stagnation because of their employers perpetuating and profiting from a 
hierarchical division of labour and entitlements.
6
  Recent findings suggest that these types of 
positions are fungible as well given the emergence of modern legal services production methods.  
As a matter of course, law firm human resources intensify the shedding of positions when they 
fragment job responsibilities by assigning contingent legal work, routinized transaction, and 
document review to employment agencies staffed by freelance lawyers.
7
  These same strategists 
can seek even more ambitious cost reductions by off-shoring work to common-law trained 
lawyers who practice at lower rates than domestic competitors.
8
  The dawn of new-age computer 
applications and technologies threaten to deskill and mechanize legal work all together.
9
  
Artificial intelligence and robotics excising human intervention from non-sophisticated legal 
tasks can antiquate outsourcing, thereby rendering the personnel administrator as redundant to 
the law firm as the associate positions they once shed.
10
   
 
Current realities spare little relief for the newest entrants to the profession where 
competition for entry-level positions is stiff.  Between 2004 and 2008, American law firms 
                                                 
5
 The issue of whether law is a business or profession remains a current topic. See S.J. Levine, “Foreword to the 
Conference: The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of 
Law in the Twenty-First Century” (2012) 40 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1.  This journal volume published papers 
from the Fordham Law School Conference of 23-24 April 2012, The Law: Business or Profession? The Continuing 
Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First Century. 
6
 J. Hagan & F. Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers’ Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 
48; S.S. Fortney, “Soul For Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects 
of Billable Hour Requirements” (2000) 69:2 University of Missouri - Kansas City Law Review 243 at 248; W.D. 
Henderson & D. Zaring, “Young Associates in Trouble” (2007) 105:6 Michigan Law Review 1087 at 1103.  
7
 R.A. Brooks, Cheaper By the Hour: Temporary Lawyers and the Deprofessionalization of the Law (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2011) at 28-39.  
8
 A. Sechooler, “Globalization, Inequality and Legal Services” (2008) 15:3 International Journal of the Legal 
Profession 231 at 237-241.  
9
 R. Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008) at 145. 
10
 Canadian Bar Association, The Future of Legal Services in Canada: Trends and Issues (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association, 2013) at 27, online: Legal Futures Initiatives 
<http://www.cbafutures.org/CBA/media/mediafiles/PDF/Reports/trends-isssues-eng.pdf?ext=.pdf> (last modified: 
12 June 2013).    
4 
 
managed declining rates of growth by eliminating 20,000 jobs.
11
  In 2009 and 2010, 250 of 
America’s largest law firms cut 9,500 positions and delayed hiring.12  Their proactive 
employment practices—the measuring and adjusting of labour resources according to economic 
hardship—showed that large law firms are similar to the organizations they represent.  
Intensifying competition for lucrative new clients and their business (which spin-off more work 
and new jobs for associates) exists in Canada too and it is causing a shakeout, or perhaps an 
implosion, at one or more of the nation’s largest firms.13  The principles of supply and demand 
suggest that the glut of new lawyers in America may not get their start in the profession before 
shrinking law school enrollments (which have fallen by 24 percent from 2010 and hover at 
figures not seen since 1975) correct the disequilibrium by churning out fewer graduates.
14
  While 
in Ontario, the problem of excess law school graduates (trained either in the province or abroad 
and who became unplaced articling students) forced the Law Society of Upper Canada to 
implement an alternative licensing program, which consists of a four month skills-based training 
course, and a four month work placement, despite fears over implementing a “two-tier” system 
that may stigmatize the credentials of program graduates to prospective employers.
15
  Deliberate 
policy intervention that allows more people to become lawyers and set up shop in a soft economy 
benefits the law societies who license them, and not the main street practitioners whose 
livelihoods are sensitive to a flood of new entrants.  Adding lawyers to an already crammed 
system gives law societies a steady pool of fee-paying licensees, but at the expense of a bloated 
labour supply.  
 
                                                 
11
 W.D. Henderson & R.M. Zahorsky, “Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—And it May 
Be a Sign of Lasting Change” ABA Journal (1 July 2011), online: ABA Journal 
<http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift/> (last modified: (1 July 2011). 
12
 “Law Firms: A Less Gilded Future” The Economist (5 May 2011), online:  The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/node/18651114> (last modified 5 May 2011).  
13
 J. Melnitzer, “Another Canadian Law Firm Will Follow Hennan Blaikie to collapse in 2014, Deloitte Report Set 
to Predict” Law Post (12 March 2014), online: Financial Post 
<http://business.financialpost.com/2014/03/12/another-canadian-law-firm-will-follow-heenan-blaikie-to-collapse-in-
2014-deloitte-report-said-to-predict/> (date accessed: 24 September 2014). 
14
 M. Hansen, “Law school enrollment down 11 percent this year over last year, 24 percent over 3 years data shows” 
ABA Journal (17 December 2013), online: ABA Journal 
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_enrollment_down_11_percent_this_year_over_last_year_data
_shows> (date accessed: 26 September 2014). 
15
A. Ballingall, “Law Society of Upper Canada expected to clear new path to enter profession” Toronto Star (22 
November 2012) A6.  Articling rounds out an aspiring lawyer’s pre-service training by requiring them to apprentice 
under an approved principal (lawyer) for a requisite time period and receive experiential training in order to satisfy 
requirements for licensure by a provincial law society. 
5 
 
Provincial law societies will not intervene to help navigate lawyers through a laissez-faire 
economy.  They have all but retreated from being a locus for collectively advancing the 
profession.
16
  For the foreseeable future, at least, they will continue to regulate the profession by 
licensing members, setting professional standards, and policing disreputable counsel.  Their days 
of restraining competition among practitioners, however, are distant history.
17
  By the late 1980s, 
most provincial law societies succumbed to the demand to allow lawyers to advertise, and the 
courts confirmed legislation that prohibited county associations from price fixing with fee 
schedules.
18
  In two noteworthy 1989 cases, the Supreme Court of Canada repealed provincial 
law society bans on non-nationals practicing law, and out-of-province lawyers practicing with 
those who were ordinarily resident in a host jurisdiction.
19
  The economies of scale have caused 
law firm and government employment to become the dominant and preferred practice structures 
in comparison to the insecurities of sole-proprietorship.
20
  These workplaces are bureaucratized, 
though, and lawyers yield their professional autonomy and work control to the employer in 
exchange for a career.
21
  As a general rule, professional associations and law societies do not 
intercede in disputes between employee-members and employers.
22
  
 
Workers of various skill levels and occupations have embraced trade unionism in order to 
shield themselves from an open labour market, except for lawyers employed in private practice.  
Historically, lawyers professionalized law and profitably sold it as an intellectual product and 
service to businesses and affluent families.
23
  This privileged and exclusive standing in the 
                                                 
16
 A.M. Francis, “Out of touch and out of time: lawyers, their leaders and collective mobility within the legal 
profession” (2004) 24:3 Legal Studies 322 at 323.   
17
 J. Nieuwenhuysen & M. Williams-Wynn, Professions in the Marketplace: An Australian Study of Lawyers, 
Doctors, Accountants, and Dentists (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1982) at 20; M. Angel, “Professionals 
and Unionization” (1981) 66:3 Minnesota Law Review 383 at 391. 
18
 D.A.A. Stager & H.W. Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 193, 219.  
19
 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 1989 CanLII 2 (SCC); Black v. Law Society of 
Alberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591, 1989 CanLII 132 (SCC). 
20
 M. Fleming, Lawyers, Money and Success: The Consequences of Dollar Obsession (Westport: Quorum Books, 
1997) at 11; D. Litowitz, The Destruction of Young Lawyers: Beyond One L (Akron: University of Akron Press, 
2006) at 71; E. Raymer, “Fewer Lawyers want to become sole practitioners, survey finds” The Lawyers Weekly (8 
July 2005) LB7.   
21
 M. Crain, “The Transformation of the Professional Workforce” (2004) 79:2 Chicago-Kent Law Review 543 at 
577.  
22
 G.W. Adams, “Collective bargaining by salaried professionals” in P. Slayton & M.J. Trebilcock, eds., The 
Professions and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 264 at 270. 
23
 D. Klegon, “The Sociology of Professions: An Emerging Perspective” (1978) 5:3 Work and Occupations 259 at 
269. 
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marketplace afforded them a strong sense of entrepreneurialism, secure self-employment and 
small law firm ownership, along with the idealization of petty capitalist interests that encouraged 
lawyers to maximize the labour of their staff (than stand beside them in a common cause of 
worker advancement).  While some researchers have re-conceptualized professionalization and 
unionization as contending processes in the struggle of an occupational group to achieve work 
autonomy, improved wages, and better working conditions,
24
 others pointed out that lawyers do 
not fit within the paradigm of organized labour because they have limited use for unions.  They 
maintained that lawyers achieve occupational status, prestige, and income from a monopoly that 
is sustained through state bar associations (the equivalent of provincial law societies in 
Canada).
25
  This presumption, however, needs revisiting as ongoing structural changes in legal 
practice, some of which have already been noted above, expose growing fissures in the 
profession’s market control from which its practitioners’ economic self-sufficiency flows.   
 
Work restructuring in the practice of law abets the process of deprofessionalization and 
will cause a decline in the autonomy and monopolistic privileges of various lawyers in Canada.
26
  
Raelin proposed deprofessionalization may incite professionals to unionize as a way to stave off 
structural forces from eroding the power base of the occupation.
27
  However, due to scant 
academic interest in why lawyers collectively bargain in the first place, we simply lack a clear 
baseline to assess whether, in the face of disruptive practice developments intensifying, law firm 
associates and other employed counsel would continue to scorn unionization (while members of 
the Canadian public sector bar already exert their group influence through employee 
representatives).  The few available studies on the subject offer a toehold to spark the overdue 
and multifaceted debate about lawyers reorganizing conventional practice arrangements by 
adopting collective bargaining.   
                                                 
24
 M.R.  Haug & M.B.  Sussman, “Professionalization and Unionism:  A Jurisdictional Dispute” in E. Freidson, ed., 
The Professions and Their Prospects (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972) 89 at 100.     
25
 S.A. Levitan & F.  Gallo, “Collective Bargaining and Private Sector Professionals” (September 1989) Monthly 
Labor Review 24 at 25; S. Milner, “The legal professions and trade unionism: the ‘Dicey’ dilemma” (1990) 21:4 
Industrial Relations Journal 298 at 307-308. 
26
 R.A. Rothman, “Deprofessionalization: The Case of Law in America” (1984) 11:2 Work and Occupations 183 at 
185. For a critique of the deprofessionalization thesis’ application to lawyers see S.L. Roach Anlue “The Legal 
Profession in the United States and Australia: Deprofessionalization or Reorganization” (1992) 19:2 Work & 
Occupations 184 at 199-200.     
27
 J.A. Raelin, “Unionization and professionalization: Which comes first?” (1989) 10:2 Journal of Organizational 
Behaviour 101 at 113. 
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In their now classic treatise of the Canadian legal profession, Stager and Arthurs skim the 
topic of lawyer unionization.  The study’s panoptic focus and finding of variations in statutory 
coverage for lawyers in different federal and provincial jurisdictions allowed the authors to limit 
the discussion by posing three rhetorical questions: (1) should lawyers be excluded from 
collective bargaining?  (2) can unionized lawyers fully withdraw legal services? (3) does a 
professional obligation prohibit them from doing so?
28 
 Thornicroft’s examination into collective 
bargaining by Canadian lawyers clarified that the federal government and the provinces of 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, British Columbia, and Ontario engage in some form of 
collective negotiations with Crown Attorneys, staff lawyers or legal aid lawyers.
29
  The 
exploratory orientation of his study illustrated an immature state of knowledge on the subject (as 
of 1993, the time of article publication).  Thornicroft’s findings were reported through the 
themes of legal environment, lawyers’ unions and collective bargaining, and professional 
responsibility, and he speculated that lawyers would be attracted to collective bargaining to 
improve wages, increase job security, and protect professional concerns.  Certain groups of 
public sector lawyers were excluded from Thornicroft’s analysis because of statutory bans on 
lawyer unionization that existed in the provinces in which they practiced.  In 2000, the situation 
changed in one of those jurisdictions, Nova Scotia, after the province recognized the Nova Scotia 
Crown Attorneys Association and signed a framework agreement that allowed joint negotiations 
over salaries as part of an initial collective bargaining relationship with their members.  
Campbell analyzed the policy adjustment that circumvented legislation prohibiting counsel from 
organizing and went on to author a doctoral dissertation in the field of management studies.  She 
focussed on how occupational community allowed Crown prosecutors to syncretise the dual 
market closure strategies of professionalization and collective bargaining in order to assert 
greater control over their labour.
30
  Lawyers’ motivations for pursuing collective bargaining were 
tested in relation to closure theory, a fundamental concept derived from sociology, in addition to 
being cast to understand the different bureaucratized conditions Nova Scotia’s prosecutors 
laboured under.   
 
                                                 
28
 Stager & Arthurs, supra note 18 at 274.   
29
 K.W.M. Thornicroft, “Lawyers and Collective Bargaining In the Canadian Public Sector” (1993) 22:2 Journal of 
Collective Negotiations in the Public Service 137 at 144.    
30
 S. Campbell, Continental Drift in the Legal Profession: The struggle for collective bargaining amongst Nova 
Scotia’s Crown Prosecutors (PhD Dissertation, St. Mary’s University, 2010) [unpublished].  
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Organized labour ruminated on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2001 ruling of Dunmore 
v. Ontario (Attorney General)
31
 as a touchstone for organizing droves of professional workers, 
including associate lawyers in large law firms.
32
  In that case, the nation’s highest court 
determined that the province of Ontario had a duty to protect the fundamental freedom of 
vulnerable workers to form associations by prohibiting employer interference.  Despite union 
plans for parlaying jurisprudence into an organizing movement, the campaign fizzled. A decade 
later, in fall 2012, lawyers employed by Legal Aid Ontario became the newest group of 
practitioners to demand that an intractable employer voluntarily recognize them in a collective 
bargaining relationship.
33
  The situation of Legal Aid Ontario lawyers illustrates that when 
labour legislation restricts Canadian public and private sector lawyers from its application, there 
is no opportunity to research the circumstances that compel lawyers to adopt collective 
bargaining since there is no critical incident to explore.  Without such an occurrence, the 
empirical basis for undertaking such a study is lacking and it leaves researchers desirous of any 
new developments for moving the subject past its stasis.  
 
A significant breakthrough for the academic study of public sector lawyer unionization, 
however, finally occurred when lawyers working for the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ)—
the bureau that represents the Canadian government in legal matters—were recognized as 
employees under new federal labour legislation.  Since 1967, the Public Service Staff Relations 
Act,
34
 the statute responsible for introducing and regulating collective bargaining in the civil 
service of Canada, deemed the positions of DOJ lawyers as managerial or confidential and 
prohibited these professionals from forming or being represented by an employee organization.  
That prohibition ended on 1 April 2005, with the Public Service Labour Relations Act
35
 coming 
into force, repealing the PSSRA, and acknowledging that non-management DOJ lawyers could 
now collectively bargain some thirty-five years after the right was first denied to them.  On 28 
April 2006, the Public Service Labour Relations Board (PSLRB) certified the Association of 
                                                 
31
 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) [2001] 3 SCR 1016, 2001 SCC 94 (CanLII). 
32
 R. Mackie, “Ontario unions prepare for new membership drives” The Global and Mail (22 December 2001) A6. 
33
 Legal Aid Ontario Lawyers Campaign to Secure Collective Bargaining Rights, online: The Campaign 
<http://laolawyers.ca/the-campaign/> (date accessed: 25 October 2013). 
34
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Justice Council
36
 (AJC) as the exclusive bargaining agent for an amalgamated unit consisting of 
2,500 non-management lawyers employed at the DOJ and some one hundred other lawyers from 
various federal departments and agencies who were previously represented by the Professional 
Institute Public Service of Canada.
37
  
 
The AJC’s bargaining unit represents the single largest group of public sector lawyers in 
Canada who are unionized and collectively bargain.  An estimated ten thousand lawyers 
employed by municipal, provincial, and federal governments comprise the Canadian public 
sector bar, which means that roughly one-quarter of all Canadian government lawyers work in 
the service of the federal Crown.
38
  Despite their numbers and significance, DOJ lawyers are 
federal public servants whose encounters with unionization and first contract negotiations have 
not yet been explored.  An empirical study such as this one is therefore justified in order to 
understand their experience with both events.  
 
1.3    Study Purpose & Research Question  
This dissertation aims to expand knowledge about Canadian lawyer unionism by studying 
non-management DOJ lawyers joining the ranks of organized professional labour.  Unionization 
is understood as the process by which a group of workers elect an employee representative 
(which a labour board legally certifies and empowers) to negotiate terms and conditions of 
employment with an employer.  The two research questions guiding this inquiry are: (1) what led 
DOJ lawyers to unionize with the AJC? and (2) what was the AJC’s experience in negotiating a 
first collective agreement?  Through analysis and interpretation of the data available to answer 
these questions, I have created a descriptive theory in the form of an account that covers the 
                                                 
36
 The AJC is identified in French as L'Association des juristes du ministère de la Justice (AJJ).  For the purposes of 
this study, the English spelling and abbreviation are used. 
37
 The Law Group bargaining unit is composed of three streams of members.  The vast majority of constituents are 
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The third group involves roughly one hundred bargaining unit members formerly represented by the Professional 
Institute of the Public Service of Canada, which included lawyers working at the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, Veterans Affairs, International Trade Tribunal, Immigration Refugee Board, and the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission, as well as any other departments and agencies outside of the DOJ. 
The study adopts DOJ lawyers as the broad identifier for the entire bargaining unit unless otherwise specified.  
38
 “Calling all public sector lawyers” The National 5:3 (May 1996) at 38, cited in D.  MacNair, “The Role of the 
Federal Public Sector Lawyer:  From Polyester to Silk” (2001) 50 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 125 at 
125 [hereinafter “Polyester to Silk”].     
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transition of DOJ lawyers between individual employment and labour relations regimes, and the 
process of the AJC legitimizing the collective bargaining relationship through a negotiated first 
labour agreement. The nature of the investigation allows for at least three key study objectives 
and proposes that the best research practice is to conduct the project as a case study.   
 
1.4   Study Objectives 
1.4.1   Unionization among Professionals       
 The academic and union investigation of neo–liberal deregulation of Western economies 
and labour markets also explores the decline of union density and prospects for regeneration.39  
Professional employees are often drawn to unions after determining that working in 
organizations under rigid administrations, and lacking the ability to influence management 
prejudices their occupational interests.40  Studies have looked at this issue to explore, for 
example, why associations representing American professors adopted collective bargaining, or to 
test and predict union-voting intentions of pharmacists and doctors in response to a top-down 
model of corporate bureaucracy that undermines professional values, autonomy, and work 
standards.   
 
Hutcheson’s historiography determined that, during the 1970s, faculty transformed 
chapters of the Association of University Professors into bargaining agents to defend against 
university administration interfering with their academic freedom, to increase faculty 
participation in governance, and to improve members’ economic status.41  In 1999, the American 
Pharmaceutical Association amended its policy to support pharmacists joining unions, while the 
American Medical Association also passed a resolution endorsing unions by forming a 
bargaining unit for physicians.  McHugh and Bodah’s nationwide survey findings of pharmacists 
                                                 
39
 J. B. Rose & G.N. Chaison, “Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: The Prospects for 
Revival” (2001) 56:1 Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 34 at 56; AFL-CIO, Rising Tide –Professionals: 
The New Face of America’s Unions (Washington: Department for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO, 2003) at iii, 
online: DFPE, AFL-CIO <http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/RisingTide-Final.pdf> (date accessed: 24 April 
2014); R. W. Hurd & J. Bunge, “Unionization of Professional and Technical Workers: The Labor Market and 
Institutional Transformation” in R.B Freeman, J. Hersch & L. Mishel, eds., Emerging Labor Market Institutions for 
the Twenty First Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 179 at 180. 
40
 T.M. Hovekamp, “Professional Associations or Unions? A Comparative Look” (1997) 46:2 Library Trends 232 at 
238-239.    
41
 P.A. Hutcheson, Unionization, Bureaucratization, and the AAUP: A Professional Professoriate (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2000) at 173. 
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determined positive union voting intentions based on beliefs of union instrumentality enhancing 
professional development, controlling workload, and improving quality of patient care.42  In 
another study, McHugh and his colleagues found receptivity among corporately employed staff 
pharmacists towards voting for a union due to increased workloads, lack of voice over practice 
conditions, and existing union presence in the industry.43  Similarly, when young physicians 
were surveyed for their assessment of unionism, a sample of 359 respondents (43 percent of 835) 
reported support for unionization, which they believed could countervail the profit-driven 
management of health care that lowered levels of patient care, autonomy, incomes, and job 
satisfaction.44  Thompson and Salmon’s mixed methods study found that recouping losses in 
power and authority were reasons why public hospital employee physicians would join a union 
and pursue collective bargaining.45     
 
Organizing campaigns of professionals seldom develop from the exact same 
circumstances.  The workplace environment established by an organization greatly influences the 
propensity to unionize.  Kuhn’s study of unionized engineers showed that the conditions 
prompting one group of employees over another to support a union will vary within a firm and 
from firm to firm.46  This finding suggests that a potential inquiry into a group of professionals 
unionizing at a single employer should be highly contextualized with findings that bear cautious 
generalizations.  Moreover, preference for union representation clearly varies between members 
of different occupations47 and between public and private sector employees.48  A study 
investigating the relatively recent unionization of a group of federal public servants should 
consider Savage and Webber’s finding that Canadian federal government austerity is responsible 
                                                 
42
 P.P. McHugh & M.M. Bodah, “Challenges to Professionalism and Union Voting Intentions: The Case of 
Pharmacists” (2002) 23:4 Journal of Labor Research 659 at 668.  
43
 D.P. Zgarrick, P.P. McHugh & M. Droege “Prevalence of and interest in unionization among staff pharmacists” 
(2006) 2:3 Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy 329 at 342. 
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(2001) 76:10 Academic Medicine 1039 at 1044. 
45
 S.L. Thompson & J.W. Salmon, “Physician Collective Bargaining in a U.S. Public Hospital” (2003) 33:1 
International Journal of Health Services 55 at 72.   
46
 J.W. Kuhn, “Engineers and Their Unions” in A.A. Blum et al., eds., White-Collar Workers (New York Random 
Press, 1971) 83 at 96, 117.  
47
 F. White, “Occupational Determinants of Professional Union Membership” (1997) 52:1 Relations 
industrielles/Industrial Relations 138 at 139.  
48
 J. Fiorito, L. P. Stepina & D.P. Bozeman, “Explaining the Unionism Gap: Public-Private Sector Differences in 
Preferences for Unionization” (1996) 17:3 Journal of Labor Research 463 at 475.  
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for deteriorating work conditions and encroachments on professional autonomy, which is 
drawing professional public servants and unions closer together.49  This drift did not occur in a 
vacuum and it underscores the truism that no bureaucracy is ever greater than the sum of its 
parts; larger federal government retrenchment can impact any of its departments, even the DOJ.  
 
On the other hand, the type and quality of legal practice the DOJ offers its lawyers yields 
intrinsic rewards of employment that are less reproducible at other outfits.  Most DOJ lawyers 
work in modern offices located in the downtown business cores of major Canadian cities.  As the 
DOJ represents the federal government in its legal affairs, its top litigators are often implicated in 
cases of national importance, which demands from them the highest level of advocacy before all 
levels of provincial courts, and sometimes, the Supreme Court of Canada.  Regardless of the 
work performed by DOJ counsel, as civil servants they enjoy the fringe benefits of 
comprehensive group insurance, various leaves and paid vacation, typically less demanding work 
schedules than expected from associates in large law firms, and coverage under the Public 
Service Superannuation Act,50 which governs an enviable pension retirement program.  
 
Decent benefits supplement the federal government paying its workers a fair market 
wage.51  However, salaried professionals report earning less than their self-employed 
counterparts and this financial strain represents a major source of discontent.52  As is the case 
with lawyers, beginning a career with the federal government offers improved job experience 
and career satisfaction in comparison to lawyering in private practice.53  Over time, though, 
noticeable discrepancies grow in the wage earning potential between lawyers employed in the 
public and private sectors.  As of summer 2009, and prior to DOJ lawyers obtaining a first 
collective agreement, their salaries were comparable to the national average paid by the lower 
rung of middle-tier law firms (which typically consist of ten to thirty-five lawyers) at up to the 
                                                 
49
 L. Savage & M. Webber, “The Paradox of Professionalism: Unions in the Public Sector” in S. Ross & L. Savage, 
eds.,  Public Sector Unions in the Age of Austerity (Black Point: Fernwood Publishing, 2013) 114 at 124.   
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Century Labour Publications, 1996) at 201.    
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53
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ten years in practice mark.54  Sensational instances of lawyers fixated with profit raise unease 
among regulators and academics over declining professionalism, but to tar government lawyers 
with like cynicism would be a gross mischaracterization.55  A more accurate reflection of the 
prestige of government lawyers is to assess them as falling on a spectrum of affluence between 
that of a solo and law firm practitioner.56   
 
Law is considered a learned and free profession, and its practitioners are thought to shun 
group orientation because of an incompatibility with professional values and social status 
ideology.57  While Taylor and Bain confirm that the way unionism ever gets started in a 
workplace remains unclear, the general aversion of lawyers towards unions adds another layer of 
complexity that blurs the phenomenon this study wishes to investigate.58  A nuanced analysis, 
therefore, should clarify whether feelings of dissatisfaction among DOJ lawyers stemmed from 
poor employment conditions, from a general malaise over a lack of influence in the setting of the 
employment contract, or, from some other factor that helped create the right environment for the 
AJC’s popularization.  The first study objective aims to demystify how unionism occurred 
among DOJ lawyers by identifying the context for them supporting the AJC, and it relates to the 
first research question.  In order to accomplish this, a detailing of the AJC’s origin and the 
change in labour legislation allowing for its legalization as a bargaining agent will be addressed.  
 
1.4.2   Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Service   
DOJ lawyers represent the first new group of employees in the federal public service to 
attain a bargaining agent within the last two decades.
59
  Twenty years ago, the Chrétien-led 
Liberals introduced their February 1995 federal budget, with its details for implementing the next 
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steps in Program Review, a bold initiative for axing roughly $17 billion in public service 
expenditures over three years and eliminating 45,000 bureaucratic positions.
60
  Program Review 
continued the government’s plans during the early to mid-1990s of downsizing operations, 
restructuring the service role of the state, and aggressively containing massive debt and 
spending.  A balanced budget for 1997-1998 signalled that the federal government had returned 
to fiscal stability, but it did so in part by freezing the wages of civil servants and suspending 
collective bargaining with their unions.  Ultimately, the federal government’s plans for 
revitalizing strained labour-management relations after a tumultuous decade came to a head in 
2003 with the Public Service Modernization Act.
61
  The statute introduced the PSLRA and its 
revamp of the legal framework governing the federal public sector.     
 
After the PSLRB certified the AJC as a bargaining agent, the union’s tireless president, 
Patrick Jetté’s cautious declaration that “bargaining will take months” proved highly optimistic.62  
In actuality, the protracted battle the AJC undertook to sign a first collective agreement tested the 
union’s mettle in negotiating wage and workplace improvements and unfolded on several fronts.  
At the bargaining table, impasse set in during negotiations between the AJC’s negotiating team 
and delegates from the Treasury Board Secretary who represented the employer, the Treasury 
Board of Canada.  In the public arena, on 13 May 2008, the AJC staged a public rally in front of 
DOJ headquarters in Ottawa to expedite the selection of a chair for first contract arbitration.  
Within political circles, Jetté campaigned before the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Finance against repressive legislation, particularly, the Expenditure Restraint Act,
63
 which 
imposed a five-year, retroactive, public sector wide wage restraint plan that froze the maximum 
salary increases the AJC could attain from collective bargaining or arbitration at roughly the rate 
of inflation.  During contract arbitration, the AJC pursued numerous contract articles covering 
terms and conditions of employment that were not resolved during negotiations or meditation to 
conclude a first collective agreement with the Treasury Board.  Before the Federal Court of 
Canada, the AJC defended a judicial review of the arbitral ruling.  Finally, at the Ontario 
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 L. Scratch, Public Service Reductions in the 1990s: Background and Lessons Learned (Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament, 2010) at 1, online: Library of Parliament <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/2010-
20-e.htm#a2> (last modified 12 April 2010).  
61
 Public Service Modernization Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22 [hereinafter PSMA].  
62
 C. Shmitz, “Labour Board holds Toronto prosecutors to national team” The Lawyers Weekly 26:2 (12 May 2006) 
at 1.   
63
 Expenditure Restraint Act, S.C. 2009, c. 2, s. 393 [hereinafter ERA]. 
15 
 
Superior Court of Justice, the AJC partially won its Charter challenge to the ERA only to have its 
hard-fought victory overruled by the Court of Appeal, and later, the Supreme Court of Canada 
confirming the disposition.
64
  In light of this remarkable course of events, the second research 
objective of this thesis is to detail the anatomy of impasse in negotiations between the AJC and 
the Treasury Board Secretariat and the process of resolution.  The analysis aims to understand 
the AJC’s struggles, triumphs, and evolution in obtaining a first labour contract particular to the 
needs of a pluralistic bargaining unit membership and addresses the second research question.  
 
1.4.3   Department of Justice Canada and its Lawyers as Research Subjects   
It is inconceivable to think of the administration of justice in Canada without the DOJ.  
The DOJ is one of over two hundred departments, agencies and Crown corporations that 
collectively comprise the federal government.  The department enjoys a seminal place in 
Canadian history.  On 1 July 1867, the British North America Act, 1867 came into force, and 
with it, Confederation was complete.  The new dominion of Canada was established under 
Cabinet-parliamentary rule with the governments of Canada and the provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick dividing legislative powers over matters national and 
local in nature.  Governance for the Crown in right of Canada required a legal representative to 
counsel the state on the law of the new land.  So, on 22 May 1868, the First Session of 
Parliament of the Dominion of Canada created the DOJ by adopting its enabling legislation, the 
Department of Justice Act.65  The DOJ’s purpose was to centralize the provision of legal services 
to the federal government and its departments.66  It has since remained as the policy architect for 
successive governments instituting and maintaining Canada as a rule of law nation.  The 
constitutionally entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms coming into force on 17 
April 198267 ushered a fundamental change in the extent of the DOJ’s advisement and litigation 
services and marked a watershed in the modern history of the department.     
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Jurists have studied the Charter imposing novel service obligations on the DOJ.68  Kelly, 
a political scientist, assessed the DOJ’s maturation within state bureaucracy by analyzing the 
department’s supervision over Charter matters and its transformation into an executive support 
agency that sits in the centre of government.69  His examination of the DOJ’s bureaucratic 
activism shed invaluable light on the inner workings of the department’s Executive, Charter, and 
Charter Litigation Committees.  The federal government regularly appealing decisions to the 
Supreme Court of Canada spurred Hennigar, another political scientist, to study patterns of 
strategic behaviour regarding appeals, and yield more insight about officiating at the DOJ.70  
These studies assess stakeholder practices at the department, but, despite their valuable findings, 
their assessments cast staff lawyers as an adjunct to the operations under review.    
 
Revisionist perspectives are developing on DOJ lawyers, positioning them as a discrete 
workforce with an important identity and role.  A growing appreciation for the distinctiveness 
associated with lawyering for the federal Crown is encouraging researchers to unravel the 
bureaucratic anonymity of DOJ counsel.  Former Deputy Minister of Justice John Tait argues 
that government lawyers have a duty to keep their employer bound to good governance 
obligations as they are guardians of the rule of public law and aides to the Minister of Justice.
71
  
Wilner urges DOJ lawyers to serve as virtuous practitioners ascribing to the highest standards of 
professional and ethical lawyering, which are inherent values necessary when lawyering for 
Canada.
72
  MacNair used the insight developed from her many years of practice at the DOJ to fill 
a gap in research on government lawyers by writing several articles that focus on: the work 
profiles of the DOJ’s Crown prosecutors, civil litigators, legislative drafters, legal advisors, and 
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policy counsel;
73
 outlining the system of ethical standards and obligations governing legislative 
drafters
74
 and federal Crown prosecutors;
75
 arguing for the public interest as an objective legal 
standard in the professional ethics of Crown prosecutors;
76
 and canvassing the interaction 
between public sector lawyers and solicitor-client privilege.
77
  The courts have found that 
government lawyers are duty-bound by provincial law society Rules of Professional Conduct to 
conscientiously observe legal ethics in daily practice, while academics have wisely pointed out 
that unlike their colleagues in the private sector, public sector lawyers are subjected to public 
service codes of conduct that oblige them, as civil servants, to maintain public trust and integrity 
in government as a condition of employment.
78
  It is fitting that as DOJ lawyers attract greater 
attention due to practice responsibilities associated with representing their client, they should be 
further distinguished in the legal and labour studies literature as professionals attempting to 
democratize their workplace through collective bargaining.  A third objective of this thesis is to 
foment interest in DOJ lawyers as a research population by showing that unionization under the 
AJC has increased the level of employee voice available to them.   
 
1.5 Research Design: Case Study 
The nature of the social phenomena being explored often informs the particular research 
framework used to structure and conduct an inquiry.79  When the inquiry involves an 
organization, a case study methodology is typically suggested.80  In fact, Yin proposes the case 
study as the ideal research approach for analyzing the complexity of an event within an 
organization.81  The case study is a valued strategy for teasing out the interactions between the 
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circumstances and processes that drive employee behaviours.82  This project’s thesis, for 
example, encourages structuring the inquiry as a case study since it seeks a detailed account 
covering the who, what, where, and when of a phenomenon, which Clardy proposes offers a 
sound rubric for investigating change within an organization.83  A case study is also the 
appropriate method for this project since the intrinsic aspect of the thesis seeks knowledge about 
DOJ lawyers that makes its findings difficult to generalize to other workplaces.84  In addition, the 
idiographic aspect of the study directs attention to uncovering and describing the complexities 
that drive the outcomes at a single organization, which so happens to have the repute of being 
Canada’s largest law firm.85   
 
1.6   Study Organization and Significance to Audiences 
So far, this chapter has addressed the three questions associated with introducing a 
dissertation: (1) what is the purpose of the research? (2) what is the context of the research? (3) 
how will the research be conducted?86  It now turns to outlining the study’s remaining 
organization.  The literature review presented in chapter 2 maps and synthesizes the academic 
study of lawyer unionization to yield research issues that are relevant to this inquiry and that are 
used to explore the research questions.  Chapter 3 elaborates on the reasons for structuring the 
research design as a case study, as well as touching on the methodological synergism between 
socio-legal and qualitative research that finds its way into the structure of this project. The 
chapter’s discussion also focuses on data collection and analysis procedures along with the 
criteria used for improving the quality of study findings.   
 
 With the background chapters setting the study’s foundation in place, I use chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 to directly address the research questions.  Chapter 4 explains DOJ lawyers’ exclusion 
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from the PSSRA and outlines management’s structuring of the individual employment 
relationship in the absence of a bargaining agent up and until 1990.  This fourth chapter also 
introduces the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee, (LOAC), which was the AJC’s forerunner.  
Chapter 5 provides a historical analysis of events leading to LOAC’s transformation into the AJC 
that are traced to June 1990, when a significant development in DOJ compensation policy 
occurred: lawyers employed at the Toronto Regional Office received an exclusive wage premium 
known as the “Toronto differential”.  The chapter describes how redressing the Toronto 
differential helped LOAC generate popular employee support for initially forming the AJC as a 
professional employee association, and, later, successfully campaigning for recognition as an 
employee organization once the PSLRA allowed for unionization.  Chapter 6 presents the AJC’s 
efforts at completing a first collective agreement and the process of resolution after impasse in 
negotiations set in, and the ERA cut off the free determination of salaries.   Chapter 7 importantly 
concludes the study by analyzing the findings from the previous chapters in order assess how the 
study’s objectives were met and to consider some of the study’s implications.87  All together, I 
develop an argument that considers how DOJ lawyers’ desire for workplace representation and 
improved wages, executive level support from the Deputy Minister of Justice, Morris Rosenberg, 
and introduction of the PSLRA aided the creation and development of the AJC into a vehicle that 
facilitated the unionization process. At the same time, I propose that the AJC negotiated a first 
collective agreement with an employer who engaged in hard bargaining that lead to deadlocked 
negotiations, but was conduct, nonetheless, the courts concluded afforded the AJC a meaningful 
process of collective bargaining prior to the ERA’s enactment.  
  
In short, this dissertation offers insight, analysis, and discussion that should interest a 
varied readership.  The significance of its findings for DOJ lawyers is in the practical insight into 
the DOJ as an employer, a history on the union that now serves as their representative at work, 
and how the first collective agreement that governed their employment came to be.  For 
researchers of professional labour movements, particularly among lawyers, the study offers a 
look into the procedures and strategies involved in reaching a first labour contract and the 
techniques used by a union’s leadership to build and maintain group cohesion during difficult 
negotiations with a steadfast employer.  Finally, the AJC’s recourse to Charter litigation to 
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counteract legislated interference in the collective bargaining process attempts to use novel 
Supreme Court of Canada precedent to secure judicial remedies, which should be of interest to 
all labour scholars who follow unions’ attempts to protect and expand the legal rights of their 
members.   
 
 
 
 
21 
 
C H A P T E R 2:  Literature Review     
  
2.1   Introduction 
In chapter 1, I argued that legal services providers are proliferating in Canada, but it is 
important to note that the arena most influenced by their expansion is the private sector market, 
which consists of individuals and businesses.  The consumers of other legal services, such as 
federal, provincial, and municipal governments, which comprise a limited public sector base, are 
less affected.  Governments have most of their legal needs met by staff lawyers who are trained 
as specialists in discrete areas of law and whose practices are guided by an ethos of public 
service. One unique facet of government lawyering (and not performed in private practice) is 
advising parliamentarians on new laws and drafting regulations and legislation.  Bloomquist 
posits that government lawyers face greater challenges than private sector counsel for 
incorporating vital virtues into their practice.  He reasons that since their work is open to public 
scrutiny and exposure to media, government lawyers must juggle serving multiple constituents, 
for which, they are inadequately paid and overextended in their duties.
88
  These two points 
represent some of the many findings jurists have made by exploring the dichotomy that separates 
public from private practice when studying: the specialized training of government counsel;
89
 
their importance to government;
90
 the nuances of federal government lawyering that entail 
distinct career patterns;
91
 ethical duties upon transfer between public and private sector 
employers;
92
 client representation;
93
 policy influence;
94
 ethics;
95
 and the special professional 
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responsibilities of federal prosecutors
96
 and civil litigators.
97
  Despite these important studies, 
scholarly work focussing on government lawyers remains a niche area that is primarily 
concerned with practice issues, and as such, stands underdeveloped in comparison to studies on 
lawyers in the private sector.   
The disparity in research output between the two groups of practitioners can be traced to 
at least the 1980s, when Canadian lawyers remained foreign to the research of jurists and 
sociologists.
98
  There are two appraisals that summarized the output of scholarship at that time: 
one on the level of knowledge on government lawyers in particular (by White), and another on 
the Canadian legal profession in general (by Stager and Arthurs).  White’s evaluation found that, 
“almost nothing has been written about government lawyers in this country,”99 while Stager and 
Arthurs noted how little is actually known about the legal profession in Canada.
100
  Afterwards, 
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when investigators studied the legal profession in greater detail, their works demonstrated the 
fact that the experiences and issues of practitioners in the much larger, more visible, and higher 
profile private sector were more amenable to research and bore greater relevance to broader 
intellectual currents than those circulating around lawyers employed by government.  We can 
appreciate these inquiries for developing a scholarship on the identity of private sector 
practitioners, their role in law firms, practice ideals and individual achievements which educates 
on: professional ethics,
101
 gender
102
 and racial equality in the profession
103
 as well as the ethnic 
diversification of the bar,
104
 and popular conceptions of lawyers.
105
  However, researchers 
excluding public sector lawyers from their general purview results in the same sorts of 
shortcomings identified on studies of American government lawyers when applied to the 
Canadian milieu.  The identified limitations are various and include the following critiques: little 
research exists on government lawyers (other than public defenders and prosecutors);
106
 
government lawyers are not subjects of sustained empirical investigation;
107
 few studies observe 
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the work processes of government legal bureaucracies;
108
 the specific practice issues facing 
federal government lawyers invites greater attention;
109
 and their roles are typically 
misunderstood.
110
  MacNair, Hutchinson, and Dodek each found that there is insufficient 
knowledge and understanding about government lawyering in Canada, which, given the above 
cited limitations of existing research, should stir little amazement.
111
  Today’s researchers, 
therefore, have an important and overdue task ahead of them in raising the study of government 
lawyers to a refined discipline within studies of the Canadian legal profession.       
 
The exclusion of government lawyers from mainstream studies on the legal profession 
does not mean that a dearth of theory or research exists on lawyers unionizing.  In this instance, a 
review of relevant literature calls for an interdisciplinary and integrative design
112
 that draws on 
studies from the disciplines of law and the social sciences.  The bifurcated format provides a 
natural organization for this chapter.  The first section maps and synthesizes the legal scholarship 
addressing the introduction of unionization and collective bargaining to the legal profession and 
its impact on the practice of law.  Since American jurists detailing the law of attorney 
unionization are responsible for an initial phase of research, this will be discussed under the 
theme of lawyer unions as legal construct.  Following this, the review considers the academic 
legal research on the interaction between collective bargaining and professional ethics and 
responsibility.  The first half of the review ends with a summary of the most current writing 
appearing in the law journals today, which argues that salaried lawyers should pursue collective 
bargaining to oppose worsening employment conditions.   
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The second part of the literature review canvasses the social scientific literature on 
professional unionization, particularly sociology’s subfield of interest in the professions.  The 
review identifies two arguments—professional proletarianization and process actor—that 
consider bureaucracy can be a catalyst (or one of many) for sparking collective action by 
professionals aimed at remedying underlying sources of work dissatisfaction.  Finally, the review 
analyzes Campbell’s study of Nova Scotia prosecutors turning to collective bargaining as an 
example of the theorization behind provincial government lawyers following the lead of other 
organized counsel in the public sector.  The format of this chapter is to first analyze findings 
from the studies and then to discuss the key concepts arising from the review.  The concepts 
identified from the evaluation help shape the research issues that offer a focal point for collecting 
and discussing data by which this study’s central research questions are investigated.113    
 
2.2   Part I: Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Lawyer Unionization  
2.2.1  Lawyer Unions as Legal Construct  
The unions responsible for organizing growing masses of white-collar employees, whose 
proportion of the American workforce in the 1950s rivaled that of blue-collar labourers,
114
 would 
eventually force the National Labor Relations Board
115
 to determine whether lawyers had the 
right to be represented by a labour organization.  The 1948 case of Lumberman’s Mutual 
Casualty Co. represented the first such instance of the NLRB granting attorneys separate 
bargaining unit recognition and protection under the NLRA as professional employees.
116
  As 
public sector employees (including public sector attorneys) were excluded from NLRA coverage, 
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U.S. federal government attorneys waited until 17 January 1962 for President John F. Kennedy 
to sign Executive Order 10988 into law before they could collectively bargain through employee 
organizations.  These two advances in labour law led the authors of a seminal 1971 law review 
article, “The Unionization of Attorneys”, to reason that, with enshrined laws in place, there 
should be a frank discussion of the legal and ethical issues related to in-house corporate and 
government lawyers joining unions.
117
  This initial study was significant for demonstrating a 
stock mode of analysis regarding the statutory laws and jurisprudence covering attorney 
unionization and the ethical implications of lawyers’ membership in a union.   The authors 
determined that the majority of lawyers employed in a single-client relationship enjoyed 
protection under the NLRA, but the right was illusory if the American Bar Association (ABA), (a 
national body of lawyers responsible for monitoring the profession and accrediting law schools), 
determined that union involvement violated rules of professional conduct.  Four opinions issued 
by the ABA under its past Canons of Professional Ethics demonstrated a gradual shift from 
opposition to reluctant observance of collectivized lawyers.  These opinions set the background 
for the ABA’s newly promulgated, but not yet interpreted, Ethical Consideration 5-13 
(Consideration 5-13) of the new Code of Professional Responsibility, which addressed lawyer 
membership in an organization of employees.  The authors argued that the ABA’s concerns over 
potential ethical violations triggered by lawyers joining unions (whose ranks extended beyond 
attorneys) and the withdrawal of legal representation in the event of strikes and work stoppages, 
should not trump interpretations of Consideration 5-13 that would chill first amendment rights of 
freedom of association.  
 
On 4 May 1977, the United File Room Clerks and Messengers made American labour 
law history by having the NLRB overturn a previously dismissed petition to represent clerical 
employees at a law firm in Boston, Massachusetts.  In Foley, Hoag & Eliot,
118
 the NLRB under 
section 14(c) of the NLRA asserted jurisdiction for the first time over private law firms provided 
that they met appropriate jurisdictional standards.  On 27 May 1977, the NLRB’s ruling in 
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Wayne County Neighbourhood Services,
119
 confirmed that non-management, staff lawyers of 
affiliates of the Legal Services Corporation (publicly funded, non-profit legal services provider 
for the indigent) were professional employees within the meaning of the NLRA and could form 
or join unions.  The NLRB’s assertion of jurisdiction over law firms and legal service clinics 
created a golden opportunity for the labour movement to seize and make significant inroads 
among different types of law workers.  Speculation on unions infiltrating the legal profession 
raised an open issue canvassed by several jurists: under the NLRA, would the NLRB consider 
private law firm associates as professional employees capable of forming bargaining units?   
   
One faction of commentators determined that the NLRB would interpret NLRA 
jurisprudence to extend coverage to lawyers throughout the profession.  One author, Norton, saw 
a “green light for future lawyer unionization” based on the NLRB likely finding that private 
sector lawyers were professional employees under the NLRA because of unclear distinctions in 
responsibilities between professional and managerial job categories and given the ABA’s 
acceptance (in 1975) of lawyers belonging to unions.
120
  Additionally, Norton noted that lawyers 
should only be excluded from bargaining units where loyalty to an employer interfered with an 
attorney’s effective participation in union activities.  Finally, Norton traced the ABA’s reversal 
of position towards attorney unionization through a series of its opinions leading to Informal 
Opinion 1325, which interpreted the Code of Professional Responsibility to contain no 
disciplinary rule prohibiting the membership of lawyers in either unions or associations.  In 
another, like-minded evaluation, Starrett remarked that the, “time of unionized law firm has 
arrived”.121  He determined the ABA’s ambiguity to lawyer representation by a union, along with 
the Supreme Court’s position on the legal profession, created a likelihood that lawyers employed 
by law firms would be allowed to organize; however, he believed that associates of small to 
moderate-sized establishments were uninterested in unions.
122
  The study had an applied goal of 
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alerting counsel to the practical unionization issues of the right to work doctrine, organizational 
solicitation, strikes, and the confidentiality of attorneys as necessary considerations in the event 
of union organizing at a law firm.   
 
Other studies tested Foley against existing labour jurisprudence in order to discover 
whether labour law was heading in a direction that supported employees of private law firms 
unionizing.  Vairo asked whether the NLRB possessed the constitutional authority to assert 
jurisdiction over private law firms and, just as importantly, whether it should exercise that 
authority.
123
  The author determined that the purposes of the NLRA were not thwarted by the 
NLRB asserting jurisdiction because, one, law firms exert a substantial effect on commerce and, 
second, that employer arguments proposing possible breaches of attorney client privilege or 
conflict of interests should not preclude law firm employees from statutory coverage on 
confidentiality grounds (except possibly for lawyers employed at firms with a substantial labour 
practice).  Vairo identified emergent legal issues surrounding appropriate bargaining units for 
associate attorneys, paralegals and clerical staff.   In another study, Stavitsky also believed that a 
looming issue before the NLRB was the need to define and organize appropriate bargaining units 
within a private law firm.
124
  He raised ethical concerns associated with lawyers forming 
bargaining units and addressed them by cautioning attorneys to avoid conflicts of interests 
between client and union and to prevent divulging confidential information.  Stavitsky remarked 
that, “beyond a consideration of jurisdictional issues and the formation of an appropriate 
bargaining unit, there is little left to be discussed”.125  The observation highlighted that prospects 
for future research rested with new developments such as bargaining issues, employer unfair 
labour practices and union countermeasures.  The article’s other focus, a finding that 
jurisdictional standards regarding the unionization of lawyers were resolved, was drawn from 
analyzing the NLRB’s reasoning in Wayne County and developments from other cases as well as 
advisory opinions on unionized lawyers employed by quasi-governmental legal service agencies. 
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By contrast, in their assessments of NLRA’s jurisprudence on professional workers and 
collective bargaining, another group of jurists argued against unionization spreading within the 
private bar.  Ackels doubted that law firm associates would gain coverage under the NLRA as 
representing the firm, binding the firm in court and contributing to firm policy and rules anointed 
them with qualities of management.
126
  Ackels determined also that law firm associates were 
confidential employees because of the right of confidentiality owed to firm clients, and 
highlighted that grievances and arbitrations involving unionized counsel may result in the 
impermissible release of employer records with client information obtained through the solicitor-
client relationship.  Sloan was another jurist who expressed reservations towards the NLRB 
recognizing bargaining units that were comprised solely of law firm associates because their job 
responsibilities arguably made them supervisors.
127
  Secondly, she uncovered a potential 
limitation on the NLRB’s jurisdiction after reviewing the muddled doctrine of labour law pre-
emption (along with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility) to reveal that, where unfair 
labour practices of the employer form part of an attorney grievance, the matter is whether the 
conduct is characterized as local in nature, and beyond NLRB authority.
128
 
 
The short-term projections cast by jurists on the future of union organizing in the legal 
profession were verified by a 1981 BNA monograph that assessed post-Foley and Wayne County 
legal and legislative developments, elections, strikes, and union organizing at private law firms, 
legal services agencies, and within the public sector.
129
  The monograph reported empirical 
evidence via court document analysis and interviews with union organizers and labour lawyers.  
Findings revealed that from June 1977 to May 1980, no elections involving law firms under the 
jurisdiction of the NLBR took place, but that forty-one elections were conducted at legal service 
agencies.
130
 Legal staff was represented at several law firms by the employer voluntarily 
recognizing bargaining agents.  Interview findings with union organizers uncovered that the 
issues of wages, working conditions, and job security involved in organizing private law firm 
secretaries, clerks, and paralegals were no different than those reported by other office 
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workers.
131
  Moreover, at legal services clinics, lawyers formed unions, not because they were 
seen a way to improve wages, but to assert greater say in the operation of programs for indigent 
clients.
132
  Lawyers employed by the federal government were found to organize into large 
professional units that were agency wide.  The monograph conjectured that a critical variable in 
the extent of future unionization would be the responsiveness of a law firm modernizing its 
personnel practices.
133
  Coincidentally, Lewis, labour counsel to law firms and one of the 
interviewees for BNA investigators wrote his own commentary, arguing that the union 
movement was a continuing threat for law firms with “staggering” consequences in the event of 
organizing success.
134
  He proposed a preventative, anti-union employee relations strategy for 
law firm administrators to stave off unions.  
 
2.2.2  The Ethics of Lawyer Union Membership  
Another research topic identified from the law articles involves the interplay between 
union membership and professional ethics.  Professional ethics are protocols of behaviour for 
members of the legal profession that are embodied through rules of professional conduct.  They 
prescribe minimum standards of care that guide practitioner discretion in the appropriate 
representation of clients, the responsible provision of services and management of a law practice, 
and the fulfillment of obligations to the profession, the courts, and the public.  Lawyers 
demonstrate an affinity for professionalism
135
 and their professionalism has been measured by 
making services available to people.
136
   
 
There are few ethical issues that expose a unionized lawyer to greater self-reflection than 
effecting strike action while still respecting an individual obligation to uphold professional 
responsibilities. Strikes forcefully aim to secure some fundamental benefit from an employer 
after collective bargaining and conciliation fails.  The presumption is that professionals should 
not strike because it is unbecoming of service values.  Lawyers take strikes very seriously 
because strikes can interfere with the functioning of courts and undermine public trust in the 
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administration of justice.  On a more intimate scale, lawyers withdrawing services that unfairly 
cause a denial of service may result in complaints to a law society by former clients who allege 
misconduct.  Consequently, jurists have keenly followed the way that lawyers have reconciled 
professional ethics with participation in strike activity. 
 
Because of their disruptive nature, lawyer strikes seldom happen, and when they do, the 
variables responsible for their genesis and outcome make for a rich topic of investigation.  In 
October 1982, criminal defense attorneys of the New York Legal Aid Society went on strike for 
ten weeks over low pay and prohibitive case loads. Arthur critiqued Ethical Opinion 82-75, 
(Opinion) an advisory statement issued by the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committee), which commented on the 
ethical implications of a hypothetical strike.
137
  The Opinion addressed silence from the ABA’s 
Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA’s Code) on the ethical responsibility of lawyers 
considering strike action, but Arthur believed that it misleadingly communicated that strikes 
were unethical.  Arthur critiqued the Opinion’s lack of specificity and found inconsistencies in 
the Opinion’s application of several disciplinary rules of the ABA’s Code regarding client 
neglect and attorney withdrawal from representation in its conclusion on when lawyers can 
ethically strike.  He advocated the Committee reverse its position. A review of the ABA’s Code 
and the recently proposed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct found that the strike by 
legal aid staff attorneys to improve the quality of client representation was permissible and 
ethically appropriate.  Arthur proposed modifying the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct to sanction and clarify the right of attorneys to strike.     
 
As Arthur’s review of the striking lawyers demonstrated, legal services were withdrawn 
in the interim so that the longer term consequences of continued practice under taxing work 
conditions could be addressed.  Concerns for the integrity of the judicial system under the banner 
of minimum standards of competent representation motivated other legal aid criminal defense 
lawyers to boycott providing their services as well.  In 1983, roughly one hundred court-
appointed private criminal defense lawyers practicing in the District of Columbia banded under 
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the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) and withdrew their services over poor 
pay and burdensome caseloads.  Lawyers continued representing indigent clients under retainer, 
but refused to accept new cases.  Within two weeks, the boycott forced the District of Columbia 
City to introduce legislation increasing wages.  Klein detailed the judicial history and outcome of 
the Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiating an anti-trust suit against 
the SCTLA claiming they illegally fixed prices and that their boycott constituted unfair methods 
of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.138  On final appeal by the FTC to the 
United States Supreme Court, a majority decision ruled that the boycott violated anti-trust 
laws.139  Klein found that the ruling thwarted lawyers from using organized labour’s tactics. 
 
2.2.3  Current Applications: Unions Saving Lawyers  
When Midwood and Vitacco rekindled the subject of American lawyers unionizing, their 
article mixed old and new insights to create a modern treatment of the topic.140  Like previous 
works, along with consideration of ABA Committee Opinions on lawyers and unions, they 
analyzed the case law regarding lawyers qualifying as professional employees under the NLRA 
based on distinctions between supervisory and managerial exceptions.  Where Midwood and 
Vitacco’s analysis tread new ground was in its singling out of legal aid lawyers, private court-
appointed counsel, and staff attorneys in public defender’s offices that were facing low wages, 
long hours, and difficult working conditions.  The article proposed collective bargaining as a way 
to remedy the plight of these lawyers and allow them to meet their ethical obligations.  The paper 
outlined how unionized lawyers could strike for workplace justice and offered proposals for 
modifying labour law in order to square collective bargaining with professional responsibilities.     
 
In 2003, when sixteen associates at the Phoenix, Arizona, law firm of Parker Stanbury 
voted to unionize under the Teamsters, they became the first group to have succeeded among 
private sector lawyers in America.
141
  A first contract was never completed as the Los Angeles 
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based owners of the branch office specializing in pre-paid legal services folded the operation.
142
  
To date, it appears that organizing success at Parker Stanbury, much like Foley, has not propelled 
other lawyers to follow suit.  Despite few examples, Chin believed that America’s Great 
Recession of 2008 created the climate for law firm associates to begin unionizing en masse.
143
  
Like Midwood and Vitacco, Chin tied lawyers organizing to the larger, white-collar unionization 
movement in America.  Her article’s analysis addressed NLRA case law allowing lawyers to 
unionize, and countered employer objections that associates bore confidential or managerial 
employee qualities, or should otherwise be prohibited from collectively bargaining due to ethical 
and professional responsibilities. Chin’s article updated NLRB jurisprudence regarding 
supervisory employee exclusions since Midwood and Vitacco’s review of the topic was 
conducted a decade earlier, but it differed in its outlining of the process for forming a private 
attorney’s union and addressing of the practical concerns of doing so.    
  
Looking at large law firms, Mortazavi’s analysis of attorney unionization argued that 
American “Big Law” profit-inducing practices spoil the personal and professional well-being of 
associate lawyers.  Her portrayal of law firm human resources management presented exploited 
associates satisfying Stakhanovite-type commitments which impeded them from satisfying key 
ethical and professional responsibilities established under ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Sector-wide unionization as the “thin edge of the wedge” that stirs a paradigm shift in 
firm culture and institutional practice was presented as the “most effective remaining alternative” 
open to private sector associates critical of dominant work patterns that diminish ethics from the 
practice of law.144  Mortazavi’s argument implied that unionization can occur when management 
directives overrule the independent discretion of practitioners on how to practice, how much to 
practice, and under which conditions to practice.  Her review of NLRA case law, administrative 
jurisprudence, and ABA rules of ethics confirmed that no legal or ethical restrictions bar 
unionization.  Nonetheless, Mortazavi’s prescription carries weight insofar as being assimilated 
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as the appropriate action by enough lawyers in one firm who faced the same employment 
conditions as those typified in the article, wanted to defend their professional standing, and were 
permanent associates.     
 
2.3   Part II:  Empirical and Theoretical Approaches to Lawyer Unionization 
2.3.1 Professionals and Bureaucracies 
From the 1930s and onwards, the wide-scale growth of the professional and semi-
professional workforces to carry out the larger economic activities of state and private 
organizations in the fields of commerce, science and technology, and education was necessary 
before such new occupations were exposed to unions and collective bargaining.145  Collective 
bargaining by professionals is a relatively modern development in Canada.  For example, in 
December 1966, the Government of Canada struck the Woods Task Force on Labour Relations 
to identify and review the pressing issues impacting the country’s system of industrial relations.  
Studies exploring professional workers and collective bargaining under the direction of the 
Woods Task Force noted the lack of reliable information and statistical data for their work.146  
Around the same time of the Woods Task Force, federal and provincial governments instituted 
access to collective bargaining for their workers whose success with negotiated settlements stood 
to promote white-collar organizing in the private sector.147  The liberalization of attitudes and 
labour laws encouraged engineers, teachers, social workers, and nurses (employed in the 
provincial and para-public sectors) to demand and attain collective bargaining rights.  This 
change in turn, created a critical mass of semi-professional and professional workers for 
researchers to investigate their gains as labour collectives.148 
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Thompson observed a marked shift in professionals turning to collective bargaining 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  In the Industrial Relations literature, he proposed a binary 
explanation to account for their motivations.149  Thompson identified defensive reasons: 
professionals were organizing themselves in order to prevent their inclusion in a bargaining unit 
of non-professionals.  American engineers unionized during the 1930s, for example, to prevent 
being lumped with less essential production workers.150  By contrast, there were offensive 
considerations involved as professionals wanted to secure their own economic or social goals 
through bargaining.  Thompson’s offensive rationale identifies collective bargaining as a 
measure used by employed professionals when real or perceived working conditions challenge 
their autonomy, pride in work, and finances.151  Bonds between salaried professionals and ideals 
of professionalism unravel in workplaces where rewards and challenges do not comport with 
expectations, and dissatisfaction with conditions of employment increases.  When identifying the 
core challenge to professional values, theorists propose bureaucratization of work as a factor.152  
The issue of whether an underlying source of dissatisfaction (and what it represents) is indeed 
attributable to bureaucratization differentiates two evaluative models: the professional 
proletarianization thesis and process actor approach.  The main difference between the two 
concepts is the emphasis each places on either the social structures or the rational, independent 
actions that account for behaviours within a workplace.  As both views bear relevance to lawyers 
unionizing, the next few sections will take a closer look at them.        
 
2.3.2 The Proletarianization of Professionals Thesis 
During the 1970s, new sociological studies on the professions emerged.  After four 
decades of prominence in Anglo-American sociology, the paradigm of studying and 
differentiating professions from other occupations based on attributes of ethics, autonomy, 
independence, occupational community, higher education and professional socialization among 
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other markers waned.153  Neo-Weberian scholars countered this trait-based model by introducing 
a monopoly approach that classified the professions as occupations seeking to establish, 
maintain, and control a labour market for their expert services.154  With the uptake of interest in 
the professions, another group of social scientists, post-industrial theorists dubbed the 
functionalists, proposed their own theory of knowledge-based workers.155  This school of thought 
argued that Western nations were evolving from manufacturing based economies into service 
and information societies and that the resulting structural changes ushered in rapid technological 
growth powered by knowledge.  The emerging new economy’s reliance on the industrialization 
of technical expertise would privilege and reward professionals with substantial workplace 
advancements and social capital.156  Yet, there was a third, alternative perspective to emerge 
during this time: Marxian political economists adapted and applied the proletarianization thesis 
to stamp their own perspective on the future of employed professionals.   
 
Proletarianization involves converging structural processes that divest increasing 
populations from control over the means of production.157  Proletarianization theorists postulate 
that professionals are no different than any other wage labourer intertwined in capitalist relations 
of production.  When surplus professionals (who are not self-employed) must sell their labour to 
an employer instead of offering their services directly to the public, they become proletarians.158 
Professional proletarianization theorists identify bureaucratization as the driver of 
proletarianization in workplaces where dependent employment has stripped professionals of the 
inherent rewards of their calling.159  As a condition of salaried employment, professionals must 
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accept subtle, but intrusive forms of management authority that is designed to direct work 
processes.  Within organizations, professional autonomy is restricted by: supervisory hierarchy, 
detailed divisions of labour and documented job responsibilities, evaluations and promotions 
determining career advancement, and mandatory use of guidelines and policy manuals that 
reduce independent discretion.  All of these constraints seek task rationalization and requisite 
standards of efficiency.160  In these environments, professionals can experience technical 
proletarianization which entails management implementing and maintaining standardized 
operating procedures through administrative systems that wrest autonomy.161  Derber suggests 
that bureaucratization more likely exposes professionals to ideological proletarianization which 
begins with management determining the division of labour and ends with a loss of control over 
the ends and uses of one’s work.162  While professionals may draw good salary and exercise 
some discretion over completing tasks, these benefits are relative to an employer extracting 
maximum profit from their labour.  Hence, many of them face the prospect of enduring 
disenchantment with work or reclaim their professionalism through acts of protest.163  Derber 
found that the professional proletarianization thesis sparked two streams of initial research: first, 
studies of job attitudes and discontent of professionals with employment, and second, studies of 
dissent and unionization by professionals.164  Works using proletarianization theory as a medium 
to study workplace change in American medical and legal practice illustrate the second prong of 
research.  They are discussed individually in each of the next two sections below.     
 
2.3.2.a  Doctors  
Initially, in the early 1970s, American doctors sporadically unionized because 
government encroachment and restrictions on practice autonomy greatly dissatisfied them.165 
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American physicians intensified union organizing thereafter as the delivery of medical services 
became corporatized and doctors lost independence and control over patient treatment and 
care.166  Proletarianization theorists argued that corporatized and profit-driven American health 
care threatened to approximate the medical labour process akin to the traditional industrial 
proletariat and subordinate it to capitalist interests.167  McKinlay and Arches identified that the 
for-profit hospital, university medical and community health centres, and the health maintenance 
organizations were responsible for institutionalizing health care and displacing opportunities for 
practitioner self-employment.168  Within these organizations, employed physicians face a 
bureaucratization of work, loss of discretion over tools of labour, declining salaries, and forced 
specialization.  A cycle of dependent employment is seemingly assured by practitioner 
oversupply, as well as by prohibitive start-up and steep overhead costs associated with running a 
practice.  Researchers of physician unionization have made two significant conclusions about 
collective bargaining: one, physicians join unions and collectively bargain in response to 
physician fee squeezing, to uphold practice autonomy, and to preserve individual professional 
judgment;169 and two, collective bargaining is used to address workplace concerns associated 
with physician-specific issues and patient care concerns.170  
 
2.3.2.b Lawyers 
Academic consideration of proletarianization extending to lawyers coincided at the time 
when the American legal profession was undergoing exponential population growth and there 
was a growing concentration of employed lawyers in law firms, government and businesses.171  
Spangler and Lehman explored the work processes of salaried lawyers in bureaucratized 
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workplaces of large law firms, corporations, government, and legal aid services agencies.172  
They sourced findings from available ethnographies to describe the scope of technological and 
bureaucratic influence over lawyers and whether they realized traditional rewards of professional 
work.  Their analysis identified varying degrees of labour control and subordination offset by 
patterns of accommodation.  Unionization was proposed as a possible countermeasure that could 
help lawyers curb management’s attempts at de-skilling and hastening of work processes.173  
 
Spangler conducted further research on the work experiences of employed lawyers to 
determine the extent of ideological, technological and bureaucratic control at each of four 
worksites previously canvassed in her study with Lehman.174  Her book’s chapter on legal 
service advocates offered a critical empirical complement and expansion of the doctrinal 
scholarship identified earlier in this literature review that studied the unionization of community 
law clinics.  Findings from interviews conducted with respondents from three non-profit Legal 
Services Corporation agency affiliates offered some of the first ethnographic revelations about 
unionized staff lawyers and their bargaining agents struggling among unit members and 
management over workplace organization, bureaucratic control, and influence.  At the time, with 
scant empirical insight on why lawyers unionize, the following excerpt presents a stimulating 
argument:  
A more plausible interpretation of unionization among lawyers would emphasize that 
professionals join unions not because they are part of a new ruling class, but because they 
are sometimes made to feel very much like the traditional working class.  In the three 
Legal Services offices reported in this study, unionization drives were sparked by low 
salaries, poor working conditions, and managerial arbitrariness.  And in all three settings, 
the staffs were willing, however reluctantly to abandon many of the challenges to 
managerial prerogatives in return for the most traditional of working class gains—a 
reasonable wage settlement.  Clearly, then, the social location of lawyer unionism 
suggests that this particular form of collective action arises when lawyers most resemble 
other workers and least resemble an emerging elite.175           
  
Spangler based her findings on confrontational managerial relations and poor pay showing that 
regardless of the occupation involved, workers see common benefits in collective bargaining.  
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The current work conditions of law firm associates, in-house counsel, government and 
legal service attorneys, and law professors was reviewed by Crain who argued that lawyers 
occupying these salaried positions do not control the ideological ends to which their employer 
directs their work, and, therefore, have lost their professional autonomy.176  She proposed that 
employed professionals dissatisfied with current declines in status should unionize and 
collectively bargain to resist employers further commodifying their labour.  Crain noted that this 
required labour law to support them by not holding professionals to be within supervisory and 
managerial exclusions.  Interestingly, her proposal involved sociological concepts informing 
legal standards as to whether management profit-maximizing techniques and policies reduce 
professional autonomy and control over technical aspects of work.  She found that American 
government attorneys practiced law in the most starkly bureaucratized work settings.  
Particularly, government lawyers experience ideological and technical control because of their 
minutely detailed job descriptions, ranking systems that determine salary, relatively routine 
promotions based on seniority, forced specialization and highly technical work.177  Overall, with 
class privilege and professional competence jeopardized by high degrees of bureaucratization 
and scientific management, lawyers like other disgruntled professionals under attack, are 
theorized to unionize.178  However, Crain’s argument is not verified by either qualitative or 
quantitative evaluation, which thereby leaves her conclusion as a testable proposition. 
 
2.3.2.c  Summary 
Of course, as with any framing concept, proletarianization theory has attracted its fair 
share of critics.  Some critics doubt that professionals can be proletarianized if they exert control 
over subordinates and remain a credentialed workforce.179  Other pundits believe that being 
proletarianized involves absorbing working class values and attitudes that professionals will 
spurn.180  Some argue certain instances of professionals unionizing are exceptions that prove the 
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rule and are therefore misleading examples of deprofessionalization181 or that certain professions 
are only in an initial stage of proletarianization.182  Still other detractors acknowledge that 
theories involving bureaucracies may be stimulating on paper but require empirical support.183  
In the area of law, several jurists question the proletarianization process because it discounts 
lawyers’ abilities to adapt and modify work conditions.184   
 
These observers’ criticisms inform that proletarianization theory stimulates healthy 
debate and provides an analytical perspective on the working conditions of professionals in 
organizations.  For example, lawyers have been incorporated within a class analysis that 
concludes young associates at large law firms form a professional proletariat within a stratified 
hierarchy of Toronto lawyers.185  Rosen suggested that the professional proletarianization debate 
could be expanded by studying whether market conditions are altering the career patterns of 
lawyers and subjecting them to the alienating effects of work.186  Still, in another contemporary 
example, Bagust used Derber’s ideological proletarianization argument as an epistemological 
tool to interpret the perceptions of corporate law firm associates practicing in neo-liberal-leaning 
Australia.187  The qualitative study used data from fifty semi-structured interviews conducted 
with partners and past and present associates of ten law firms regarding work practices.  While 
corporate law firms historically rose in prominence because of their association with high-status 
clients, these same corporate entities are now rewriting existing service bargains and causing law 
firms to adjust to the new rules of business.  Bagust found that in a thoroughly commercialized 
                                                 
181
 R. Murphy, “Proletarianization or bureaucratization: the fall of the professional” in R. Torstendahl & M. Burrage, 
eds., The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy (London: Sage Publications, 1990) 71 at 78. 
182
 D. Coburn, “Canadian Medicine: Dominance or Proletarianization? (1988) 66: Supplement 2 The Milbank 
Quarterly 92 at 109. 
183
 E. Friedson, “The Changing Nature of Professional Control” (1984) 10 Annual Review of Sociology 1 at 11. 
184
 R.L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987) at 27; R.L. Nelson & D.M. Trubek, “Arenas of Professionalism:  The Professional 
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context” in R.L. Nelson, D.M. Trubek & R.L. Solomon, eds., Lawyers’ Ideals/Lawyers’ 
Practices:  Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 177 at 203; 
J. E. Wallace, “Organizational and Professional Commitment in Professional and Nonprofessional Organizations” 
(1995) 40:2 Administrative Science Quarterly 228 at 247; J.E. Wallace & F.M. Kay, “The professionalism of 
practicing law: A comparison across work contexts” (2008) 29:8 Journal of Organizational Behaviour 1021 at 1043; 
I. Campbell & S. Charlesworth, “Salaried lawyers and billable hours: A new perspective from the sociology of 
work” (2012) 19:1 International Journal of the Legal Profession 89 at 99. 
185
 J. Hagan, M. Huxter & P. Parker, “Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and Mobility among Toronto 
Lawyers” (1988) 22:1 Law & Society Review 9 at 51.  
186
 R. Rosen, “‘Proletarianizing’ Lives: Researching Careers” (1999) 33:3 Law & Society Review 703 at 708. 
187
 J. Bagust, “The Legal Profession and the Business of Law” (2013) 35:1 Sydney Law Review 27 at 29. 
42 
 
and competitive high-end, legal services marketplace, law firms must promote and deliver 
efficient services to sustain current client bases and the high levels of profitable billable hours 
that associates generate.  Downward pressures fall squarely on the shoulders of associates who 
reported that their professionalism is being compromised by having to advertise the firm.  A 
greater threat to associates’ autonomy, however, was in meeting client objectives, which 
threatened the goals and purposes of lawyering.  Bagust argued that the flow-through effect of 
strict agency between firm client and counsel compromised the independence of practitioners, 
and could jeopardize their careers in the event that unethical behaviour was needed to maintain 
customers.188  Overall, the study maintained a persuasive argument for ideological 
proletarianization conceptualizing how lawyers lose some of their professional identity.   
 
2.4   Professionals Unionizing as Process Actors 
In 1980, Abel reviewed the literature on the sociology of lawyers and acclaimed Larson’s 
work as a breakthrough in the sociology of professions, which was poised to influence “all 
writing about professionals for many years”.189  Larson developed a thesis of the “professional 
project” a concept inspired by the neo-Weberian sociological tradition and generated to contrast 
the trait model of studying professions.  The professional project characterized a profession as an 
occupation that masters and standardizes a knowledge product, creates a market for its services, 
and then enlists the state to preserve it through professional licensure.190  If successful, the spoils 
of the professional project—social standing and economic rewards—accrue to occupations 
capable of a maintaining a collective process of upward mobility for its members who reinforce 
and perpetuate conditions.  True to his words, Abel adapted and applied the market control thesis 
to American lawyers.191  Abel’s success with using this theory in many of his studies has been 
such that Marshall remarks the approach, “has dominated the contemporary literature on the 
legal profession” and “has become the dominant paradigm for examining lawyers”.192  Abel’s 
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writings allow inquiry into how much and in what way the heyday of the legal profession (lasting 
until around the mid-to-late 20th century) will continue in the future.   
 
The legal profession, like other occupations in capitalist society, strives to control the 
market for its goods and services.193  According to Abel, the success or failure of a professional 
project of market control in law involves: maintaining a scarcity of legal providers (regulating 
the production of producers), asserting control over production of legal services (regulating the 
production by producers) through national and state bar associations, and stimulating demand for 
services.194  As the legal profession’s grip on market control loosens, however, classic legal 
professionalism weakens and changes in the division of labour and work organization of lawyers 
follow.195  Evidence of the American legal profession splintering into disparate and unequal 
sectors, less interested, or even capable of maintaining market control, is demonstrated by lawyer 
employment growing in areas outside of the traditional sole-proprietorship and law firm 
paradigm.  For example, Abel reviewed the working conditions of perennially dependent 
American government lawyers, arguing that they were noticeably underpaid in comparison to 
private sector lawyers and that these practitioners often leave their jobs for better opportunities 
elsewhere.196  Accordingly, the structure and rewards of government employment shapes lawyers 
with interests and concerns distinct from practitioners in other, more lucrative employment 
arrangements.  Government lawyers are middling beneficiaries of the professional project who 
should be expected to influence more immediate spheres of economic interests.   Providing their 
services to the government shields them from the larger market, and so their attempts at 
improving employment rewards unfold at the level of their employer.  Kritzer argues that Abel’s 
analysis reveals just how the motivational basis of upholding a professional project involves 
preserving the economic self-interest of individual practitioners.197   
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Abel’s study was a historical analysis of the macro-level social organization of the legal 
profession.  In outlining the parameters of his work, he averred that explanation was not its 
focus, nor did it look at the daily work of lawyers.198  Moreover, Abel excluded the exploration 
of lawyer unionism by positioning it as a suggested alternative organizational form among 
multiple options available to practitioners.199  The neo-Weberian-inspired premise that argues 
employed professionals will attempt to influence the organizations where they work at as part of 
an occupational group’s continuing struggle for institutional recognition helped Harrison develop 
and apply a processual approach to explain unionization among professionals.200  The processual 
approach concerns itself with the capacities of entire professions and sub-groups within them to 
improve realms of control that unfold at the levels of the organization, work process, politics, 
and institution.201  The approach anticipates that subgroups within a profession have different 
prerogatives, and that various stakeholders take different kinds of actions to protect their 
interests.202  In the case of employed professionals unionizing, this outcome may occur when 
elements such as: legislative and judicial decisions, social norms concerning unionization, 
recruiting strategies of non-professional unions, collective bargaining patterns among non-
professional service occupations, and leadership orchestrating worker mobilization create an 
opportunity for workers to act and improve their influence over economic, strategic, and 
operational control.203  The processual model differs from proletarianization theory by 
prioritizing contextual, organizational, and interactional factors that propel union activity, rather 
than bureaucratization invariably threatening professional control, which depends on the power 
relationships between members of a workforce and administrators.204    
 
2.5 Nova Scotia Crown Attorneys and Collective Bargaining   
 Campbell’s study on collective bargaining by Nova Scotia Crown prosecutors is the most 
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relevant research into public sector lawyer unionization in Canada.
205
  Campbell explored Crown 
lawyers adopting collective bargaining as a usurpationary strategy aimed at securing greater 
control over work that exposed one element of a dual form of closure with the other component 
being that lawyers exclude non-licensed practitioners as members of a self-regulated profession.  
The study illustrated that collective bargaining was an expedient solution for a faltering 
professional project associated with dependant employment, while showing prosecutors as a 
unique occupational community capable of sustaining an ideology of professionalism and 
collective action.
206
   
 
Campbell explained that Crown attorneys resorted to collective bargaining due to 
historical and political evolution in employment relations with the province of Nova Scotia.  By 
introducing a Public Prosecution Service that reigned in control over the prosecutorial labour 
process and developed it as an organization under ineffective management, the province created 
a hostile working environment.
207
  Frustration among prosecutors grew as they felt marginalized 
by diminishing professionalism, low pay, wage roll-backs and freezes, lack of offices with 
appropriate amenities and administrative support, arbitrary promotions, and the growing 
complexity of Charter prosecutions.
208
  Their dissatisfaction reached a tipping point after 
demands to the provincial Attorney General for improved working conditions went ignored. 
Frustrated prosecutors mobilized through their agent, the Nova Scotia Crown Attorney’s 
Association (NSCAA), and staged a provocative, two-day illegal strike in June 1998, calling for 
a salary setting process.
209
  A subsequent inquiry into the Provincial Prosecution Service 
included a recommendation that prosecutors receive collective bargaining rights.
210
  Campbell 
determined that the actions of Nova Scotia Crown attorneys leading to the acquisition of 
collective bargaining rights showed them as a group who were neither de-professionalized nor 
proletarianized, but as workers who had adopted working class militancy to achieve their 
goals.
211
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2.6 Synopsis of Research Literature on Lawyer Unionization  
2.6.1 Doctrinal Legal Literature and Lawyer Unionization  
American legal scholarship has produced a substantial literature on the law of lawyer 
unionization.  The methodology of these studies involves jurists analyzing modifications in 
labour law doctrine and the practice and professional responsibility issues linked to lawyers’ 
collectively bargaining.  The output of these studies can be characterized as a literature written 
for lawyers by academic lawyers.  Doctrinal studies on lawyer unionization are steeped in 
technical and prescriptive analysis and this, ultimately, narrows the scope of inquiry and 
findings.  Consider Rubenstein’s brief article on attorney labour unions published in 2007.212  
The article canvassed the familiar discussion of employers opposing attorney unionization on the 
basis of confidential employee, supervisor or managerial employee exclusion, or, in the 
alternative, potential concerns with unionized attorneys breaching ethical standards.  As the 
article indicates with, “surprisingly little NLRB precedent with regard to attorneys”213 jurists are 
hard pressed to add fresh insight to the subject without new case law.  This project proposes that 
a better use of information yielded from a labour relations board certifying a bargaining agent for 
a unit of lawyers is to study events leading to that act and its implications (than have, as a study’s 
main goal, an interpretation of a decision as evidence of new directions in jurisprudence 
governing professional unionization).   
 
The most current studies on attorney unionization published in the law reviews contrast 
the older literature by advocating for lawyers stationed on the margins of the profession to 
unionize.  Challenging the terms and conditions of employment that interfere with legal aid and 
large law firm practitioners’ regard for responsible client representation and ethical legal practice 
as the basis for jurists’ reasoning, however, does not seem to aid the understanding of DOJ 
lawyers’ interest in collective bargaining.  The premise is important, however, for identifying 
professional ethics as a relevant issue in the determination of whether lawyers should enjoy the 
right to unionize, bargain collectively, and strike.  Professionalism propagates a common culture 
that shapes the behaviour of practitioners.
214
  For example, professionals are influenced by 
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attitudinal markers that reinforce the perception that unionization and professionalism are 
mutually exclusive.
215
  It remains contested in the literature whether unionization as a blue-collar 
phenomenon is compatible with professionalism and if collective bargaining can account for the 
distinct traits of professional work.
216
  Yet, examples of collective agreements suggest organized 
professionals seek contractual provisions that advance professional standards.
217
  Ambiguity 
caused by researchers debating the issue creates an empirical question that this study explores 
through inquiry into DOJ lawyers’ experience with practicing law under a collective agreement.  
Insight from respondents will provide important (and previously missing) perspective on how 
DOJ lawyers view belonging to a union while maintaining professional values and ethics, which 
is relevant to the issue of decreasing departmental resources and increasing practice volumes 
inciting the AJC to consider job action.  
 
2.6.2  Social Scientific Literature and Lawyer Unionization   
Conflict theories that assume the autonomy and ideals held by employed professionals 
clash with the demands of an organization offer a logical starting point for considering how 
dissatisfied professionals react to workplace conditions detrimental to their interests.
218
  While 
the professional proletarianization thesis offers a pattern of thinking for unionism among 
government lawyers, the question remains whether concepts from the theory apply to events at 
the DOJ.  This is another key empirical question explored in this project through interviews with 
DOJ lawyers that seek their perception of whether and to what extent collective bargaining was 
seen as offering a solution to poor working conditions reducing practitioner autonomy and 
technical control over legal practice.   
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Gorman and Sandefur identify that in the current literature on professional and expert 
work, researchers are explaining collective group actions by focussing on the processes and 
social actors that produce outcomes.
219
  The process analysis approach concedes that 
professionals unionizing may be a response to bureaucratic employment, but views it as one of 
many different options a workforce may choose as they strive to achieve greater influence at 
work.  Process researchers query whether bureaucratic threats to professional control alone can 
account for the attractiveness of unionization to improve wages and working conditions.  This 
outlook unveils another issue for research that investigates whether DOJ lawyers were attracted 
to collective bargaining as a means to advance wages and benefits.  Asking respondents to reflect 
on these considerations will provide insight as to whether economic issues—in addition to other 
contextual and interactional factors—helped the AJC rally around a common cause as part of its 
development into a champion for the interests of its members.  
  
A review of Campbell’s study revealed two gaps this dissertation intends to fill.  First, 
unlike the NSCAA, which was voluntarily recognized as bargaining agent for prosecutors, the 
PSRLA required the AJC to conduct an organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers and prove majority 
support in order for it to become certified by the PSLRB.  This fact creates the opportunity to 
study that organizing drive and explore the reasons why the majority of DOJ lawyers supported 
it.  This may, in turn, provide evidence whether the proletarianization model or processual model 
better frames the events under study.  Second, Campbell’s exploration of Crown prosecutors 
negotiating a collective bargain was limited to the efforts of NSCAA bargaining team negotiators 
dealing with the challenges of disclosure, establishing positions, and strategically revealing 
information briefs (which was related to the strengthening of an occupational community 
amongst prosecutors).
220
  The initial framework agreement that allowed for the Province of Nova 
Scotia and Crown prosecutors to negotiate pay was not amicably resolved and had to be settled 
by binding arbitration.
221
  While Campbell’s assessment of contract negotiations offers an 
important perspective, an inconclusive picture still remains of how negotiators representing a 
                                                 
219
 E.H. Gorman & R.L. Sandefur, “‘Golden Age,’ Quiescence and Revival: How the Sociology of Professions 
Became the Study of Knowledge-Based Work” (2011) 38:3 Work and Occupations 275 at 291.  
220
 Campbell, supra note 30 at 271.   
221
 In The Matter of Interest Arbitration Between Nova Scotia Crown Attorney’s Association and the Province of 
Nova Scotia by its Department of Human Resources – Decision (18 January 2008), online: PIPSC 
<http://www.pipsc.ca/portal/page/portal/website/groups/nscaa/nscaa-decision-feb08.en.pdf> (last modified 21 
February 2009).    
49 
 
bargaining unit of lawyers prepare for, handle, and analyze the experience of first contract 
negotiations ending in stalemate.  The process of DOJ lawyers negotiating a first collective 
agreement took a different path that also resulted in arbitration, but ended through Charter 
litigation.  The AJC’s first contract bargaining negotiations and its outcomes are therefore treated 
as subjects of interest in and of themselves. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
To conclude, the research literature suggested that the motivations for DOJ lawyers 
unionizing can be seen as a defense against ideological proletarianization or as a workforce 
interested in improving its position within the DOJ.  It also indicated that to gain improved pay 
and work conditions collective bargaining is necessary.  The review demonstrated that 
professional ethics and responsibility are a consideration when lawyers unionize and collectively 
bargain and that further research on the topic is necessary to address differing viewpoints raised 
by the extant literature.  It is therefore appropriate to develop both these areas into topics that are 
explored in this project through interviews with respondents and in document analysis.  As for 
bargaining agents negotiating a first collective agreement governing lawyers, the available 
literature reported little about the experience, thus directing an emergent design using initial data 
for generating research parameters.  A grounded approach will allow for an understanding of the 
situation from documentary and interview data.  Now that the background literature that informs 
this study has been explored, the next chapter will deal with the practicalities of generating a 
research design.  
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C H A P T E R 3: Research Design 
 
3.1  Introduction 
To analyze and discuss the complexities of DOJ lawyers unionizing and the AJC 
negotiating a first collective agreement, it is important to develop a strong and clear research 
design.  The first step of the process, and before discussing the mechanics of conducting the 
study, involves identifying how a doctoral dissertation in law that seeks empirical understanding 
of a workplace phenomenon relates to academic legal scholarship.  The early twentieth century 
American legal realist movement may have petered out during the interwar period, but not before 
introducing an appreciation for empiricism and the techniques of social science to the study of 
law.   Heise credits empirical scholarship gradually becoming rooted in the academy during the 
mid-1950s through to the 1970s with: (1) University of Chicago Law School producing the 
groundbreaking Chicago Jury Project; (2) Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law supporting 
research; (3) generous foundational funding reaching a critical mass; and (4) development of the 
Law and Society Association.222  It is not until the turn of the twenty-first century, however, that 
Diamond and Mueller pinpoint legal scholars popularizing empiricism through their research.223  
Currently, within the Anglo-Commonwealth legal academy, enthusiasm for empirical 
scholarship continues to steadily grow.  This evolution signals important progress because 
academics producing greater volumes of empirical work strengthen the field’s vitality.    
 
In the United Kingdom, the demand for empirical studies to inform policy making and 
evaluate policy implementation may outstrip producer capacities.224  The Nuffield Inquiry on 
British Empirical Research recommends increasing the supply of empirically trained legal 
scholars to replenish scores of retiring faculty.225  The study proposes to bolster the empirical 
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studies knowledge of early to mid-career academics through dedicated funding streams, 
fellowships, professional mentorships, and promoting greater collaboration and improving 
teaching relationships between law and social science departments.226  This institutional 
recognition of applied and theoretical empirical legal scholarship attests to its value as a prized 
intellectual property. 
 
The Nuffield study informs what the influential Consultative Group on Research and 
Education in Law foreshadows when it examined Canadian law schools in the early 1980s.227  
Law and Learning recommends shoring up law as a scholarly discipline by developing 
fundamental legal research, which involves studying law as a social phenomenon using empirical 
and interdisciplinary methods.  Law and Learning positioned graduate law programmes at the 
hub of the initiative, as fostering a pluralistic intellectual environment would instill future 
scholars with diverse research interests.  The vast majority of faculty members unfamiliar with 
fundamental research practices, however, left the leadership overseeing the endeavour unclear in 
their direction.  Macdonald, assessing two decades of Law and Learning’s legacy, finds that 
scholars do not produce enough fundamental research.228  Backhouse confronts the field’s inertia 
by urging professors and graduate students to conduct more interdisciplinary work.229  Her 
clarion call reprises graduate students’ role as participants in Law and Learning’s plan for 
sophisticated legal scholarship.  Graduate law students who lack social or natural sciences 
training, however, may not be keen on conducting an empirical dissertation as minimal 
experience breeds doubts over producing a valid study, which, in turn, stunts initiative.  Good 
empirical research is distinguished by an investigator revealing how observations are collected 
and analyzed so that conclusions reasonably follow from data, while poor empirical research 
overlooks these principles.230  For graduate students unskilled in empirical research, law school 
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journals do not necessarily help make the training easier as they publish articles demonstrating 
both good and bad examples of empirical work.231    
 
This chapter offers a framework for empirical training by articulating the procedures 
involved in collecting and analyzing the data used to answer the study’s research questions.  The 
chapter categorizes the various research methods of legal scholarship and then describes how the 
study falls within the socio-legal rubric.  The nature of this investigation invokes the case study 
because, as Rowley observes, employing the format calls for some evidence of mastery in its 
use.
232
  This comment alerts us to the fact that readers frown upon case studies that neglect sound 
research design.
233
  Case studies are crafted using a range of data from many sources.  After data 
is collected, it must be analyzed and reported.  As the task is the investigator’s responsibility and 
requires some assurance of trustworthiness, Caelli, Ray and Mill’s four-point design for 
demonstrating the credibility of findings is applied to the study.  Taking up this credibility 
framework, which consumes a considerable portion of the chapter’s discussion, also attends to 
Luck, Jackson and Usher encouraging investigators to manage the reliability and researcher bias 
associated with case study research by clarifying their theoretical and philosophical positions, 
logic of thinking and assurance of rigour.
234
  Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining the 
limitations of the study and then summarizing the key points regarding the construction of a 
research design. 
 
3.2  The Four Approaches to Legal Scholarship    
When enough scholars share common perspective on studying law they create an 
intellectual community.  Learned groups differ from one another because the proponents of each 
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subscribe to different epistemologies that instruct specific conceptions about law.  Each 
consortium maintains differing intellectual priorities, research agendas, and a body of 
representative literature that affords prospective adherents models with which to align their 
research.  The main methodologies used in dissertations of law and associated with leading 
schools of legal philosophy are: doctrinal, historical, comparative, and socio-legal.235   
 
Doctrinal scholarship represents the study of law as a self-contained and professional 
discipline.  The researcher views court decisions, statutes, and legislation as sources of legal 
rules that provide data for evaluation.  Their analysis may involve identifying or explaining a 
new area of law or trends in an existing one.  Legal doctrine is often critiqued, and normative 
prescriptions for judges or policy makers on how to reform an unsatisfactory law can encompass 
a study.236  Doctrinal studies represent the leading form of academic legal research conducted.  
The bench and bar use doctrinal literature for their practice, while the professoriate relies on it 
for their teaching.  
 
Legal history involves examining past events, laws, institutions, lawyers and judges.237 
The methodology involves describing how legal landscapes once existed as crucial to our 
understanding of the ways modernization shapes and transforms the legal culture of a society. 
Law and Learning defines historical methods as, “tracing the history of a particular development 
within the law and possibly as well its relationship to the history of society”.238  The legal 
historian uses primary sources such as court records, legislation and government documents that 
are relevant to the period and topic under study.    
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While it is neither new nor novel comparative legal scholarship is currently in vogue and 
is enjoying a considerable upsurge in visible practice.  Given that globalization exerts 
tremendous pressure on the growing integration of foreign and domestic laws, the structuring of 
international legal norms, and the creation of new regulatory frameworks that overlap countries, 
comparative legal scholarship looks at the ways law develops and works in one national legal 
systems in comparison or contrast to another.239  It is a preferred methodology for evaluating 
how disparate jurisdictions react to similar legal issues confronting them.   
 
Socio-legal approaches round out the methodological taxonomy. This last approach 
studies people’s interactions and intersections with law and legal institutions.  The socio-legal 
scholar views law as a social construct and studies its workings through theoretical perspectives, 
interdisciplinary approaches, and methods of the social sciences, economics, the humanities and 
other non-law disciplines.  In this methodology, research questions are posed and answered in 
terms of law as a phenomenon with analysis directed towards evaluating, predicting, and 
understanding legal doctrine or building theory. 
 
This study involves an inquiry about lawyers forming an association to represent their 
workplace interests through collective bargaining.  Once formed, their union engages with the 
employer and judicial institutions where each interaction adds another level of depth and 
complexity for analysis.  Understanding the developments responsible for outcomes requires data 
collection methods that allow for historical and contemporary assessments. Of the four 
methodologies defined above, the socio-legal research strategy is most appropriate for this study 
because it offers access to the tools of the social sciences that can capture and expose the 
multiple perspectives of lawyers interacting with collective bargaining.  
 
3.3  Socio-legal Paradigm: Law as Social Research  
 Jurists and social scientists produce empirical knowledge about law and their scholarship 
is pragmatic.  As Singleton and Straits note, “all research begins with the selection of a 
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problem”.240  This includes legal scholarship.241  Academics pursue specific research problems 
because the questions raised by their examination can expose a gap in knowledge of some 
practical or theoretical condition.
242
  Conducting a study to address a deficiency builds 
understanding that may otherwise remain obscured.  A study that explores, describes, or explains 
law as a phenomenon affecting individuals represents social research.
243
  Steinus and her 
colleagues propose that the fundamental goal of all social research is to detail a conceptually 
adequate description of a historically specific topic.
244
  Within this definition then, social 
research is the objectively organized and systematic pursuit of knowledge about reality through 
data and theory,
245
 whereas data is empirical evidence or information gathered according to a 
procedure and protocol,
246
 and theory constitutes, “the systematic set of interrelated statements 
intending to explain some aspect of social life”.247  Theory helps an investigator communicate 
discoveries about their project and compare and apply study findings to what the literature 
reports or what occurs in actual practice.  The type of theory generated depends on the 
investigator’s underlying philosophy which manifests itself through a positivist, interpretive, or 
critical positioning.
248
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A research design within the positivist tradition, for example, tests or develops theory 
using hypotheses.249  Positivist research works deductively to discover causal relationships as the 
basis of generalized knowledge.250  Objective knowledge is produced by translating data into 
quantifiable variables, through statistics as proxies for population parameters, and by purposely 
controlling for external variations.251  An interpretive approach, alternatively, represents a 
phenomenological tradition of exploring human behaviour and experience from the perspective 
of the audience under investigation.252  Inductive research understands and describes a group, 
institution, situation, or event to develop theory from written, observed or imaged data.253  When 
the study’s goal is to critique power structures that oppress people, however, a critical 
positioning works best.  Critical theorists’ research looks at lived experiences and human 
interactions within society.  Critical theory involves ethnographic and historical studies of 
organizational processes and structures aimed at confronting an injustice of a particular 
community.254  Such studies educate audiences about hidden interests and contradictions by 
critiquing oppressive power relations and the critical theory that supports the purpose is built 
either deductively or inductively.255    
  
           The literature review in chapter 2 shows that public sector lawyer unionism, and the 
process and outcome of lawyers collectively bargaining, are topics in need of greater 
understanding.  To this purpose, descriptive theory building in the interpretivist tradition, as 
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outlined above, is appropriate.
256
  The qualitative approach is the methodological compliment for 
interpretivism as its methods represent a naturalistic research strategy that can document a causal 
process within an individual case and the ways people make sense of it.
257
  Qualitative research 
is better comprehended by its unifying features rather than by any standard definition.
258
  
Academic disciplines conceive qualitative research differently as well as do practitioners 
working within the same field.  For example, jurists must determine which form of qualitative 
research suits their intellectual preference and reflects their work.  Dobinson and Johns argue 
that doctrinal research is qualitative because, in addition to understanding social context and 
interpretation, it is non-numerical and involves the process of selecting and weighing materials in 
light of hierarchy and authority.
259
  Webley’s understanding of the method partially echoes that 
of Dobinson and Johns’ as the case-based approach of studying law through precedent is a form 
of qualitative research.  She acknowledges, however, that qualitative legal research also 
encompasses an orthodox form.  This mode involves capturing and categorizing social 
phenomena and their meaning using direct observation, in-depth interviews, and document 
analysis.
260
   
 
3.4       Qualitative Methods: The Case Study 
As it has been established, this study’s qualitative orientation is empirical, and a 
qualitative study can conducted in one of five ways: (1) Biography; (2) Phenomenology; (3) 
Grounded Theory; (4) Ethnography; or (5) Case Study.
261
  The selection of the most appropriate 
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mode depends on the research question and the phenomenon under investigation.
262
  In the 
instance of this research, the case study offers the most effective structure for handling:    
(1)   A research area that is newer and less developed, and an examination of the 
phenomenon under investigation requires an understanding of context;
263
 
(2) Actual practices, including the details of significant activities that may be unusual 
or infrequent;
264
 
(3)    A research question that has a what, how, and why component;
265
 
(4) The study’s call for the concentration on the description of social processes and 
an explanation of their dynamics.
266
 
The criteria for using a case study match up with the aims of this project.  First, union organizing 
drives among Canadian public sector lawyers occur infrequently.  Second, the study’s central 
research questions involve a “what” component.  Third, the perceptions, meanings and attitudes 
to unionizing and working under a collective bargain agreement are variables that are not easily 
quantifiable.  Fourth, as case studies describe and explain events within context, the behaviours 
involved in the collective bargaining process are to be understood holistically.  All of these stated 
factors pointed towards designing and conducting this inquiry as a qualitative case study.  
 
Tellis advises that if the uniqueness of a phenomenon disallows for comparison with 
another case then a single-case design should be chosen, as it is in this project.267   A single-case 
design will be embedded when a phenomenon under investigation is complex.   The larger 
subject (i.e. unionization) is looked at in terms of units with each part being studied individually.  
The results from each unit of analysis are then drawn together to yield an overall picture of the 
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subject.268  This case study is embedded and broken down into two parts with each component 
corresponding to a research question: one unit of analysis consists of what instigated DOJ 
lawyers to unionize under the AJC, and the other involves the AJC concluding a first collective 
agreement.  Each unit invites particular understanding and reporting which are developed as the 
subjects of chapters 5 and 6 respectively.    
 
3.5  Case Study Assessment Standards 
3.5.1  Generic Qualitative Case Study 
Yin, Stake, Merriam, and Perry, among other methodologists offer helpful strategies for 
designing and conducting case study research.269  Their guidance offers a necessary orientation 
for jurists who want to conduct a case study but better know the term as part of their 
pedagogy.270  Jurists, like the novice researchers from other disciplines, must confront a body of 
literature on case study methodology that is contradictory and confusing at first blush.271  
Appleton proposes that if an investigator adopts a particular author’s case study strategy it should 
align with their philosophical and methodological stance.272  This suggestion makes sense 
because positivist and interpretive philosophies each articulate the process and assess the 
outcome of inquiry differently.273  Qualitative case studies produce research that requires 
appropriate assessment standards which suit the design of this project.274  
 
The interdisciplinary orientation of this dissertation situated the evaluation criteria in 
need of specific framing.  Merriam’s discussion on the characteristics of generic qualitative case 
study offers an approach that accounts for the vagaries of interdisciplinary synthesis.  She 
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describes a basic or generic qualitative study as one that seeks, “to discover and understand a 
phenomenon, a process, or the perspectives and worldviews of the people involved”.275  Findings 
consist of a mix of description and analysis of an event,276 and the generic qualitative approach 
can work in conjunction with the case study.277  Caelli, Ray and Mill use credibility as a 
benchmark for validating a generic qualitative research.  A case study seeking credibility as 
outlined by the generic qualitative format should address four factors: (1) theoretical positioning 
of the researcher; (2) methodology and methods; (3) rigour; and (4) analytic lens.    
 
3.5.2  Theoretical Positioning 
Theoretical positioning invites reflexivity from the researcher as to the motivation, 
assumptions and history that are instigating and influencing their study.
278
  Acknowledging a 
researcher’s position to the research group and data helps identify their entry point to the 
inquiry.
279
  Any study capable sustaining an investigator’s prolonged efforts must strongly 
capture their notice at the outset.  My own interest was piqued after inadvertently discovering the 
PSLRB decision on the AJC’s certification application.  The importance of reading this ruling 
was magnified by my understanding as a lawyer that unionism was unheard of amongst my 
private bar colleagues.  As I found out about lawyers unionizing after the fact (and through print, 
not direct experience) it shaped my identity as a researcher: I came to the subject as an outsider.   
 
 I commenced the study with minimal knowledge of the DOJ and its workforce.  Limited 
understanding fed my curiosity as a researcher and as a lawyer interested in the practice of law 
on behalf of the federal government.  Having litigated one judicial review against counsel from 
the DOJ provided a focussed, albeit limited perspective of their work.  I further learned about my 
subject while conducting research in the field, and it was there that my legal training helped me 
gather relevant data.  When I was conversing in court hallways and interviewing respondents, my 
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familiarity with the lingua franca of practicing law helped me greatly in building an initial 
rapport with the individuals involved. 
 
3.5.3  Methodology and Methods  
Achieving congruence between methodology and methods requires that researchers 
understand and convey the differences between these two fundamentals of social research.
280
  
Evans and Gruba distinguish the concepts by defining the former term as a philosophical 
underpinning taken towards a study while the latter represents steps taken to answer the research 
question.
281
  Once the researcher identifies an empirical dimension to a study, he or she can then 
direct attention to the ways in which data is collected and analyzed.  Obtaining evidence from 
miscellaneous sources is the hallmark of case study methods, and Cunningham explains that 
tapping multiple data streams is necessary as the investigator has no control over the research 
setting of a case.
282
  Various sources are used, therefore, because each contributes evidence 
independently of, or in corroboration with, the other.  Whether the researcher’s choice of 
techniques was appropriate to obtain data is also important because it offers a partial measure of 
study quality.
283
  Typically, case study evidence comes from archival records, documents, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artefacts.
284
  For this 
particular study, interviews, documents, and participant observation were consulted and 
employed.   
 
3.5.4 Interviews 
3.5.4.a  Ethics 
An interview involves two people participating in a focussed, mutual conversation.  An 
interview seeks to learn the perspective of others, so the interviewer must take care to minimize 
any risks associated with interviewees sharing their thoughts.  Before I could conduct interviews 
for this study, my project first had to clear an ethics review.  The process is overseen by the 
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Office of Research Ethics at York University (“ORE”), which looks to preserve the safety, 
welfare and dignity of research participants.  The ORE expects that investigators adhere to 
university guidelines for ethical research.  I was required to complete a Human Participants 
Review Sub-Committee tutorial on the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for 
Research Involving Humans.  I also submitted a proposal and requisite protocol forms before 
ORE issued their certificate of ethics approval (#STU 2010-095).
285
 
 
3.5.4.b Semi-Structured Interviews  
The semi-structured interview format was used to organize interview questions.  Semi-
structured interviews involve the interviewer identifying themes of interest and generating 
questions prior to speaking with respondents.  Each of the five qualitative research modes puts 
interview data to different use.  Gubrium and Holstein’s taxonomy of qualitative research 
assisted in clarifying whether the final interview protocols fulfilled the objectives of this 
inquiry.
286
  Elliott, reviewing Gubrium and Holstein’s work explains the naturalist approach 
recognizes the social world provides an external reality, observable and describable by the 
researcher.
287
  This allows for interview questions focusing on who, what, where, when, how, 
and the why behind the subject of investigation, which is what Clardy proposes the language 
should be when investigating developments in an organization.
288
  
 
There were two primary interview protocols produced: one was for DOJ lawyers and the 
other for AJC personnel.  A pilot interview protocol for DOJ lawyers was circulated to a solicitor 
and a small, general practice law clerk for feedback on the relevancy of interview questions.  
Afterwards, the interview protocol was submitted for consultation on syntax to a member of 
York University’s Writing Centre.  Another edit to the protocols came after losing a potential 
respondent.   A DOJ lawyer initially expressed interest in being interviewed, but later declined 
citing time constraints.  Their withdrawal alerted me to respect the fact that many respondents 
have tight schedules.  Both interview protocols were then scrutinized for superfluous background 
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questions, such as what law school respondents attended, and duplicative questions were 
consolidated in order to shorten the time commitment.  They were revised in anticipation of 
interviews lasting between forty to sixty minutes in length.  Polished interview protocols were 
sent to a strategic informant aligned with the AJC.  The importance of recruiting a key contact 
from an organization under study is well documented.
289
  The reviewer analyzed interview 
questions and provided suggestions on content.  Their insight was particularly helpful in linking 
DOJ lawyers unionizing with legislative amendments. Several questions on union organizing 
were amended to be less directional.    
 
3.5.4.c Accessing and Interviewing Respondents 
Locating study respondents takes work, and recruiting lawyers can be especially tricky.  
Danet et al., report their funded observational study on lawyers and clients being scuttled 
because the investigators could not negotiate access to solicitor-client interactions.
290
  Bumatay, 
citing Lund, notes government lawyers may hesitate being interviewed because multiple 
pressures deter them from speaking candidly with researchers.
291
  It is quite possible that several 
of the people I contacted for participation in the study considered this rationale when 
overlooking the request.  Respondents agreeing to an interview were primarily secured using the 
tactics of purposeful and snowball sampling.  Their recruitment was informed with the 
contextualized-consequentialist ethics model in mind.  The philosophy requires the researcher 
develop relationships of respect and trust that are non-coercive and not based on deception.
292
   
 
Obtaining a list of lawyers employed by the DOJ is an undemanding task.  A search of 
commercially published lawyer listings and on-line provincial law society member directories 
yields their contact information.  A “shot in the dark” mass mailing campaign undercuts 
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conventional wisdom on recruiting elite respondents and was disregarded.  Initial respondents 
were therefore solicited based on their advanced educational standing or service to the broader 
legal community which suggested an increased predilection for study participation.  Court 
transcripts and AJC news bulletins identifying noteworthy people associated with the union were 
other resources consulted for spotting potential respondents.  This particular enlisting technique 
underlies purposeful sampling which suggests interviewing specific individuals who will most 
likely broaden the theoretical explanation.
293
  Snowball sampling occurred with a few 
interviewees who recommended the names of their colleagues who might be interested in the 
study.   Two interviews came about spontaneously during fieldwork.  
    
By learning a little about potential respondents, I was able to better tailor their letters of 
study invitation.  A customized letter creates space for introducing the study, the researcher, 
study voluntariness and anonymity, and noting the significance of contributing to the study.
294
  In 
short, the letters sent were meant to encourage participation.  When counsel is tasked with 
concluding a business transaction or preparing argument for trial, time is a commodity that is 
understandably guarded.  An hour spent partaking in the study was an hour of lost productivity 
needing to be recouped later in the day for my participants.  As well, counsel’s hourly diem 
dwarfs the $50 honorarium offered for study involvement, thus the decision to be interviewed 
was ultimately based on the respondent’s interest.  Mailed letters were followed up by e-mails.  
A respondent positively replying opened the door for an interview to be scheduled.  Interviews 
were conducted by phone in all cases except for one where the respondent preferred an in-person 
interview.  I went to Ottawa to meet with them.  Of course, travelling to various cities across 
Canada for interviews would be a time-consuming and expensive endeavour.  Under these 
circumstances, telephone interviews were acceptable.
295
    
 
Twenty-three interviews were conducted.  They are divided among eleven current and 
three former DOJ lawyers, seven AJC negotiating team members, and two senior AJC 
administrators.  One standard interview protocol was used for rank-and-file DOJ lawyers and 
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another for AJC personnel to assure some comparability between answers provided by 
respondents from each of the two pools.
296
  Questions for DOJ lawyers covered issues of ethics, 
bureaucracy or economic factors behind the decision to unionize, the AJC’s organizing campaign 
and delay in negotiating a first contract.  Questions for union representatives focussed on 
involvement with the AJC, the AJC conducting an organizing campaign, and first contract 
negotiations.
297
  Two interview protocols were tailored for specific individuals whose unique 
experiences required some modification in questions.  As interviewing progressed, questions to 
the DOJ lawyer protocol were adjusted to improve procedure and tease out new data emerging 
from previous interviews.   
 
Before interviews started, respondents were reminded of the voluntariness and 
confidentiality of study participation.  They were asked whether they wished the interview be 
audio taped or transcribed by hand.  If respondents declined being recorded, then notes were 
taken and later typed up.  Audio taped interviews were produced in mp3 format and sent to a 
professional transcriptionist for processing.  The distribution between audio-taped and hand 
transcripts was roughly proportional.  Respondents are acknowledged in the analysis by a lawyer 
or AJC negotiating team member designation and a number.  Respondent privacy requires data 
not disclose an interviewee’s identity.     
 
3.5.5   Unobtrusive Measures 
For additional data collection, this project employed unobtrusive measures.  Unobtrusive 
measures involve inconspicuous data collection methods.  Webb et al., explain that unobtrusive 
sources in the form of physical traces, archives, and observation are used to supplement or cross-
validate interviews and questionnaires.
298
  Unobtrusive measures are necessary components of a 
case study as researchers should turn to discrete observation or examination of records as a first 
means for collecting case study data.
299
  Unobtrusive data for this study involved judicial, 
government, institutional and mass media records as well as direct observations.     
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3.5.5.a  Primary Documents 
Archival records consist of historical and contemporary primary and secondary 
documents which are a staple of case study evidence, and, in fact, can be used as principal 
data.
300
  Primary documents are original and contemporaneous first-hand recordings of events, 
whereas secondary documents provide an interpretation of a primary event.  The value of both 
types of documents is in their capture, dissemination or evaluation of social or historical matters 
that a researcher could not personally observe or analyze.  In this study, primary documents were 
obtained from York University’s Scott Library government collections, court and labour board 
registrars, Access to Information requests, and the AJC’s website.  
 
3.5.5.b Court and Public Service Labour Relations Board Records 
 The use of court records as data in this study requires greater elaboration as to their 
definition and accessibility.  The open court principle presumes that legal hearings and 
documents that contain information about proceedings are available to the public.
301
  Court 
documents involve: statements of claim and defence, application records, motion records, court 
transcripts, affidavits, factums of law, written submissions, exhibits, and judgments.  Obtaining 
paperwork related to the matters of Babcock et al., v. Attorney General (Canada),
302
 Federal 
Law Officers of the Crown v. Treasury Board of Canada; Association of Justice Counsel v. 
Treasury Board of Canada; Treasury Board of Canada v. Professional Institute of the Public 
Service of Canada,
303
 and AJC v. Canada (A.G.)
304
 involved visiting the Supreme Court in 
Vancouver, the PSLRB in Ottawa, and the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto.  Court registrars 
in the jurisdiction wherein the proceedings originate maintain copies of court documents.  Files 
were indexed by their style of cause which is distinguished by a court file number, and the title 
of proceedings that are drawn from the names of the plaintiff and the defendant.  Records are 
released to the public only for on-premise viewing and their form and content is unknown prior 
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to an inspection.  The AJC’s website posted documents related to the arbitration over the first 
collective agreement
305
 and judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Association of Justice Counsel.
306
 
 
For those researched for this project, each case file yielded different amounts of data and 
reflected various time periods.  Three boxes of court records were available from Babcock.  The 
suit commenced in May 1996 and the decision was released in April 2005.  The case involved 
lawyers from the DOJ’s Vancouver Regional Office suing their employer for breach of 
employment contract over not receiving a salary increase awarded to lawyers employed at the 
Toronto Regional Office.  A court clerk advised me that in 2008, much of the file’s physical 
contents became inaccessible to the public, except for remnants the registrar preserved for use in 
another case.  Available materials included statements of claims and examination for discoveries 
of seven deponents conducted between 1998 and 2004.  Affidavits sworn in support of motions 
contained sundry internal records of the DOJ from 1990 to 2002 that were appended to 
supplement the facts being deposed.  The documents involved consolidated terms and conditions 
of employment for non-management lawyers, salary setting policies, correspondences, DOJ 
news releases and records of senior committee meetings, and salary studies.  One of the 
affidavits in the file, sworn by Joan McCoy, appears to have been the one resulting in an appeal 
before the Supreme Court of Canada regarding Cabinet confidences and whether the document 
was exempt from disclosure.
307
  Another key affidavit contained documents produced by former 
Deputy Minister of Justice Morris Rosenberg, which revealed important information about the 
AJC’s creation as a professional association.  Additional materials were twenty-four days of 
transcripts out of a forty-six day trial produced by the testimony of office managers of the DOJ’s 
Vancouver Regional Office, past human resources staff from DOJ headquarters, Lois Lehman, 
the AJC’s first president, and Morris Rosenberg.    
 
The FLOC, AJC v TBC was a sizeable record.  Court documents detail the history and 
process the PSLRB took to confer bargaining agent status on the AJC.  Correspondences from 
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the PSLRB, exhibits entered on consent by parties to the proceeding, the litigants’ factums, and 
the Book of Documents of the Federal Law Officers of the Crown, a rival employee association 
seeking certification of DOJ lawyers employed in Toronto, offer insight into the AJC’s early 
history.  Staff at the PSLRB informed me that exhibits raised in evidence during hearings are 
destroyed two years after a matter is heard.  They noted that, in tribunal proceedings, transcripts 
are not recorded.   
 
The court registrar’s copy of the AJC v. Canada (A.G.) file involving the AJC’s Charter 
challenge offered less content in comparison to the other court files.  It contained the Application 
Record of the AJC and supporting documents, motion scheduling confirmations, as well as 
affidavits of service.  Documents not included with pleadings and those associated with 
subsequent appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada were found on 
the AJC’s website.  Material from this file contained information I understood was difficult to 
get.  My strategic union informant told me that neither employer nor union negotiate in public, so 
AJC personnel might be hesitant to disclose sensitive information about confidential discussions.   
Charter litigation, however, forced union and management-side deponents to outline in their 
affidavits the history of first contract negotiations, resolved collective bargaining terms, those 
mired in dispute, and reasons for impasse.  Hence, I was able to glean the information contained 
in these affidavits, as well as data from the briefs prepared for first contract arbitration, without 
having to press respondents directly on the topic during interviews. 
 
3.5.5.c  Access to Information Requests 
The Access to Information Act
308
 makes information in records held by Canadian 
government institutions available to the public.  Anyone can request a record by completing and 
filing an Access to Information request with the department holding the documents.   A nominal 
application fee covers up to five hours of search and preparation time and photocopy fees.  The 
cost of additional searching beyond the initial review period is $10 per hour.
309
  Five Access to 
Information requests were sent to the DOJ for documents of interest I identified from court 
transcripts and other records.  One Access to Information request was sent to both the Treasury 
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Board Secretariat and Privy Council Office respectively.  While many documents were enquired 
about, only a few were actually produced.
310
  Written decisions from the Access to Information 
and Privacy Coordinator noted if the results of a search yielded no records.  Alternatively, replies 
cited that information is exempt from release pursuant to section 19.1 of the Access to 
Information Act as it includes disclosure of information related to personal privacy.  Whalen 
finds that solicitor-client privilege and its application to records of the Department of Justice 
forecloses many records to historical research.
311
 
 
3.5.5.d  Association of Justice Counsel 
The AJC’s website is the primary means by which the union communicates with its 
membership across Canada.  As an information portal, the website supplies information on union 
basics such as membership structure, union representation and member services.  It functions as 
a newswire by posting periodic bulletins and updates on union business and activities.  The most 
valuable data sources that are provided on the website and were used for the study consisted of 
updates on collective bargaining negotiations, court documents, and pictures of AJC events.    
 
3.5.5.e  Direct Observation 
Direct observations were conducted of DOJ counsel participating in continuing legal 
education, of DOJ offices, and of federal prosecutors practicing criminal law. The risk of a 
researcher’s presence jeopardizing solicitor-client confidentiality rendered my observations of 
lawyers working on the premises of DOJ offices simply untenable.  As well, sitting in on 
negotiations between employer and union bargaining teams was not feasible.  Instead, I attended 
a full-day annual conference offered by Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Development on 
Crown liability and two workshops organized by the Ontario Bar Association on ethics and 
professionalism for government lawyers.
312
  During fieldwork in Ottawa, I visited the 
headquarters of the DOJ, and received a private guided tour.  Offices in Saskatoon, Edmonton, 
                                                 
310
 A copy of an Access to Information Request response  is included in Appendix C.   
311
 J.M. Whalen, “The Application of Solicitor-Client Privilege to Government Records” (1984) 18 Archivaria 135 
at 140.   
312
 “7th Annual Conference on Crown Liability” (Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Development Program, 
Toronto, Ont., 18 February 2011); “Ethics and Professionalism:  The Ethical Framework” (Ontario Bar Association, 
Toronto, Ont., 2 March 2011) [videostream]; “Ethics and Professionalism: The Public Sector Lawyer as an 
Advocate” (Ontario Bar Association, Toronto, Ont., 7 June 2011); “Ethics and Professionalism: The Public Sector 
Lawyer as Advisor [Solicitor Focus]” (Ontario Bar Association Toronto, Ont., 11 September 2011).    
70 
 
Vancouver and Toronto were also visited.  These are restricted, contemporary worksites that are 
located in impressive downtown buildings.  Seeing these places helped me appreciate part of the 
environment in which DOJ lawyers work.    
 
I attended an afternoon of Charter litigation at the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto 
between the AJC and the Attorney General of Canada.  I spent one week observing and 
informally interviewing seven federal Crown attorneys between two Greater Toronto Area 
courthouses.  The experience provided first-hand insight on prosecutorial work.  Before 
discussions started, I told lawyers about the study, the anonymity received by speaking with me, 
and their consent to participate.  They were asked about the intersection between professional 
ethics and union membership.  In almost all instances, counsel was pleased to talk with me.  
Observations and answers were recorded by hand in a field note log.     
 
3.5.6  Document and Interview Data Analysis  
Data analysis involves interpreting collected information through an analytical cycle.  
Jorgensen explains the process as the disassembly of research material into components that are 
then reassembled and reconstructed to illustrate classes, processes or wholes.
313
  Once arranged, 
facts form an explanatory or descriptive theory that responds to a research question or problem.  
In case study applications, direct interpretation of data invokes a similar process.  Stake notes 
that direct interpretation involves concentrating on an instance, pulling it apart and then putting it 
back together more meaningfully.
314
  Direct interpretation was applied to employer, union and 
court documents in order to identify facts about human resource and salary policies at the DOJ, 
and to build the story about the founding of the AJC, its certification as a bargaining agent, its 
experience with first contract negotiations, and its involvement with Charter litigation.    
 
My analysis of interview data incorporates Kvale and Brikman’s bricolage format, which 
involves mixing different analytic techniques and concepts and applying them to interview data.  
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Interpretations from this method are meant to generate rich descriptions.
315
  As Leavy notes, 
interviews are tools for eliciting people’s subjective experiences and personal accounts.316  
Excerpts from interview transcripts are reproduced to speak for themselves and are incorporated 
into the discussion to complement other sources in describing events.  Thematic content analysis 
was reserved for analyzing interview data regarding legal ethics and collective agreement 
bargaining.
317
  Using this technique, I manually reviewed transcripts for noteworthy responses 
and then reduced them into short, themed phrases.  Phrases from the initial coding framework 
were collected, reviewed and grouped into overlapping categories that reflected patterns and 
similarities across concepts, and offered a guide for reading the transcripts for evidence to 
support my textual interpretations.  
 
3.5.7 Rigour  
Efforts to promote quality of dissertation findings involved data triangulation and 
compliance with best practice guidelines for case studies.  Tellis states that case study is known 
as a triangulated research strategy.
318
  Stake expands on this point by presenting triangulation as 
a quality assurance tactic.
319
  Yin agrees that the study’s construct validity improves through 
triangulation, as corroborating evidence can counteract researcher bias in collection and analysis 
of data.
320
  When possible, then, I triangulated a point of information from documents and 
transcripts by cross-checking it against more than one source.   
 
A second measure of quality assurance involves the researcher using critical appraisal 
guidelines to determine how well a case study informs about a subject.  Myers proposes that 
developing an answer involves the assessment of the case study against several features.  The 
table below sets out the way this study addressed each standard set out by Myers’ taxonomy: 
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         Criteria                 Application in Study 
 
The case must be interesting 
 
First instance of DOJ lawyers unionizing.  
The case must display sufficient evidence 
 
Multiple data sources to enhance data 
credibility. 
The case should be complete 
 
Case study covers period before and after 
founding of the AJC to completion of first 
collective bargain. 
The case study must consider alternative 
perspectives 
Research issues expand scope of inquiry to 
consider alternative explanations for lawyer 
unionization.  
The case study should be written in an 
engaging manner 
 
Narrative style, complemented by data vignettes 
that describe lawyers unionizing and negotiating 
a collective agreement.     
The case study should contribute to 
knowledge.
321
 
Research literature on Canadian lawyer 
unionization is underdeveloped. 
 
3.5.8   Analytic Lens 
Caelli, Ray, and Mill refer to analytic lens as the methodological and interpretive 
presuppositions a researcher brings to bear on the data.
322
  In other words, it is how the 
researcher engages data in light of their underlying assumed theoretical beliefs, which in the case 
of a socio-legal-interpretive study, can be approached through the disciplinary tradition of Law 
and Society or New Legal Realism scholarship.  Law and Society as an interdisciplinary, and 
empirical approach to studying how law works and what it does, focuses on the legal profession 
as a social institution and its interactions with the public.
323
  Researchers working in this 
paradigm carry out diverse fieldwork projects such as: studying relations between divorce 
lawyers and their clients,
324
 conducting case studies of lawyers working in franchise law firms
325
 
and of cause lawyering in Seattle, Washington,
326
 and interviewing a cohort of lawyers in British 
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Columbia, Canada about the impact of gender on practice.
327
  Law and Society scholarship 
diversifies studies of lawyers away from monolithic roles in the administration of courts to 
showing them working as professionals whose aspirations for the practice of law are shaped by 
their worksites.  Law’s impact on lawyers, either as individuals or as a group, creates experiences 
amenable to investigation
328
 and outcomes are studied empirically.
329
    
 
Two recent jurisprudential movements gaining momentum are responsible for stirring 
interest in empirical scholarship: the Empirical Legal Scholarship (ELS) group and the New 
Legal Realism (NLR) group.  Chambliss informs that social-science trained law school 
professors created the ELS association to improve the quality of empirical legal scholarship.
330
  
ELS research provides an accurate and objective representation of law and legal doctrine using 
quantitative research methods.  The methodology adopts a, “model-based approach that seeks a 
positive theory of law or legal institution and then tests that theory using quantitative techniques 
developed from the social science”.331  By contrast, the NLR, the other emerging and 
contemporary circle of legal scholars, seek sound synthesis between law and social science 
through theory and empiricism to build stronger understandings of law and the formulation of 
legal policy.
332
  NLR does not prioritize an overriding method paradigm for conducting research. 
Quantitative and qualitative approaches are used either independently or in tandem depending on 
the nature of the research question.
333
  In this way, NLR practitioners emphasize the role of study 
questions in determining research methods which shows evidence of a well-planned project.
334
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NLR builds on its predecessor, Law and Society, with a few additional nuances.  NLR 
aims to produce social scientific inquiry without reproducing the politics of its investigator.
335
  
Its epistemology is one of pragmatism that links practice to theory through social context and 
real world action as sources of meaning and truth.
336
  Legal phenomena are studied from either a 
“top-down” or “bottom-up” perspective.  The “bottom up” or “contextualist” vein of NLR 
stresses how law works in practice on everyday people as well as for elites and professionals by 
investigating behaviour in social context.
337
  Assessments are made about law affecting 
people,
338
 as well as institutions, as they offer a backdrop for understanding how law works in 
practice and at ground level.
339
  Contextualist studies of lawyers produce understanding about 
causes and remedies for unethical litigation practices in large firm litigation,
340
 yield narratives 
about diversity in law firms,
341
 and inquire about the roles and responsibilities of Bar 
Associations in law reform.
342
   
 
The NLR research orientation, more than that of Law and Society or ELS, informed my 
assumptions about conducting an interpretive, socio-legal study.  Sensitivity to methodology is a 
key component of NLR research in bridging effective translations between law and social 
science and addressing concerns over quality.  By contrast, judging a Law and Society study as 
Friedman suggests, on the basis of its utility and theoretical value within a particular sphere may 
be problematic when integrating case study methods, as this format is criticized as a weak form 
of scientific inquiry itself.
343
 NLR’s focus on respectful translations between differences in 
empirical method and legal theory offered this project the leeway to collect and analyze data 
using case study techniques.  Moreover, during interviews, several respondents noted that they 
appreciated knowing when the study was published, so they could read a copy of it.  These 
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observations suggested that DOJ lawyers and AJC union members are a readership likely 
interested with the study and NLR research is produced for a broad audience with the goal of 
making empirical knowledge accessible.
344
 
 
3.6  Limitation of Study  
This dissertation bears several limitations regarding the perspective of the data and its 
availability.  Describing union organizing invariable prioritizes the findings developed from the 
experience of employees and their representatives, which narrows an understanding of the 
employer’s perspective.  Employer insight is contained to DOJ internal documents, reactions 
tangentially raised and filtered by union materials, and court documents that advocate 
management’s legal interests.  Interviews with DOJ managers and employer bargaining team 
members were not conducted.     
 
Interpreting past events depends on available and trustworthy information.  Marginal 
success with Access to Information requests limited the extent of documents internal to the DOJ 
to those collected from court records.  With the passage of time, court registrars should not be 
presumed to house a complete file, as this project discovered.  Findings raised by this study are 
restricted, then, by the scope of documents obtained and people interviewed.  Nonetheless, the 
court documents used in the study should be considered as yielding reliable information.  
Documents placed into production during a proceeding are meant to prove some fact and are 
presumed truthful in content.  Furthermore, lawyers are ethically obligated not to mislead a court 
with false evidence.  Testimonial proof is reliable to the extent a witness can accurately recall 
their memory and perceptions and witnesses are sworn to tell truth under punishment of perjury 
for flouting their oath.  Court transcripts accurately render testimony and court reporters affirm 
that they transcribe audio taped proceedings to the best of their abilities.  They must also certify 
transcripts as evidence of the official trial record.   
 
Critique that case study findings cannot be generalized to other settings should be seen as 
a misunderstanding rather than an inadequacy of the method.
345
  Some methodologists maintain 
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single-observation case studies that produce causal stories with a view to encouraging legal 
reform but do not follow principles of causal and inductive reasoning are flawed.
346
  However, as 
Stake writes, single case studies excel at focussing on a local situation rather than proposing how 
it represents other cases more broadly.
347
  Due to the idiographic nature of a single case study, it 
is not assumed similar circumstances exist in another context.  Corrothers observes that it is 
extremely difficult if not impossible to generalize about collective bargaining for employed 
professionals.
348
  For this project it is true that: DOJ lawyers work for the largest employer of 
public sector lawyers in Canada; the collective bargaining regime and law governing the federal 
public services is particularized to that workforce; and, collective bargaining disputes amongst 
collectivized lawyers typically do not result in Charter litigation.  Thus, this case study intends 
to create a critical narrative that both explains and describes and while carrying theoretical 
import.
349
  Conclusions drawn from case study findings can then be generalized to theory and 
recommendations for further research can also be proposed.
350
 
 
3.7   Conclusion 
 The chapter’s discussion of a research design anchors the methodological framework of 
the study.  To borrow Gibbert and Ruigrok’s phrasing, this chapter sought to “talk the walk” by 
illustrating the logic and purpose of adopting a particular research design for this project.
351
  The 
task involved reviewing the various approaches available for carrying out academic legal 
research and determining that an empirical-interpretive study in the qualitative case study mode 
was the most appropriate selection.  A framework for evaluating the case study’s credibility was 
provided with reference to the generic qualitative orientation.  The chapter covered the issue of 
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credibility by canvassing the motivation behind the study, appreciating the distinction between 
methodology and methods, addressing rigour, and noting the project’s analytic lens.  The 
necessary background is now set for chapter 4 which presents non-unionized staff relations 
governing DOJ lawyers as a historical antecedent to collective bargaining.   That discussion 
follows next.  
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C H A P T E R 4:  Administrating the Individual Employment    
           Relationship at Canada’s Largest Law Firm 
         
4.1   Introduction 
A union collectively represents all employees in a bargaining unit as the sole agent for 
negotiating terms and conditions of employment with the employer.  For an unrepresented 
workforce, the employer determines the employment contract by incorporating industry 
precedents and observing minimum employment standards.  In 1967, the PSSRA implemented a 
system of individual employment relations that sanctioned the Treasury Board to establish rates 
of pay and conditions of work governing DOJ lawyers as a group of professionals excluded from 
labour legislation.  This long-standing arrangement is a starting point for contextualizing lawyer 
interest in a formal employee representative with collective bargaining rights.  The purpose of 
this chapter, then, is to discuss the DOJ’s emergence as a supplier of comprehensive legal 
services to the federal government from the late 1960s and onwards, and to describe the 
employment policies governing the lawyers who provided them up to a critical juncture in the 
department’s compensation policy: lawyers at the department’s Toronto Regional Office 
receiving an exclusive salary increase in 1990, known as the “Toronto differential”. 
     
In terms of structure, the chapter will start by explaining the PSSRA’s ban on DOJ 
lawyers from joining bargaining units, which will then be followed by a description of the Royal 
Commission on Government Organization’s (RCGO) role in making the DOJ into Canada’s 
original, national law firm.  The next portion of the chapter outlines the department’s place in the 
mosaic of federal government administration as the DOJ Act
352
 entrusts the Minister of Justice 
with the functions of the department, and is followed by discussing the framework that 
determined the conditions of employment for DOJ lawyers.  The third portion of the chapter 
introduces the origin and purpose of the Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (LOAC), which 
was a consultative intermediary between management and non-management DOJ lawyers.
353
  
The discussion closes by analyzing the findings that emerge from the retrospective and largely 
descriptive material presented in this chapter.    
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4.2  DOJ Lawyer Exclusion under the PSSRA: Legislative and Judicial Rationale 
The introduction of legislated collective bargaining rights for federal public servants has 
a rich gestation period, evolving over a half-century of employment relations between the 
Government of Canada and its public servants.
354
  A thumbnail sketch takes us to an Order in 
Council of May 1944 when the National Joint Council (NJC) was established.  The NJC was an 
advisory forum that allowed civil servant employee associations to address labour issues with 
employer representatives and advance policy recommendations for government consideration.  
The employee associations’ initial optimism for the advisement process gradually faded, 
however, after finding their influence was trivial: significant terms and conditions of 
employment such as pay were non-negotiable and joint proposals carried non-binding weight.  
The result of staff associations demanding improved joint consultation led in September 1957 to 
the creation of a Pay Research Bureau under the direction of the Civil Service Commission to 
recommend pay increases on behalf of civil servants to the government.  In reality, though, Pay 
Research Bureau input was ignored and the state continued to unilaterally set wages for 
government employees.
355
  
 
A turning point for federal civil servants attaining collective bargaining rights proved to 
be legislation that failed to remedy the mischief it was intended to cure.  The Civil Service Act of 
1961 granted employee associations the ability to consult with the Minister of Finance over pay 
and between the Minister of Finance and the Civil Service Commission regarding the terms and 
conditions of employment.  Unfortunately, the bifurcated system proved cumbersome, the 
employee organizations still lacked genuine negotiating powers, and the government remained 
the arbiter over rates of pay.
356
  It was the mounting frustration with employer paternalism that 
propelled the staff associations to exploit the political turmoil that overthrew the minority 
Progressive Conservative government led by John Diefenbaker. They demanded collective 
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bargaining rights from any political party willing to curry their favour.
357
  Before the federal 
elections of 1963, Civil Service Federation president Claude Edwards sought each of the 
campaigning parties’ position on collective bargaining.  The tactic was a decisive one as Lester 
Pearson, leader of the Liberal Party and Official Opposition, heeded the call and endorsed 
collective bargaining and arbitration for public servants as an election platform.
358
 
 
Pearson’s newly elected minority Liberals honoured their pledge to the electorate and in 
August 1963, the government appointed Arnold Heeney to head a Preparatory Committee on 
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service.  The Preparatory Committee was to make provisions 
for the introduction of collective bargaining and arbitration into the federal public service, as 
well as to consider reforms for systems of classification and pay.  In July 1965, the Preparatory 
Committee published its report, which included the draft labour relations legislation as a 
touchstone for realizing study recommendations, and the blue print for the most significant 
overhaul of employer-employee relations in the history of the federal public service.  The report 
proclaimed collective bargaining and arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism for all 
employees of the federal government, including almost all professional and scientific staff.  
There was little reason to exclude professional workers as they were found to enjoy a productive 
history of organization and considerable participation in the development of processes of 
consultation regarding pay and terms and conditions of employment.
359
  The Preparatory 
Committee recommended excluding DOJ lawyers from bargaining units, though, fearing that 
their membership could provoke a conflict of interest.
360
  Those individuals who exercised a 
significant amount of responsibility for managing employees or who were involved in a role that 
may be considered as confidential to management were the workers whose membership in a 
union were deemed as potentially prejudiced in their duties.
361
  A tidbit of legislative history on 
the exclusion of DOJ lawyers is provided by then Secretary of the Treasury Board, George 
Davidson’s testimony before the Parliamentary Committee when he articulated that proposed 
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legislation did not contemplate coverage for a workforce identified under a managerial 
exclusion: 
The Legal Officers of the Department of Justice are called upon from time to time to 
provide the government, the employer, with advice and counsel in a great variety of 
matters that could be related to this legislation, and consequently, it is considered that 
they should be regarded as persons employed in a managerial capacity, with all that 
implies for their position under this legislation.
362
        
  
Davidson’s observation implied that the best interests of the employer required that DOJ lawyers 
provide clients with advice not tainted by mixed allegiances or employee sympathies, which 
could spoil its quality and impair government decisions about labour relations.  
 
On 20 February 1967, when the House of Commons assented to the PSSRA, Public 
Service Employment Act,
363
 and An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act,
364
 a legal 
framework for collective bargaining in the federal public service was created.  The PSEA 
governed staffing hires, deployments and lay-offs.  The Financial Administration Act 
amendments confirmed the evolution of Treasury Board as representative of the Crown for the 
management and employment concerns of the federal public service.
365
  The Preparatory 
Committee recommendations regarding who was an employee for the purposes of collective 
bargaining were observed by legislative drafters of the PSSRA.  Section 2 defined an employee 
as a person employed in the public service; it was also subject to several exceptions, one of 
which was a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity.  For greater clarity, the 
PSSRA plainly spelled out that a legal officer in the Department of Justice occupied a managerial 
or confidential position.  Other persons defined within this non-employee class were those in a 
position: of confidentiality to a number of specified officials; with executive duties in developing 
and administrating government programs; involved in personnel administration, the process of 
collective bargaining, or handling grievances; of confidentiality to another employed in a 
managerial or confidential capacity; and any other role the Public Service Staff Relations Board 
(PSSRB) designated.  Nevertheless, DOJ lawyers were still entitled to grievance and 
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adjudication procedures under legislation.  Two years after PSSRA’s passage, over 95 percent of 
eligible federal civil servants unionized.  On 31 March 1969, the PSSRB certified the 
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC) as the bargaining agent for a unit 
of sixty-four employees holding law positions in departments and agencies outside of the DOJ.
366
  
In an annexed schedule to the decision there was an agreement between the Treasury Board and 
PIPSC that designated DOJ legal officers and senior management as confidential and 
management employees.  
 
The PSSRA definition of a “managerial and confidential employee” was a legal standard 
for excluding federal civil service lawyers from bargaining units.  During the PSSRA’s time, the 
National Energy Board, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission, and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada all 
requested hearings asking that the PSSRB determine whether their lawyers conducted 
confidential or managerial work.
367
  By contrast, PIPSC’s applications inquired whether 
positions held by lawyers working as editors at the Supreme Court of Canada and Immigration 
and Refugee Board lawyers remained managerial or confidential.
368
  However, it was the 
PIPSC’s appeal of the PSSRB’s decision in Cuddihy and Norton369 to the Federal Court of 
Appeal that elicited the judicial reasoning on DOJ lawyers being excluded from collective 
bargaining.   
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The case originated with the Canadian Transport Commission serving the PIPSC with an 
application asking the PSSRB to designate two legal officers as managerial or confidential 
persons.  The Commission believed the lawyers were confidential to a superior who themselves 
were employed in a managerial or confidential capacity.  The PSSRB adjudicated the application 
by looking at the duties and responsibilities incumbent on counsel.  The legal analysis addressed 
situations where a person employed in a managerial or confidential capacity delegates a 
significant portion of their duties to another that calls for their skill, judgment, trust and 
confidence.  The observation supported the PSSRB concluding that when legal counsel advises 
management responsible for developing and administrating government programs they too are 
considered confidential employees.    
 
PIPSC then asked the PSSRB reconsider its decision pursuant to section 25 of the 
PSSRA.  Their plea was denied, and so a judicial review of the Board’s ruling to the Federal 
Court of Canada ensued.  On 15 December 1972, the court issued its decision.
370
  Chief Justice 
Wilbur Jackett speaking for Thurlow J. and Bastin D.J. reviewed the evidence considered by the 
PSSRB and confirmed that its judgment was sound.  The court disposed of the matter by 
assuring itself of the correctness of findings regarding the confidential nature of counsel’s work.  
In doing so, his lordship opined on the Board’s reasoning in the context of lawyering for the 
federal government:  
When a portion of the government service has a legal adviser, in the nature of things, his 
services are provided on a confidential basis, and, when it has a legal branch, the 
responsibility of the director of that branch is to provide such services, and to discharge 
that responsibility he must have the help of lawyers whose services must be provided to 
him or as directed by him on a confidential basis.  If such a lawyer is not in a confidential 
position in relations to the director of his branch, or as the statute puts is, “confidential” 
to the director, I have difficulty to conceive, on the basis of my experience, of any person 
in the Public Service who is “confidential to” any other person in the Public Service.371     
  
These confidential characteristics led Jackett to conclude, “This is, undoubtedly, why legal 
officers of the Department of Justice were excluded as a class”.372  Jacket’s comment 
acknowledged that the provision of legal advice requires the candid and free exchange of 
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information between parties.  Solicitor-client privilege facilitates this exchange and courts 
generally uphold it as a rule of law.  The Chief Justice’s observations about the advisory services 
provided by DOJ lawyers at the time, therefore, appear to be grounded in fact.  He could draw 
his insight from a highly successful legal career with the DOJ, having started work there in 
January 1939, developing a tax specialty, and ultimately serving as the eighth Deputy Minister of 
Justice from 1957 to 1960.
373
  Around the time of Jackett’s tenure as Deputy Minister of Justice, 
the Legal Branch of the DOJ was divided into Civil Litigation, Taxation, Criminal Law, Civil 
Law, Legislation, Advisory, and Departmental Service practice sections.
374
  Lawyers in the 
Departmental Services section regularly acted as counsel for nine government departments 
providing most, if not all, of their legal services.
375
  The Civil Law Section addressed matters 
pertaining to Quebec’s Civil Code.  When departments, boards, commissions, and agencies 
required legal opinions lawyers from any section with relevant expertise provided them.
376
  
Opinions that did not fall within the specialty of section solicitors were handled by an Advisory 
unit.  During the twelve months ending May 1961, the sections produced an average of 107 
opinions per month.
377
  Thus, the many aspects of providing legal advice to client departments 
consumed the bulk of the department’s lawyers’ work and defined their roles as counsel to 
management.
378
 
 
4.3   Royal Commission on Government Organization and Re-Organization of the 
Federal Civil Service: Impact on the Department of Justice 
 
On 16 September 1960, the Diefenbaker Progressive Conservative government 
authorized Order in Council P.C. 1960-1269 and established the RCGO.  The Commission, 
headed by prominent businessman J. Grant Glassco, investigated and reported on the 
organization and processes of federal government departments and agencies.  Under broad terms 
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of reference, its purpose was to improve public service delivery by recommending measures for 
the introduction of efficiency and economy into government operations.
379
  Checks and balances 
were needed to contain bureaucratic overlap and spending, improve management of departments 
and agencies, and streamline the machinery of government.  First published in September 1962, 
the Commission’s findings and recommendations stretched over five volumes in what is 
colloquially referred to as the Glassco Report.  
 
A survey of the federal government’s legal needs, who met them and how well, turned 
the investigators’ attention to the DOJ.  Project Group auditors discovered that departments and 
agencies retained their own lawyers, and more significantly, that the DOJ was understaffed and 
its practice of farming out work to other firms and agents created inefficiencies in the system.  
Within the DOJ, some practitioners became intertwined with management in policy making 
decisions while other counsel went underutilized.  In both instances, lawyers drifted from their 
intended roles.  The report noted that DOJ lawyers expressed feelings of reduced career 
prospects and that the department had a problem recruiting and retaining experienced lawyers.
380
  
Recommendations for solving this bureaucratic malaise involved forming an integrated legal 
service and opening branch offices throughout Canada.
381
  The modernization plan put forward 
by the Glassco Report helped raise the department out of relative obscurity and overturned its 
modest operations. 
 
Given the obvious need for reform, DOJ senior management moved to implement the 
first of Glassco’s proposals.  In 1965, Alban Garon, the former Director of the Legal Division in 
the Department of Public Works was appointed to oversee the centralization of legal services in 
the DOJ.
382
  Commercially-orientated and independent agencies (the Judge Advocate General’s 
office at National Defence, External Affairs, Pension Advocates at Veteran’s Affairs and Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police) were excluded from the consolidation exercise.  Undoubtedly, 
Garon’s diplomacy skills as the Director of Departmental Legal Services were taxed by selling 
                                                 
379
 D.C. Rowat, “Canada’s Royal Commission on Government Organization” (1963) 41:2 Public Administration 
193 at 197 
380
 Glassco Report, supra note 374 at 412.  
381
 Ibid. at 421.  
382
 M. Brunet, Out of the Shadows: The Civil Law Tradition in the Department of Justice Canada, 1868-2000 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2000) at 67.  
86 
 
Deputy Ministers on the benefits of the department’s reprisal as the state’s exclusive legal 
representative.
383
   
 
A new administrative model and operational mandate necessitated closer ties between the 
DOJ and the federal departments and agencies it intended to serve.  A network of regional 
offices stood to reinforce headquarters’ operations and fulfill the second of the Glassco Report’s 
edicts for the DOJ.  Improved efficiencies and policies were put in place by in-sourcing work 
previously referred to private firms and by delegating better supervised agents.  DOJ branches 
were opened in Montreal (1965), Toronto and Yellowknife (1966), Vancouver (1967), Winnipeg 
(1969), Halifax and Whitehorse (1970), Edmonton (1972), and Saskatoon (1974).  Expansion 
into these cities firmly established the DOJ’s presence in Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, as 
well as the Atlantic, Northern, and Prairie regions.  The expansion also aided in diversifying the 
department’s work as lawyers employed at the regional offices conducted criminal, tax, civil, 
immigration, and administrative law litigation on behalf of the Crown.  While policy 
development, legislative services, and the departmental legal service units remained concentrated 
within the Ottawa area, the new regional branches influenced the department’s local labour needs 
and compartmentalized lawyers into geographically discrete practice specialties.   
   
Patterning the DOJ as a primary legal service provider continued after the Glassco 
Report.
384
  The Government Organization Act, 1966
385
 passed to implement, and later 
consolidate, Glassco’s recommendations transferred the DOJ’s handling of Parole Service, 
Combines Investigation, Bankruptcy Administration, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and 
Superintendence of Jails to other departments.
386
  Department resources were therefore freed 
from administrating extraneous programs in order to focus on core competencies.  The DOJ 
experienced unprecedented personnel boom.  From the mid-1870s to 1939, departmental staff 
was an inconspicuous lot that consisted of two lawyers and a few clerks inherited from the office 
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of the Attorney General of Upper Canada.
387
  In 1965, the DOJ employed about sixty lawyers.
388
  
From 1966 to 1970, as the Glassco Report reform plan took shape, the DOJ absorbed one 
hundred departmental and agency lawyers from the broader federal public service.   By 1972, of 
the roughly 280 staff lawyers, over 120 worked in departmental legal service units to provide 
counsel to government departments and agencies.
389
   
 
In April 1974, the influx of lawyers from external government departments and agencies 
required the Department to implement further organizational reforms.  Duties of senior 
management were clarified and new senior positions created
390
 and the department continued to 
establish new legal service units to serve additional government departments and agencies.  The 
department became more active in law reform activities after its Legal Research and Planning 
Branch opened to conduct policy-oriented studies.  Lawyers advised on reforming Canadian 
divorce law, reviewed criminal law provisions, and prepared Access to Information and Privacy 
Acts.
391
  In 1982, as a further refinement to operations, a corporate management system for the 
DOJ was implemented.
392
  A Human Rights Law Section was opened to assist the department 
oversee the Charter and handle the corresponding growth in litigation.  By 1984, the number of 
lawyers employed at the DOJ rose to 686 lawyers; by 1991 roughly 735 lawyers were 
employed.
393
   Thus, the full impact of Glassco Report reforms, as well as having to steward a 
national justice system influenced by changing societal norms in Canada during the late 20th 
century, expanded the department’s lawyer labour force and broadened their practice 
responsibilities to eclipse those of a once modest complement of legal advisors.    
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4.4  DOJ Lawyers within the Bureaucracy   
4.4.1 The Minister of Justice’s Role 
 Canada is a constitutional monarchy where formal executive authority is vested in the 
Crown, which is embodied in Queen Elizabeth II.  As of 1 October 2010, she is represented in 
Canada by the 28th Governor General since Confederation, David Johnston.  While executive 
state functions are Crown prerogatives, it is the Prime Minister working with Cabinet, an 
executive committee of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, which is responsible for 
introducing most legislation in the House of Commons.
394
  The Prime Minister staffs Cabinet 
with Ministers who are elected members of the majority party, as well as department heads.  
Section 2(1) of the DOJ Act appoints the Minister of Justice to preside over the DOJ.   
 
Section 2(2) of the DOJ Act specifies that the Minister of Justice, by virtue of holding 
office, is also the Attorney General of Canada.  This dual role embodies the diversity of solicitor 
and barrister practice necessary for the Minister to discharge a wide scope of statutory 
obligations.  Sections 4 and 5 of the DOJ Act respectively detail the separate functions of the 
Minister of Justice and Attorney General.  The Justice Minister advises on the administration of 
national justice, supervises statutes covering areas of law assigned to the federal government 
under the constitutional division of powers, and examines the content of all proposed regulations 
and bills to ensure their compliance with the Charter.  The Attorney General acts as chief legal 
advisor to the heads of departments and agencies, and represents the Crown in all legal action 
brought for or against the federal government.  The DOJ Act defines the Minister’s duties and 
therefore also conditions the need of lawyers for its operations. 
 
To note the obvious, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General cannot personally 
execute all of her or his duties.
395
  The work of the Minister is delegated to the bureaucracy 
assigned to the DOJ.  The Prime Minister appoints the department’s most senior bureaucrat: the 
Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Justice.  Section 24(2)(c) of the 
Interpretation Act
396
 permits the Deputy to assume any powers, duties or functions conferred on 
the Minister of Justice and Attorney General.  The Deputy Minister serves the Minister by 
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advising them on policy development and providing organizational leadership to the department.  
Section 3.3 of the DOJ Act provides for two Associate Deputy Ministers who complement the 
pinnacle of executive command.  Senior management is further distributed through a network of 
chief public servants including Assistant Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Attorneys General, 
Chief Legislative Counsel, and Regional Director Generals, all of whom report to the Deputy 
Minister (who in turn accounts to the Minister).  In this arrangement, lawyers conduct the full 
range of the department’s day-to-day legal services.    
 
The Treasury Board is a Cabinet committee of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and 
employer of personnel at departments and organizations grouped within the core federal public 
administration, which includes the DOJ.  Treasury Board has expansive personnel management 
authority pursuant to section 7(1) of the Financial Administration Act.
397
  Section 11.1(1) of the 
FAA elaborates its powers to cover personnel requirements and allocation of human resources, 
classification of positions and employees, rates of pay, hours of work, leave and other terms and 
conditions of employment as necessary for the effective management of staff.  The Treasury 
Board Secretariat (TBS) conducts Treasury Board’s work by providing administrative services 
and support and monitoring departmental compliance with employer policies.  The Deputy 
Minister of Justice is accountable to TBS for the DOJ following Treasury Board’s employment 
programs and standards.  The Deputy Minister was assisted by department’s Human Resources 
Directorate (HRD).  As noted in the 1989 Guide to the Organization of the Department of 
Justice, the HRD was also responsible for (among other duties) administrating the department’s 
personnel management, supervising programs in staff relations, and interpreting legislation, 
regulations, policies, and collective agreements.
398
 
 
4.4.2 Employment of DOJ Lawyers 
The practice of the DOJ was to issue new lawyers letters of employment that confirmed 
the position hired for, its salary, length of term, and that Treasury Board fixed the terms and 
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conditions of employment.
399
  Treasury Board’s “Consolidated Terms of Conditions and 
Employment Law Group” outlined employer rules regarding work hours, holidays, pay 
entitlement, leaves and discipline.  Separate versions covered non-management and management 
lawyer groups.  Treasury Board unilaterally set rates of pay for DOJ lawyers through a 
classification standard that established the relative worth of jobs in the public service as a basis 
for determining compensation.  Lawyers belonged to the Law (LA) Occupational Group which 
was a subdivision of the Professional and Scientific occupational category.  Positions assigned to 
this group were those involving the application of a comprehensive knowledge of law and its 
practice in performing legal work.  Classifying a position within the Law Group involved both a 
job analysis and evaluation component.
400
  A description was used to understand the purpose and 
function of a job which was referred to as a collection of duties assigned and performed by an 
employee.  A job was evaluated by comparing its duties relative to levels of responsibility within 
an occupational group and in relation to other classified position descriptions.
401
  
 
Furthermore, each occupational group received a classification standard and pay plan.  
Treasury Board administered payment of DOJ lawyers in accordance with the “Salary 
Administration Policy – Law Group – Department of Justice and other excluded legal officers” 
(SAP).  SAP was contained as a chapter in the Personnel Management Manual (PMM).  The 
PMM, carried on as the Treasury Board Manual, was a compendium of service-wide 
employment policies and guidelines issued by Treasury Board and updated through circulars, 
information notices and amendments.
402
  SAP outlined six classification levels for lawyers 
divided into LA-1, LA-2A, LA-2B, LA-3A, LA-3B and LA-3C rankings.  Jobs were assigned to 
various grades based on the required functions, complexity and skills of a position.  Each 
occupational level had a specific salary range that consisted of minimum and maximum pay rates 
commensurate to a practitioner’s experience. 
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Categories moved upwards to reflect increasing degrees of specialization.  LA-1, for 
example, was an entry level designation. Lawyers typically spent four years of practice before 
reaching LA-2A standing, which was reserved for skilled lawyers practicing under minimal 
supervision.  Level LA-2B represented first stage management though senior, non-management 
specialist practitioners populated this and higher stages.  Promotion to these stages was merit 
based, and required a minimum of eight years of experience from the bar.
403
  Lawyers at the LA-
3 stage were expected to manage an organization providing legal services.  As noted in Lehman 
v. Canada, the HRD annually screened DOJ lawyers for inclusion on an eligibility list for 
promotion.
404
  However, composition of the LA-2B and higher group was capped at 30 percent 
of the lawyer workforce. 
 
Section 6 of the SAP instituted a performance pay system.  Periodic in-range increases 
allowed for progression through a salary range.  A lawyer’s assessed level of job performance 
determined the rate of increase as a percentage of the individual’s salary.  Lawyers at LA-2A 
levels and higher received an additional bonus provided their performance evaluations were 
ranked as superior or outstanding, their salary reached the maximum of the pay band, and the 
annual payroll budget allowed for the expense.  The Treasury Board wage policy encouraged 
lawyers to be rewarded for outstanding individual contributions to the department.   
 
An overview of the Treasury Board’s administration of DOJ lawyers’ salaries would not 
be complete without an understanding of how pay rates were determined.  Management lawyer 
salaries were benchmarked to executive group levels within the greater federal public service.  
The Treasury Board received recommendations for changes to salary and terms and conditions of 
employment from the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation which 
reviewed annual findings of the Advisory Group on Executive Compensation in the Public 
Service.  Law Group non-management and management pay scales were set to maintain 
relativity with one another.   The Treasury Board set salary ranges for non-management lawyers 
based on an average rate derived from the earning level of lawyers in the public and private 
practice from across Canada.  Good fringe benefits and pension plan factored in the overall 
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compensation cost.  Lawyers received the same pay rates regardless of the location of their 
employment. Provincial Crown salaries provided a natural comparator for Law Group wages 
because of the similarity of work performed by the two workforces.  Salaries paid to DOJ 
lawyers typically matched or exceeded those received by lawyers employed by provincial 
governments.  Section 4 of the SAP allowed Treasury Board to periodically adjust these wages.  
HRD monitored wage competitiveness by reviewing surveys from the Pay Research Bureau of 
the PSSRB and compensation trends in the broader legal labour market.  Staff recruitment and 
retention difficulties, inflation, or simply an economic adjustment were considered in justifying 
an annual increase to lawyer salaries.   
 
In the era prior to collective bargaining for DOJ lawyers, proposals to Treasury Board for 
amending Law Group compensation proceeded at the discretion of the Deputy Minister working 
through the department’s Executive Committee.  The Executive Committee, a plenary session of 
about twenty senior managers, addressed significant management issues by recommending to the 
Deputy Minister a course of action.  It was one of many advisory panels tasked with handling 
some specific facet of departmental policy, practice or operational issue.  DOJ and HRD senior 
management liaised with their counterparts at TBS in preparing salary submissions.  TBS 
measured the feasibility of Law Group wage submissions when reviewing the request. For 
example, analysts from the Senior Level Retention and Compensation Group, Classification and 
Excluded Groups Division of the Human Resources Branch assessed external comparability and 
affordability of Law Group wage proposals based on similar sources of data used by HRD.  The 
contents of formal submission sought authority from Treasury Board Ministers to adjust salary 
ranges for specific levels within the Law Group.  Approved rates had effective dates that 
generally lasted in short-term yearly spans and they remained in place until revisited by 
subsequent submission.    
  
4.5  Legal Officers’ Advisory Committee (“LOAC”) 
In the early 1980s, Bill Halprin a Crown Prosecutor in the Vancouver Regional Office, 
proposed Justlaw.  Halprin and like-minded colleagues became proactive about their 
employment situation after government anti-inflation measures capped salaries.  They formed 
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Justlaw as an employee association to represent the interests of lawyers.
405
  The usual business of 
setting up an organization took place: a cast of founding directors was named, some people 
signed up while others refused, meetings took place, and funds were collected.  The movement 
spread east by recruiting members in other regional offices.  A reasonable salary increase to 
lawyers’ salaries dissipated the fledgling organization and curtailed its further growth.406  Don 
Christie, Associate Deputy Minister of Justice and overseer of regional offices at the time, 
doubted lawyers could form an association, aware that legislation would render any further 
efforts as an ill-conceived spectacle.
407
  In such belief, he informed Halprin of his serious 
reservations who clearly understood the subtext of the message.    
 
Justlaw was an upstart to the established Management Advisory Committee (MAC).  
MAC was a forum between representatives of legal officers and management.  Representatives 
met with their office constituents to discuss developments and concerns over salary, working 
conditions and the terms and conditions of employment, which they later relayed at meetings 
with management.
408
  MAC was disbanded after Deputy Minister of Justice Roger Tassé 
determined the organization needed new direction.  Apparently, legal representatives from 
Ottawa disavowed management’s positions and sealed MAC’s fate.409  MAC representatives 
from different regional offices wrote to Tassé about a revived committee.  The drive succeeded 
when in early 1982 LOAC, a joint committee of management and lawyer representatives, 
started.
410
    
      
   LOAC’s beginnings seem to indicate a departmental culture where management saw the 
employment interests of lawyers as secondary to their work.   LOAC offered lawyers a way to 
participate in the affairs of the department, and management the mechanism for constructing a 
decent working relationship with its lawyers.  DOJ annual reports produced throughout the mid-
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1980s revealed LOAC’s early work.411  Since LOAC’s inception, staffing and promotion 
processes and policies were regular topics addressed, as were lawyers’ salaries, benefits, and 
training.  LOAC also advised on official languages policy and on employment equity issues, and 
it helped propose new criteria for the performance review system.  By 1987, LOAC provided 
input on a departmental submission to Treasury Board on terms and conditions of 
employment.
412
 
     
LOAC operated within a committee-consultation model.  Its membership consisted of 
five management nominees appointed by the Deputy Minister and sixteen non-management 
lawyer-representatives.
413
  The non-management lawyer representatives consisted of voluntary 
members elected from each of the regional offices, headquarters and departmental legal service 
units.  A management chair, appointed by the Deputy Minister, presided over meetings.  The co-
chair was a secretary chosen from non-management lawyer representatives.  Recommendations 
on employee-employer matters were communicated through at least two management members 
of LOAC who reported to the Executive Committee.
414
  LOAC meetings were held bi-annually 
in Ottawa.  LOAC representatives convened among themselves, typically by conference call, to 
address matters as required. 
  
LOAC’s mandate outlined its roles: to advise management on terms and conditions of 
employment, employee-management relations, departmental personnel management systems, the 
quality of the work environment, and “to be actively involved in the formulation and 
presentation of compensation submissions by inter alia legal officer compensation on the LA 
Compensation Committee”.415  Vancouver Regional Office lawyer 1, a former LOAC regional 
office representative, explained the group’s work as such:  
So we had sort of an association of lawyers bringing forward issues with respect to 
primarily employment issues. So rate of pay and terms and conditions of employment 
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etc... I would’ve described it as a loose association and each regional office had a 
representative... I would say a key role, as I thought when I was the LOAC 
representative, was a conduit for information. Information from the lawyers, up the line 
to management, and information from management down the line to the lawyers.   
  
This respondent identified LOAC’s function as a communication channel.  LOAC’s power as an 
advocate for lawyers, however, was constrained.  Lawyers could talk to supervisors about their 
individual work concerns and more intractable disputes were pursued through formal grievances.  
LOAC’s influence was primarily in consulting with management and its recommendations 
extended as far as management deemed appropriate. Turnover of representatives was common 
and their work suffered from inadequate resources and budget.   Without the authority or legal 
right to bargain on behalf of lawyers, LOAC strove to act as a voice for employees, but its more 
fundamental problem was that it was grossly unequal in power to management, which did not 
necessarily have to listen to its proposals on compensation and other terms and conditions of 
employment.  
 
4.6  Conclusion  
DOJ lawyers designated as confidential and management employees under the PSSRA 
were prohibited from forming bargaining units.  The Preparatory Committee wanting to prevent 
potential conflicts of interest reflected the industrial relations type of thinking of a particular time 
and place that applied to the work conducted by a relatively small bureaucracy of lawyers.  The 
expansion and diversification of operations publicized by the DOJ from at least the early 
1970s,
416
 however, created lawyering roles for its staff that were distinct from advisory 
functions.  Over time, not all lawyers could be expected to provide labour and employment 
advice to clients regarding the PSRRA or determine general organizational policy by sitting on 
departmental committees.  Management responsibilities consumed no more than a third of the 
workforce which left the remaining majority subject to inapt labour provisions regarding 
membership in a bargaining unit.  As the factual predicate underlying the PSSRA’s blanket 
exclusion changed, the rationale for excluding positions occupied by DOJ lawyers from a 
bargaining unit lost its force.  Unable to bargain collectively, staff lawyers had little say over the 
way their work was directed.  LOAC was never intended as an employee association, and 
previous attempts at the department to establish one unceremoniously petered out.  Discussions 
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between DOJ and TBS on matters of annual compensation or operational problems were 
conducted with a view to how best manage staff in support of efficient department operations.  
 
A workplace converting from a non-union to a union form of representation is an instance 
of organizational change.  Pentland suggests studies can explore such developments by looking 
at the connection between antecedent and consequence and describing the events that connect 
them.
417
  The management system designed for directing unrepresented DOJ lawyers 
characterizes an initial condition.  Outdated legislation and a compensation scheme set by the 
employer were elements of that framework incapable of independently sparking a unionization 
movement.  They highlight, however, the primary variables capable of interacting and 
overlapping with actors intrinsic to the department.  For example, LOAC’s non-management 
representatives desired greater representative capacities during the mid-1990s when the 
centrally-commanded federal public service was being downsized and restrained from wage 
increases.  
 
The multi-jurisdictional legal practice of the DOJ inevitably faced operational difficulties 
that demanded adaptability from a rigid employment administration.  In 1990, a dire recruitment 
and retention problem at the Toronto Regional Office forced an unprecedented deviation from 
national salary policy in favour of the Treasury Board approving a Toronto differential.   The 
department’s failure to rescind the benefit demonstrated the inequities in the management system 
by aggravating employee expectations of fair dealing.  Employment environments prone to 
organizing drives are those where feelings of job dissatisfaction and autocratic leadership 
pervade amongst workers,
418
 which appeared to be the case for the DOJ.  The events responsible 
for DOJ lawyers finally obtaining the right of collective bargaining are presented in the 
following chapter.    
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C H A P T E R 5:  DOJ Lawyers Become Employees  
George Thomson, when he was deputy minister, turned up at Treasury Board and said the 
issues of non-management lawyers are not his responsibility.  Lawyers at Justice had 
been willing to rely on the paternalism of management but not any longer.
419
 
 
5.1  Introduction      
In Canada’s Parliamentary democracy, a political party that wins the most seats in the 
House of Commons after an election forms the country’s next federal government.  The reigning 
government will proceed to pass laws to implement political priorities identified in the Governor 
General’s throne speech, which opens every new session of Parliament, or, as part of its 
established governance, modify existing laws to chart new public policy.  On 6 February 2003, 
the majority Liberals instituted a fundamental policy shift in federal public sector labour and 
employment relations by introducing Bill C-25, the Public Service Modernization Act, into the 
House of Commons.
420
  Bill C-25 heralded the most significant changes to human resources 
management in the federal civil service in over three decades, which directly affected the DOJ.
421
  
Under new labour legislation, the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA), non-
management DOJ lawyers could now unionize.  For them to exercise their individual free choice 
and realize their newfound privilege, however, required an employee organization to campaign 
for recognition and convince a majority of DOJ lawyers that the benefits of pursuing workplace 
objectives through a collective outweighed those associated with maintaining the existing, 
management-driven system of individual employment relations.    
 
This chapter’s goal is to understand the factors and events responsible for the AJC 
conducting a successful organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers.  I propose that a majority of DOJ 
lawyers’ support for the AJC was attributed to changes in employment relations both internally, 
at the DOJ, and externally, in the broader federal public service between 1990 and 2003.  My 
analysis develops a holistic schema that embeds the unionization process within a historical, 
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bureaucratic, and legal context that arose from three key institutional developments: (1) 
employee dissatisfaction with the employer as a pre-condition for collective action; (2) the Legal 
Officers’ Advisory Committee’s (LOAC) development into the AJC based on employee support 
to secure formal workplace representation and improve wages through collective bargaining; and 
(3) the AJC’s organizing campaign of DOJ lawyers as an extension of its initial mandate for 
becoming a professional association. 
 
To mark the start of this series of events, this discussion begins with a close look at the 
Treasury Board’s decision in June 1990 to approve a rare deviation in the DOJ’s national salary 
plan: a Toronto differential that paid lawyers at the Toronto Regional Office (TRO) more than 
lawyers working elsewhere in the department (in order to remedy a staffing crisis exacerbated by 
wage gains secured by Ontario government lawyers collectively bargaining).
422
  The introduction 
and prolongation of the Toronto differential is traced to show how a stop-gap measure sustained 
by a half-decade of federal government wage-restraint legislation and the department’s inability 
to manage employee expectations for extending salary equity helped LOAC’s non-management 
representatives structure a mandate for becoming a professional association.  The introduction of 
the PSMA, with its goal of promoting harmonious labour relations in the federal public service, 
allowed the AJC to recruit DOJ lawyers and stand to become be certified by the PSLRB as a 
union once the PSLRA came into effect on 1 April 2005.  The following discussion will analyze 
the AJC’s mobilization of lawyers that defused the organizing entreaties of the Professional 
Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), but could not appease lawyers employed at the 
TRO (who formed their own employee organization as the Federal Law Officers of the Crown, 
[FLOC] with the goal of striking out as their own employee organization under the PSLRA).  
Ultimately, this chapter traces each of the three key sequences of events in the unionization 
process to provide a concise history that argues that lawyers supported the AJC based on its 
perceived instrumentality of increasing input in the determination of the employment agreement 
through collective bargaining—particularly for wage equity and increase—with Treasury Board.      
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5.2   DOJ Law Group National Wage Policy Schism: The Toronto Differential   
5.2.1 Background     
The Toronto differential was tied to the city’s dynamic legal market, of which the DOJ’s 
Toronto operations were a part.  During the late 1980s, Toronto, as Ontario’s commercial and 
financial capital, enjoyed economic prosperity that was driven by rapid population growth, 
booming real estate market, and lead-up to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement that kept 
reputable downtown Toronto law firms’ solicitors busy with commercial transactions, and their 
barristers litigating an abundance of court files.  Upper-tier law firms were hiring lawyers and 
legal secretaries to maintain high service levels and to prepare for expansion into new practice 
areas.
423
  An upbeat legal labour market prompted the management of the DOJ’s TRO to closely 
follow developments concerning its roughly sixty-five lawyers, the vast majority of whom 
occupied the LA-1 and LA-2A ranks.  In fall 1987, management’s attention to staffing increased 
after turnover destabilized the DOJ’s flagship regional office.    
 
The TRO was strategically located to supply legal and advisory work to various 
government departments operating throughout the populous Greater Toronto and southwestern 
Ontario area.  Toronto’s many local tribunals and courthouses, including the province’s 
Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal (where the federal government initiated and defended 
all types of legal actions), assured the office had its share of both high profile and mundane 
cases.  Between 1987 and 1988 the central Toronto office was extremely busy opening some five 
thousand new files and closing a similar amount.
424
  Its lawyers were spread across a General 
Counsel group and diverse practice sections, which consisted of Advisory, Commercial and 
Property Law, Civil Litigation, Tax Litigation, and Criminal Prosecution.  High volume 
operations were sustained through a division of labour between legal support staff (who handled 
the administrative duties of a file) and lawyers (who practiced in courts and boardrooms).  With 
half of the office’s law assistants and clerks quitting, however, lawyers had to make up the 
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labour shortfall by working more hours.
425
  The extra work kept piling on lawyers’ desks and, 
compounding the stress, operations were relocated to an upper floor within the historic Dominion 
Public Building at the foot of downtown Toronto.  The move into reconverted warehouse space 
greatly displeased staff as environs were cramped and office procedures were not automated.        
 
In response to office turmoil, between 1987 and 1990, roughly thirty lawyers left for the 
private bar or relocated to other DOJ offices.
426
  Replacing the departures was difficult as heavy 
workloads and lack of mentoring, compounded by poor compensation packages that Toronto’s 
steep cost of living magnified, produced a revolving door of new personnel.
427
  New lawyers 
lasted only twelve to eighteen month and whereas previous job postings attracted upwards of 
forty applicants, the number plummeted to five or six hopefuls.
428
  This passage, drawn from a 
memorandum written by a member of the External Competition Committee to the TRO’s 
Director, Ted Thompson, outlined the many factors causing the hiring problem: 
As I indicated to you verbally, during the course of our interviews of the candidates who 
applied for the position with the Advisory, Commercial and Property Law Section of our 
office on January 17, 1990, the candidates all expressed surprise at the low rates of pay 
within the federal government...In the advertisement that was posted, the recruitment 
rates for the Department of Justice were not included.  Given the reaction of all the 
candidates on January 17, 1990, if the recruitment rates had been posted, I question how 
many candidates would still have applied to the Department of Justice.  Even if we are 
able to recruit and hire a candidate, it is questionable how long we will be able to keep 
that candidate given the significant disparity between the salaries paid by the Department 
of Justice and the salaries paid by other law firms not only in downtown Toronto but in 
the suburbs.
429
           
  
Mounting recruitment and retention difficulties demonstrated that the DOJ had more than lost its 
lustre as an employer: its TRO was in the throes of a dismal staffing dilemma.   
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Lawyers who remained with the department pursued several strategies to strengthen their 
demands for better wages and a reason to stay.  One approach indicated by Ted Thompson’s 
memorandum to the Associate Deputy Minister Litigation, Douglas Rutherford, involved 
lawyers documenting their grievances:  
The letter to the Deputy of October 5, 1989, signed by many of the Toronto lawyers is 
another cry of despair.  It is clear they have many misperceptions.  Unfortunately, I have 
not been able to obtain a concise and consistent statement of our salary policies so that I 
am in a position to provide accurate information as to how LA-1 increases will be applied 
and calculated.  While these issues are being settled, a feeling of abandonment and a 
sense that the real problems in Toronto are going unrecognized and the dedicated efforts 
by our staff to cope are unappreciated.
430
   
 
Another approach, expressed by former Toronto Regional Office lawyer 1, was a constitutional 
challenge over the PSSRA prohibiting DOJ lawyers from collective bargaining.  The idea 
developed during the summer of 1989, inspired by the successes of provincial lawyers employed 
by the Ontario Ministry of Attorney General (MAG).  After years of provincial government 
lawyers working under poor conditions and pay,
431
 the Ontario government appointed labour law 
professor Paul Weiler to prepare a report with recommendations for establishing compensation 
levels and terms and conditions of employment for professional public servants without statutory 
entitlement to collective bargaining.
432
  The January 1988 Weiler Report recommended that the 
province’s lawyers have access to collective negotiations over salary and terms of conditions of 
employment accompanied by binding arbitration.  On 21 July 1989, the lobbying of the Ontario 
Crown Attorney’s Association (OCAA) and Association of Law Officers of the Crown (ALOC) 
led to the province recognizing both employee associations through the signing of the 
Framework Agreement on Collective Bargaining, which affirmed collective bargaining and the 
scope of issues to be covered during upcoming negotiations.
433
  Some of Toronto’s DOJ lawyers 
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believed that suing the federal government could jumpstart similar gains, so they each 
contributed $50 to fund a retainer for labour lawyer Paul Cavaluzzo to prepare a legal opinion. 
On its strength, a statement of claim was issued but the action died soon thereafter.  Despite his 
prominence in co-ordinating the suit, former TRO lawyer 1 did not bemoan the suit’s demise—
he left the DOJ for private practice.  
 
In January 1990, OCCA, ALOC, and the Province of Ontario achieved a first collective 
agreement that gave provincial government lawyers, on average, a 30 percent pay raise over two 
years retroactive to January 1989, a new salary classification plan, and the payment of law 
society fees.
434
  The agreement caused the MAG to standout as a cross-town, public sector rival 
to the DOJ, which offered a much better employment package and desperately needed 
prosecutors to tackle a backlog of cases clogging the courts.
435
  As the current workforce could 
not maintain service levels, any drain of talent to the province imperiled the office’s viability.  
Government departments already bemoaned their current representation by the TRO regardless 
of the embarrassment caused to the DOJ.  An excerpt from this senior Toronto counsel’s 
memorandum to Rutherford portrays the level of frustration expressed by upset clients:  
In addition, more and more our departmental clients express concern about whether we 
can or will deliver the high quality of legal services that they were receiving in the past.  
They are increasingly asking to be represented by the private bar because there is little or 
no turn-over in lawyers handling their cases and they have more senior staff and 
resources (adequate resources).  They do not have to wait long periods of time for 
something to be done on their files because there is more than one lawyer handling their 
case.  They can call up the office and speak to the same lawyer that they have been 
dealing with during the course of the proceedings, rather than be told when dealing with 
our office, that their lawyer(s) has left the Department, and someone will call them back 
later.  Later means probably a week to ten days, if they are lucky.
436
     
  
Proposed solutions in the form of farming out work to Ottawa or even shuttering Toronto’s 
operations were debated but rejected for being impractical, short-sighted, and ineffective at 
catching up to existing workloads and meeting future demands.  Outsourcing excess legal files to 
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agents was not a way out either, since staff lawyers still needed to supervise contractors.  At this 
point, saving Toronto’s operations required measures beyond Thompson’s immediate powers.   
 
On 31 January 1990, DOJ senior managers, consisting of Douglas Rutherford, the 
Assistant Deputy Minister – Corporate Management Sector Norman LaBarre, and Human 
Resources Directorate (HRD) Director General Sandra Stoddard, attended the Toronto office to 
canvass employees for their concerns and alert them to operational problems being addressed. 
The mission returned to Ottawa and debriefed Deputy Minister John Tait, who then ordered an 
action plan for saving the TRO.  As the Law Group compensation package expired on 1 April 
1989, the pending HRD proposal to TBS regarding revised terms and conditions of employment, 
performance pay, and an adjustment to the national salary range of articling students, LA-1, LA-
2A and LA-2B lawyers, retroactive to 1 April 1989, would include a non-pensionable, 
terminable regional allowance tacked on to the national salary scale (rather than a base salary 
increase) and paid solely to lawyers employed at, or reporting to, the TRO.  This “parity 
allowance” proposal would adjust salary ranges to match those received by Ontario MAG 
lawyers effective 1 January 1990 (with subsequent range adjustments implemented in August 
and October).  
 
Non-management LOAC representatives monitored the department’s compensation 
proposal through its members’ participation on the LA Compensation Committee.  On 12 March 
1990, LOAC LA Compensation Committee members convened a conference call with regional 
LOAC members to discuss the department’s proposal.  LOAC’s non-management chair, Guy 
Faggiolo, advised the plenum that a national rate increase could not match the parity allowance. 
This was because introducing an across-the-board gain at Ontario MAG rates of $12,000 to 
$16,000 would distort relativity between non-management and executive pay scales, which was a 
cornerstone of Treasury Board compensation policy.
437
  Montreal’s LOAC representative and 
member of the LA Compensation Committee suggested a competitiveness increase to the 
national salary rate that would narrow the difference between the parity allowance for Toronto to 
$5000 and make the introduction of the differential less shocking to other lawyers.  This salary 
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competitiveness measure was advanced through a memorandum to LaBarre to be considered by 
the department’s executives during their negotiations with TBS.438   
 
A 15 March 1990 meeting between TBS and DOJ representatives cast a new die for the 
department’s draft Law Group compensation submission.  TBS rejected the DOJ’s retroactive 
start date of 1 April 1989 for national salary rate adjustments, and instead proposed 31 March 
1990.  Furthermore, approving the DOJ’s regional parity allowance plan as it stood troubled 
TBS’s representatives.  They did not want regional economics to skew the remuneration of 
lawyers.  During the steep inflation years of the early 1980s, the DOJ adhered to a single pay 
policy despite lawyers in Vancouver, Toronto, and Edmonton calling for a salary raise to match 
escalating cost of living expenses.  As well, TBS disliked the notion of special treatment for one 
set of civil servants while other unionized government departments in Toronto also had their own 
recruitment and retention issues.  They suspected influential national unions, such as the Public 
Service Alliance of Canada, would use the precedent to seek similar concessions in upcoming 
collective bargaining negotiations.  Thus, TBS recommended a prudent compromise: the TRO 
would receive its own salary scale, distinct and separate from the national standard, at rates 
comparable to those paid by the MAG.  At the LA Compensation meeting of 30 March 1990, 
LaBarre relayed to LOAC’s representatives that the parity allowance was being dropped for a 
separate Toronto salary scale. 
   
By 20 April 1990, HRD staff finalized the Law Group compensation proposal and 
readied it for the signature of the Associate Deputy Minister, Deputy Minister, and Minister of 
Justice.  Once the TBS received the DOJ’s submission, its staff prepared an aide-memoire to 
accompany the proposal and delivered the completed package to the Treasury Board.  In decision 
number 814117, dated 6 June 1990, Treasury Board ministers approved the DOJ’s request for 
establishing a regional salary scale for lawyers employed at the TRO.  The Treasury Board 
decision overlooked any restructuring of the national salary ranges as TBS withheld that portion 
of the submission.  Deputy Minister Tait’s memorandum of 11 June 1990 to lawyers explained 
the decision to bifurcate the salary submission as follows:   
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As a result of discussions with Treasury Board officials concerning our submission, and 
given the urgency of the situation regarding the Toronto Regional Office, it was decided 
to proceed to the Board with respect to the Toronto rates of pay only, as the consideration 
of the salary range changes sought on a national basis would have led to delays in the 
approval process.  We proceeded on this basis on the understanding that Board officials 
would continue to work with us on a priority basis to review the general Law Group 
salaries and that an appropriate submission to the Board would be made in that regard as 
soon as possible...Consultations with the LA Compensation Committee on this next phase 
of negotiations with the Treasury Board will continue, and all efforts will be made to 
advise you of the outcome in a timely way.
439
         
  
The decision naturally heightened lawyers’ interest in learning the eventual margin between the 
two salary scales.  The suspense ended on 25 July 1990, after Treasury Board ministers approved 
the national DOJ Law Group compensation proposal and awarded economic adjustments in the 
amount of 0 percent and 3 percent effective 31 March 1990 and 31 March 1991 respectively.  
The decision set national salary ranges for lawyers at the LA-2A level roughly $6,000 lower than 
the starting range of the Toronto scale and $13,000 less at its upper end.   
  
DOJ senior management’s handling of the Law Group compensation proposal 
demonstrated that LOAC’s involvement in the salary determination process was moderated.  
After its 7 June 1990 conference call with LaBarre, LOAC’s non-management representatives 
understood that the Treasury Board would likely approve the competitiveness increase advanced 
by its members on the LA Compensation Committee.  Instead, Treasury Board ministers 
approved the same wage increases proposed by the 20 April 1990 Law Group compensation 
submission.  Moreover, LOAC’s LA Compensation members believed that Treasury Board 
would review the national salary proposal in August, only to discover the national salary 
submission had proceeded in July.
440
  LA Compensation Committee members documented the 
unease caused by their peripheral involvement as this memorandum written to LaBarre notes: 
...Following the Board’s decision to adopt special rates of pay for lawyers in the Toronto 
Regional Office, you indicated, in the course of a telephone conversation with the 
representatives of the Legal Officers on LOAC, that there was a 90% chance that the 
Board would approve the Department’s request for a competitiveness increase for non-
Toronto LA’s...We asked you whether the Board had any problems with our 
Department`s proposed submission.  The only problem you mentioned was the Board 
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officials’ reluctance to make a retroactive rate change.  You further indicated that apart 
from this, Board officials found our request...reasonable.  Needless to say, as we had not 
been informed of any other problems with our submission, the Board’s unfavourable 
decision, the details of which we are unaware, came as a disagreeable surprise.  
 
In his memorandum of June 11, 1990...John Tait, indicated that... the Department would 
continue to work with it on a priority basis to review the general Law group salaries and 
an appropriate TB submission would be made as soon as possible.  He...sa[id] that 
“[c]onsultations with the LA Compensation Committee on this next phase of negotiations 
will continue...” No such consultations took place on the content of or strategy pertaining 
to this submission nor were the representatives of the Legal Officers given a copy of the 
second submission...   
 
We have been instructed by the representatives of the legal officers on LOAC to register 
their displeasure with the lack of consultation between management and LA 
representatives during this last phase of the salary negotiation process.  By not 
volunteering timely and relevant information to the LAs’ representatives on the 
Compensation Committee the Department was certainly not living up to the spirit of its 
own Mission and Values Statement which states that “[t]he Department’s strength comes 
from all members of the organization who are committed to working together on the basis 
of mutual trust, support, and respect.” 
 
...LOAC representatives recognize that management must be given considerable leeway 
in carrying out negotiations, nonetheless, they are of the view that, where these could 
lead to results totally different from those sought by the Department and agreed to by the 
LAs representatives on the LA Compensation Committee, the latter ought to be advised 
beforehand in order to ascertain possible input.
441
 
 
The Toronto differential, as an exceptional deviation from the SAP’s objective for the 
consistent administration of salaries for DOJ lawyers, was a zero-sum and divisive compensation 
policy.  The longer the two unequal salary scales existed, the more lawyers who did not work at 
the TRO could ask their LOAC representatives to inquire about plans DOJ management had for 
increasing the national salary scale or for formalizing provisions to allow for allowances to any 
office facing labour circumstances like Toronto’s.  In the event that lawyers wanted to take a 
more proactive stance, there was always the idea floated by Vancouver’s LOAC representative to 
revive Justlaw and agitate for an improvement in national salary rates.
442
  By and large, however, 
non-management LOAC representatives preached patience.  They saw a silver lining in the 
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Treasury Board having to maintain comparability between the Toronto differential and salaries 
paid by the Ontario MAG—the national salary scale would have to be adjusted upwards as well.  
By contrast, TBS’s preference was for the two salary scales to return to one and it believed that, 
with recent Pay Research Bureau data showing that the national benchmark for lawyer salaries at 
a plateau due to a national recession and the legal labour market cooling in Toronto, the 
convergence would occur sooner than later.  However, economic and political factors beyond the 
control of either the TBS or the DOJ instigated measures responsible for the Toronto 
differential’s immediate perpetuation.   
 
5.2.2 Legislative Deep Freeze  
 The emerging salary compensation picture at the DOJ was overshadowed by the 
recession of the early 1990s, which compounded a fiscal crisis in federal government finances, 
and the Conservative (and subsequent Liberal) government’s program of tackling deep budget 
deficits.  On 26 February 1991, the government’s budget, tabled in the House of Commons, 
called for aggressively restraining state debt and expenditures.  The budget initiated the period of 
federal government restraint and retrenchment lasting from 1991 to 1997, which involved 
Ottawa reducing government services, downsizing the federal public service, and freezing public 
sector wages.  With the enactment of the Public Sector Compensation Act
443
 (PSCA) on 2 
October 1991, the government implemented its budget prerogatives and quelled federal 
employee unrest over wage restraints in one fell swoop.  Every compensation plan along with 
terms and conditions of employment extant in the federal public service as of February 1991 was 
extended by twenty-four additional months. The law froze salary ranges of both DOJ national 
and Toronto compensation plans for the first year of the Act, but they would rise by 3 percent for 
the second annum.    
 
The salaries of DOJ lawyers were directly affected by PSCA’s cost-containing provisions.  
The Toronto differential stalled behind the salaries of Ontario MAG lawyers after an increase 
raised it by an additional 5.78 percent effective 1 January 1991.  On 22 November 1991, TBS’s 
Personnel Policy Branch issued a directive suspending in-range salary performance pay and 
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bonuses for DOJ lawyers at the LA-2A and higher level for the 1991-1992 appraisal year.
444
  The 
course of PSCA’s cost restrictions required LaBarre’s successor, Mario Dion, to monitor and 
liaison with TBS regarding the Toronto differential’s continuance since the Treasury Board 
approved the benefit on the understanding of it being periodically reviewed.  In October 1992, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers was retained to conduct a study analyzing the city’s short-to-medium 
term labour market as a measure for assessing the differential’s longevity. TRO lawyers 
responded by forming a committee that denounced the need for the project.  Their concerns were 
allayed on 2 April 1993 by the passage of the Government Expenditure Restraint Act, 1993 No. 
2
445
 as the Act extended section 5 of the PSCA’s salary range and performance pay moratoriums 
for two additional years.  The Budget Implementation Act, 1994
446
 (BIA), the third and final piece 
of wage-restraint legislation, extended the legislative freeze on public servant compensation 
plans until 31 May 1997.
447
  The three Acts preserved the Toronto differential over the length of 
their legislated terms, which prevented the TBS and DOJ from formally revisiting its necessity.       
 
Legislation artificially sustaining the Toronto differential far beyond the market 
conditions that justified it perplexed senior management at the DOJ who wanted a return to a 
single national salary plan.  As it stood, the differential flouted the DOJ’s cost–cutting 
prerogatives as its operational budget was slashed by 10 percent from 1993 to 1997.
448
  
Continued administration of the Toronto differential hampered employee morale and fanned the 
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discontent of other lawyers working in large cities who did not receive the benefit.
449
  The 
lawyers most incensed by the Toronto differential were those employed at the Vancouver 
Regional Office.  They performed the same work as lawyers in Toronto and also faced soaring 
housing and living costs.  In May 1995, Vancouver lawyers apprised their Regional Director, Jim 
Bissell, of ten criteria that they determined further investigation would support their calls for 
higher wages.
450
  A few months later, they voiced their demands through numerous grievances to 
Deputy Minister Thomson, albeit unsuccessfully, claiming financial and geographic 
discrimination because of Treasury Board implementing the Toronto differential.  These failed 
complaints encouraged lawyers to initiate a collection (seeking $100 from each member) to fund 
a legal opinion about suing the government and to review of a draft statement of claim.  On 31 
May 1996, fifty-three Vancouver lawyers sued the Attorney General of Canada, Treasury Board 
of Canada, Minister of Justice and Deputy Minister of Justice for damages, claiming that the 
Toronto differential breached an express term of their contract of employment and declaring that 
the PSSRA’s prohibition on DOJ lawyers organizing to collectively bargain infringed their 
Charter right of freedom of association.
451
  The BIA expiring, along with the market conditions 
responsible for the Toronto differential dissipating, therefore offered the DOJ a window of 
opportunity to settle some of its finance and personnel issues by revisiting the Toronto 
differential.  In April 1996, Thomson wrote to the secretary of TBS requesting measures to allow 
the DOJ to adjust the Toronto differential.  When the DOJ’s HRD followed up with the TBS 
about the Toronto salary scale review process they were advised to advance a salary position 
based on an objective market analysis.
452
    
 
Six years of fiscal restraint and downsizing understandably damaged the reputation of the 
federal government as an employer.  This assessment, noted by the Clerk of the Privy Council, 
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Jocelyne Bourgon, in her February 1997 Fourth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the 
Public Service of Canada, illustrated the “quiet crisis” brewing in the federal public service 
endemic of low morale, job dissatisfaction and flight among civil servants caused by cutbacks.
453
  
Strained labour and employment relations demanded the government launch the ambitious 
human resources reform programme of La Relève, which was a wholesale review and multi-year 
action plan for revitalizing the federal bureaucracy.  At the DOJ, the La Relève: Justice Action 
Plan saw the department meeting its future business challenges through a new competency-based 
system for all DOJ human resources policies, practices, processes, and systems.  The document 
outlined the department’s strategy for reforming human resources management and proposed 
that its primary challenge was to create an engaged and resourceful workforce within a changing 
legal service delivery environment.
454
  The department faced the immediate issues of 
compensation, automatic promotion between LA-1 to LA-2A that was suspended since January 
1993, senior promotion, and improved employee recognition that could hinder employee 
participation in the department’s larger reform agenda.455  To address these matters, as well as 
the changes to the Toronto differential, implementation of performance pay for 1997, and 
revising terms and conditions of employment, the report noted a sub-committee of the Human 
Resources Committee would investigate and make recommendations to the department’s 
Executive Committee.
456
   
 
Indeed, in April 1997, the DOJ’s Human Resources Committee (HRC) struck an LA 
Compensation Subcommittee (LACS) (comprised of managers and three LOAC non-
management representatives) to allow for employee representation on the panel.  Compensation 
policies needed normalizing after the triumvirate of wage restraint Acts caused several anomalies 
in the wages of the DOJ Law Group: salary ranges required an economic adjustment without 
allowing for retroactive increase; recruiting rates were outdated; LA-2A and LA-2B lawyers 
accumulated tenure and their salaries needed repositioning within the salary grid to reflect their 
advancement.  Furthermore, there were no salary adjustment for lawyers within the LA-2A pay 
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band, but progression for lawyers at the LA-1 level resulted in “leapfrogging” where, upon a 
subordinate’s promotion between levels, they surpassed the salary of their superior despite 
having less experience. The HRC was short on resources previously dedicated to researching 
lawyers’ compensation as the Research Pay Bureau folded in February 1992, which was 
followed by the shuttering of the Law Group Compensation Committee one year later.  In spring 
1997, Deputy Minister Thomson retained an external consultant, Robert Casault, to serve as a 
liaison to the HRC and address the Toronto differential by investigating whether the recruitment 
and retention problems justifying the benefit remained, and, if not, options for its discontinuance.  
Vancouver lawyers, who advocated for Casault’s work to advance a regional rate scheme that 
extended pay increases to offices based on need, elicited a cool response from the department 
and exposed the contentiousness of the Toronto differential. 
 
5.2.3 The Differential Remains: Gain to Some, Pain to Others  
Robert Casault’s initial report of May 1997 found that the Toronto office’s recruitment 
and retention problems had dissipated.  He proposed seven options for reducing or eliminating 
the Toronto differential, from which LACS members picked four.
457
  Since members could not 
narrow their decision to one selection, they solicited feedback from within the department.  
Vancouver lawyers knew of Casault’s findings through their LOAC representative who sat on 
the LACS subcommittee, and they critiqued them for not fully assessing the implications of 
repealing the Toronto differential without hearing from lawyers most impacted by the decision.  
LACS accepted their request to speak with Casault and he was dispatched to Vancouver in mid-
June 1997 for two days.  His instructions were to obtain information from the office’s 
management committee about phasing out the Toronto differential.  Casault attended the 
Vancouver office, met with the office director and, management committee, and discussed his 
report with LOAC’s representative and other lawyers.  He maintained that a regional wage 
premium depended on data showing atypical and extended staff loss undermining operations, 
and noted that he welcomed material from lawyers that substantiated their assertions.  Casault 
also conducted fieldwork at the department’s Montreal and Toronto offices.  During the Toronto 
visit, he canvassed lawyers for their views on entitlement to the differential, heard about 
repercussions if it were repealed, and received an endorsement for other offices receiving a 
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similar allowance on the basis of demonstrated need.  Apparently, the Toronto visit was 
important, as Casault’s final study of 31 October 1997 recommended maintaining the Toronto 
differential, albeit with the observation that the rate was a source of lingering bad feelings 
throughout the department.
458
  
 
On 7 November 1997, HRC members met in Ottawa to review the Casault report findings 
and discuss the Toronto differential’s future.  The committee’s agenda expanded after Toronto 
and Vancouver Regional Office Directors were allowed to present their office’s positions on the 
matter.
459
  Vancouver’s newly appointed Regional Office Director, Barbara Burns, saw the 
intervention as a calling on a manager’s duty to advocate for her staff’s financial interests.460  
Burns, accompanied by the Director of Federal Prosecution Services for British Columbia, 
Robert Prior, and LOAC’s office representative presented a written submission on recruitment 
and retention problems that included stories of lawyers quitting, statistical data on departures, 
recent staffing actions, wage comparisons with the Attorney General of British Columbia 
(showing a shortfall in salaries at LA-1 and LA-2A levels), and memorandums detailing labour 
shortages in various practice sections.  The material set the premise for the delegation’s bold 
proposal overlooked by Casault: a submission to Treasury Board entailing a temporary, non-
pensionable, regional allowance to any office that qualifies on the basis of defined criteria 
demonstrating a recruitment and retention difficulty.
461
  Prospects for expanding regional rate 
allowances as a feature of the department’s salary plan were staked on the extent of Vancouver’s 
operational difficulties.     
 
While the Toronto differential was in the process of being reviewed, LOAC’s bi-annual 
meeting of 23 October 1997 resulted in committee members determining that the other aspects of 
the post-legislated restraint Law Group compensation submission should be completed by a 
                                                 
458
 Ibid. at 48, lines 7-10.  
459
 Schedule “C” Documents, supra note 428 (Exhibit 13, Final Records of Decisions #35, Human Resources 
Committee Meetings on LA Compensation Including Toronto Rates of Pay, Held on 7 November 1997 at 2). 
460
 Babcock, supra note 302 (Proceedings at Trial of 28 October 2004, Transcript of Barbara Burns at 32, lines 15-
21) [hereinafter 28 October 2004 Burns Transcript].   
461
 Babcock, ibid. (Proceedings at Trial of 27 September 2004, Transcript of Robert Prior at 104, lines 18-30) 
[hereinafter 27 September 2004 Prior Transcript]. 
113 
 
dedicated and impartial body.
462
  The resolution compelled Deputy Minister Thomson to ask, 
and TBS to permit, the department to retain an expert that would build on the Casault Report 
findings and generate recommendations for a fiscally responsible compensation proposal that the 
department could use in negotiations with TBS.  That expert was Jim Thomas, whose hiring was 
announced at the 27 November 1997 HRC meeting.
463
  This HRC meeting was also notable for 
other reasons.  On the eve of the meeting, one of LOAC’s non-management representatives 
alerted the HRD that the HRC was not considering input from lawyers outside of Toronto and 
Vancouver in its decision-making process and that some allowance for additional contributions 
should ensue.
464
  Furthermore, committee members conceded that the available data supported 
maintaining the Toronto differential.  They also believed that figures from Vancouver 
demonstrated operational problems, but sought more information on which a case for a special 
regional rate could be defended.  Attendees learned that tinkering with the national salary plan by 
introducing regional rates could open a Pandora’s Box of funding reform.  The Treasury Board 
provided the DOJ an annual budget from which salary expenses of different regional offices 
were drawn.  Unless the Treasury Board financed proposed regional allowances, the department 
would have to source funding internally, and, possibly, by diverting resources from the budgets 
of other offices where wages surpassed local comparators.   
  
A proposed regional rate pay system disconcerted lawyers working in Ottawa and 
Montreal, who disapproved of geographic differentials and were determined to inform decision-
makers of their opposition.  Ottawa lawyers enlisted their regional director to oppose salary gains 
for Vancouver.
465
  Lawyers and notaries at the Quebec Regional Office, with the endorsement of 
their regional director and managers, petitioned Treasury Board ministers to deny any 
departmental proposal seeking regional allowances by denouncing salary inequity and calling for 
an end to existing regional differentials.
466
  The question remained whether the DOJ’s Executive 
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Committee deemed regional rates advantageous for Vancouver, while mulling on whether to 
eliminate or reduce the amount of the Toronto differential.  Robert Prior advanced the 
Vancouver office’s case by giving policy makers sufficient data on its recruitment and retention 
difficulties.
467
  Overall, Thomas, through his dealings with the HRD, meetings with TBS, 
consults with Casault, and information provided from Vancouver, had enough material to 
consider regional salary rates as part of his recommendations.      
 
At the Executive Committee meeting of 16 January 1998, Thomas presented his initial 
analysis on Law Group compensation and proposals for discussion with TBS.  He suggested that 
the DOJ leverage the gains PIPSC attained through a June 1997 collective bargain covering its 
lawyers by requesting the same performance pay increase of 5 percent within salary range, as 
well as an economic increase of 2 percent to salary ranges for the 1997 and 1998 fiscal years.  He 
also supported maintaining the Toronto differential, but economic adjustment to its salary ranges 
would be limited to 1 percent, which was half of the gain sought for the national salary scale.  
The Toronto differential would enjoy a higher maximum rate at the LA-2A level and above, but 
minimum and maximum salary ranges at the LA-1 level would merge into one national rate 
along with the minimum salary level for LA-2A group.  As for the DOJ’s management lawyers, 
economic and performance raises were sought at levels recommended by the Advisory 
Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation chaired by Lawrence Strong.
468
  
Furthermore, increased national recruiting rates for LA-1 and LA-2A level lawyers, with 
variations from the standard on a regional basis for Vancouver and Toronto were encouraged 
(rather than a regional rate premium).  Regional variations were proposed in the event of 
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recruiting and retention difficulties that were not associated with cost of living increases, and to 
allow for adjustments to LA-2A lawyer salaries to prevent wage compression.   
  
The DOJ’s executive simply could not adopt a controversial regional rate allowance 
proposal for inclusion in a compensation proposal to TBS.  Given the hostility towards the 
Toronto experience, they noted what Thomas observed was a need for great caution before 
introducing another regional rate differential.  As well, Thomas’ finding of separation rates 
amongst those leaving the Vancouver office for pay reasons at 10 percent for 1997 (and double 
the attrition rate for 1994-1995) was crucial since TBS considered this measure as the standard 
for assessing the level of personnel loss.
469
  As the numbers did not suggest Vancouver staffing 
problems approximated Toronto’s crisis in 1990, or demonstrate what TBS understood 
substantiated a recruitment and retention dilemma, the DOJ placed confidence in lessening that 
office’s staffing shortages through pay adjustments that increased salary ranges to parity with 
salaries paid by the province of British Columbia.  Vancouver lawyers from the LA-1 and LA-
2A complement who quit represented the majority of the office’s staffing losses and they 
typically cited salary non-competitiveness as the reason for their departure (which, the cited 
difference of $10,000, is roughly what calculations of the proposed PIPSC economic and 
performance increase would raise non-management lawyer salaries).
470
  Compensation meetings 
between representatives from both the DOJ and TBS continued while TBS studied the proposal 
before they finally presented a formal submission to the Treasury Board.  On 6 June 1998, 
Treasury Board ministers approved the DOJ’s Law Group compensation submission based on 
Thomas’ report recommendations.  Vancouver’s regional rate proposal was short lived, but it 
kept pay allowances based on regional differences on the department’s radar.  
 
The department struck an LA Compensation Working Group to deal with other perennial 
concerns affecting DOJ lawyers’ terms and conditions of employment such as the Law Group 
classification system, performance pay and assessment standards, inter-level progression, and 
overtime.  The LA Compensation Group’s tasks became encompassed with the work of the 
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Reference Level Review.  Reference Level Review was a collaborative initiative between DOJ 
and TBS that assessed the DOJ’s current and future human, technological, and resource funding 
requirements.  Five areas of operations ranging from government client to federal prosecution 
services were evaluated with a view to assist the DOJ meet its priorities.  Identified deficiencies 
were earmarked and would be remedied by requests to TBS for additional funding.  One of the 
five modules studied was Law Group compensation and its sub-issues of pay rates, terms and 
conditions of employment, benefits, overtime, attrition, and regional premiums.    
  
The Reference Level Review Reports of Spring 1999 marked one of four inquiries 
conducted through September 2001 that yielded TBS and DOJ a composite analysis of DOJ Law 
Group compensation.  The Reference Level study of 20 April 1999 informed that TBS officials 
would only consider extending a regional rate allowance to other offices based on solid evidence 
showing attrition caused by market variables alone and not by job security or cost of living 
factors.
471
  Subsequent studies demonstrated serious difficulties in any one regional office 
qualifying for a Toronto-type wage premium.  The LA Compensation Working Group retained 
Ruth Matte of Consulting and Audit Canada to study whether compensation trends between 1992 
and 1999 prompted recruitment and retention problems at the department.  The study found 
minimal attrition among DOJ lawyers based on insufficient compensation.
472
  A June 2001 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) study investigated the DOJ’s future recruitment and retention 
needs.  Recent attrition rates of lawyers were calculated at 5 percent, which allowed the study to 
find that the DOJ did not suffer an immediate recruitment and retention crisis, but faced 
imminent retirements and a need for more lawyers.
473
  Finally, TBS commissioned a private 
consultancy firm on compensation, to assess the positioning of DOJ lawyer salaries vis-a-vis 
corporate, private and public sectors based on year 2000 data.
474
  Released in September 2001, 
the Hay Group’s analysis of provincial Crown labour markets found that, other than for Ontario, 
salary ranges for Law Group counsel positions were between 15 to 40 percent higher than similar 
positions with differences especially pronounced at senior levels.
475
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This collection of DOJ Law Group compensation studies allowed Mario Dion to write to 
lawyers in late December 2001, and advise them of management’s assessment of their salaries:  
Taken together, the Consulting and Audit Canada study and the PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers study, which looked at recruitment and retention issues, and the Hay Report, 
which examined rates of pay in both the public and private sectors, have provided us with 
a comprehensive understanding of the overall and regional recruitment, retention, 
compensation and work environment issues that are important to Justice counsel.  Based 
on the research, we know that recruitment and retention are not a major problem at this 
time in the Department and, based on the Hay Report, we also know that salaries are 
competitive, with the exception of the Toronto region.
476
     
  
The message reinforced the Department’s view that its national salary ranges were adequate, and 
on the right track towards slowly narrowing the gap between the Toronto differential.
477
  No 
regional office required special rate amendments to offset staffing shortages, other than a 
potential one developing at the TRO due to significant, arbitrated wage gains secured by Ontario 
government lawyers. 
 
The brief period of relative wage competitiveness between the Toronto wage scale and 
the salaries of the Ontario MAG was caused by the freezing of provincial government lawyers’ 
salaries from January 1992 to October 2000.  The freeze was due to the Ontario New Democrats’ 
“Social Contract Act,” which was closely followed by the Conservative government’s “Common 
Sense Revolution.”  As the initial round of collective bargaining between MAG, ALOC, and 
OCAA demonstrated, however, extended recesses in upward compensation leading to salary 
disparities were compensated for by a generous wage increase.  History repeated itself as the 
interest arbitration award between the province of Ontario and its lawyers of 26 October 2000, 
issued by Chair William Kaplan, dispensed an exceptional 30 percent increase in the annual 
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salaries of provincial lawyers employed by the MAG retroactive to 1 January 1999 (Kaplan 
award).
478
  MAG salaries spiked an average 20 percent higher at both the minimum and 
maximum levels in comparison to each of the Law Group classification levels at the Toronto 
salary scale.  The difference stood in even starker contrast to the national DOJ salary scale, 
which languished between 5 and 15 percent below that of the Toronto differential rates.  DOJ 
management, having research indicating that national salary rates were competitive, could not 
change lawyers’ perception that the Toronto differential was unjust, and could do nothing to 
head off more frustration if further increases outpaced comparable gains to the national salary 
scale.  As the following sections will show, the Kaplan award emboldened LOAC’s non-
management representatives to proceed with a referendum seeking the approval of DOJ lawyers 
for a professional association with one of its directives being to reduce salary disparity between 
the national and Toronto salary rates through collective bargaining.  
  
5.3 Reforms at the DOJ  
5.3.1 Background to LOAC Becoming a Staff Association  
 On 1 July 1998, Morris Rosenberg succeeded George Thomson as the Deputy Minister of 
Justice of Canada.  The timing of his appointment installed him as custodian over the ongoing 
human resources reform endeavour underway at the department.  Initiated in January 1998 by 
Rosenberg’s predecessor, the “Big Conversation” was a department-wide, town hall meeting tour 
for staff and senior management to interact with another, take stock and discuss numerous 
appreciable shifts in DOJ operations.
479
  Certain changes, such as the introduction of 
timekeeping by lawyers for legal services, were banal.
480
  Other innovations, though, were more 
structural and sought cost and work process efficiencies through investments in information 
management systems and technology, development of service agreements with client 
departments, and reorganization of the department into a portfolio management system to 
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improve the delivery of legal services.
481
  The variables responsible for the DOJ’s personnel 
expansion throughout the 1990s, however, most affected the day-to-day work of staff.
482
  The 
DOJ’s labour needs expanded partly due to an increase of legal work and advising associated 
with government initiatives in Aboriginal and international affairs, partly due to sheer growth in 
the volume and complexity of civil, criminal, and Charter litigation, and partly due to client 
departments’ demands for services and willingness to pay for staff.483  The DOJ’s growth was 
facilitated using a term-work model where staff was hired on a contract basis to handle spikes in 
workloads and temporary projects.  The employment practice of integrating the department’s 
LA-1 population into an inclusive workplace culture would need re-assessment, of course, as 80 
percent of lawyers in this complement worked on a term basis.
484
  Overall, the Justice Forums 
were intended for staff to raise their employment concerns and allow management to take their 
issues into consideration when considering human resources policies.  Improved employee 
relations were part of the new mantra at the department as it strove to become a “workplace of 
choice.”  LOAC’s non-managerial members also had their rationale for improving the workplace 
that centred on their committee becoming a more effective, service-oriented entity.  
 
The period of legislated moratoriums on public sector wage increases may have 
suspended the work of the LA Compensation Committee, but the break in responsibilities helped 
divert LOAC’s non-management members’ attention to other committee functions.  The April 
1995 LOAC semi-annual meeting in Ottawa seemed to have marked a change in non-
management LOAC representatives’ view towards the committee’s potential.  They attended 
with a steering committee in the works to evaluate LOAC and its mandate in light of: its non-
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management members’ growing involvement in lawyers’ grievances; their interest in re-
assessing LOAC’s structure; and their possible participation on the Policy, Operations, and 
Human Resources Subcommittees of the department, which were evolving to assume greater 
managerial responsibilities.
485
  Granted, LOAC’s expansion into staff advocacy added more 
work for its regional representatives who had neither the added resources nor the permission to 
fulfill an employee need, but, the practice of addressing employee performance assessments 
particularly startled the department’s HRD.  As this passage, taken from the testimony of Lois 
Lehmann
486
 recorded during the Babcock
487
 trial reveals, the appropriate course of action was to 
abstain from employee representation all together:  
It was a thrust that management was getting into in the late 90s that resulted in some 
difficulty for a couple of people listed above.  We had all been representing our 
constituents in our own regional offices with respect to potential grievances, complaints, 
competition appeals.  We’d done that since I started in 1990.  That was the other facet—
the individual facet—of the nature of the work we did, we represented.  And suddenly 
over time, but certainly this makes it clear that management is taking a dim view of that 
and saying, well, you’re not—you’re not the employees’ representative, you don’t have 
any status, and therefore they can come—they should come directly to us.  That was that 
kind of attitude probably was something that propelled us to say, well October 1998, it’s 
time to move forward into an association so that we can, in fact, provide that 
representation.
488
          
  
The observations raised in this passage encapsulated a sentiment shared by Lehmann’s 
colleagues: that LOAC surpassed being a mere transmitter of communications.  With the culture 
of change unfolding at the DOJ, the appropriate climate was formed for non-management LOAC 
members to advance their own agenda.  
 
On 15 September 1998, LOAC’s non-management regional representative hosted an 
information session in Ottawa regarding alternate models of employee representation.  Several 
provincial lawyers’ association presidents were invited to attend and discuss their organizations’ 
experiences, and, afterwards, LOAC non-management and management representatives gathered 
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to discuss findings.  On 8 October 1998, LOAC non-management representatives followed up 
the meeting by sending a memorandum to Rosenberg that formally requested changes to LOAC.  
The memorandum expressed their concern about LOAC’s inability to act for the interests of non-
management lawyers, senior management not considering the views of non-management LOAC 
members, and a request for changing LOAC’s structure by creating two full-time positions 
(assisted by secretarial support) to handle employee representation.
489
  These observations helped 
substantiate Rosenberg’s decision to initiate LOAC’s re-evaluation by investigating whether it 
was satisfying its objectives as a communication vehicle in light of the DOJ expanding its 
personnel and responsibilities.
490
  In April 1999, Rosenberg commissioned a “Beyond LOAC” 
Committee with a mandate of: (1) examining the different models for how the interests of non-
management lawyers are better represented; (2) consulting broadly with non-management 
lawyers as to their preference for a form of representation; and (3) submitting recommendations 
for a new model to him.
491
 
 
The outcome of the Beyond LOAC project was a formal report produced with the 
assistance of labour mediator George Adams, who facilitated consultations between three 
management and three non-management LOAC representatives.  Committee members met on 6 
and 27 April 1999, and for a third session on 25 June 1999.  During the Beyond LOAC 
consultations, non-management committee members unanimously backed a recommendation for 
removing the PSSRA’s prohibitions on DOJ lawyers participating in an employee 
organization.
492
  Management committee members rejected the proposal, citing that collective 
bargaining spoiled the development of a professional partnership.
493
  The framework enshrining 
LOAC’s new consultative role then culminated from compromises in negotiations between 
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parties regarding the extent formal representation was permissible within the parameters of the 
PSSRA.  On 19 July 1999, the report was presented to Rosenberg for his consideration.  
 
The Beyond LOAC Report findings were based on a review of LOAC’s functions, 
insights from non-management and management on its utility, and their consensus on 
recommendations for refurbishing the committee into a vehicle for improving employee-
employer relations.  The report detailed LOAC’s many deficiencies.  Operationally, LOAC’s bi-
annual meetings with management that lasted for a day and a half were too short and 
management-dominated, which prevented meaningful consultation with non-management 
members.  Other factors disadvantaged LOAC, such as lack of resources allotted for 
representatives’ work, no operating budget, and high turnover of voluntary representatives.  
Structurally, LOAC did not participate in any of the DOJ senior decision-making committees.  It 
had no dealings with TBS, and it lacked a representational framework for redressing employee 
issues of salary, workload, and performance evaluations.  In short, without significant reform 
LOAC was not viable.  The Beyond LOAC Report’s three central recommendations attempted to 
improve the situation and involved: (1) creating a professional association of non-management 
lawyers that represented lawyers in employment relations with the DOJ and Treasury Board; (2) 
the DOJ and Treasury Board committing to acknowledge the association as exclusive 
representative of non-management lawyers for the purposes of non-management lawyer 
representation; and (3) representing lawyers in advancing grievances.
494
  LOAC’s non-
management members approved the report on the encouragement of their outgoing chair, Tom 
McMahon, who suggested that the proposal was a vast improvement over LOAC’s existing 
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model and a stepping stone to collective bargaining.
495
  What remained was gaining the Deputy 
Minister’s approval, without which the plans for LOAC’s new future would remain unfulfilled. 
Rosenberg accepted the Beyond LOAC Report recommendation that the department provide 
$150,000 to defray the costs of studying the association’s creation and allow for staff 
consultations to measure popular support for implementing other report recommendations.  
 
LOAC non-management members agreed to a three-person transition team comprised of 
their peers Jeff Hutchinson and Beyond LOAC non-management committee members Francisco 
Cuoto and Lois Lehmann to spearhead LOAC becoming an association.  Lehmann was also 
appointed to a full-time, one-year assignment dedicated to coordinating the association’s launch.  
Lawyers, however, first needed to be acquainted with the details of the project.  Throughout the 
autumn of 1999, management and non-management Beyond LOAC committee members visited 
DOJ regional and departmental legal service unit offices to consult with staff on Beyond LOAC 
report proposals and solicit feedback.
496
  Audiences generally supported Beyond LOAC non-
management members’ goals for creating an employee association that was formally recognized 
by and collectively negotiated with the Treasury Board to achieve a national salary equivalent to 
the rate paid by the Ontario MAG.
497
  In June 2000, both casts of Beyond LOAC committee 
members reconvened to update each other on steps towards realizing the association.  At the 
meeting, Beyond LOAC management committee members confirmed that Rosenberg would 
implement all Beyond LOAC report recommendations within the DOJ’s authority provided they 
had the support of a majority of staff lawyers.
498
  Those recommendations that affected the 
Treasury Board required their consent, and they refused direct negotiations with DOJ lawyers.
499
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Instead, TBS preferred an agreement outlining its role in meetings between the lawyers’ 
employee association and DOJ management.
500
 
 
Another retainer for Ruth Matte Consulting resulted in a report recommending a 
consultation system to guide the lawyers’ employee association and the DOJ in discussions with 
TBS.  The consultant advised creating a compensation council as a system for DOJ management 
and its lawyers to reach agreement on pay and terms and conditions of employment.  Input from 
the council would be informational and used in recommending a position on compensation that 
DOJ management would communicate to TBS; however, final recommendations remained 
within each of the authorities’ scope of decision-making powers.501  The Beyond LOAC 
transition team balked at the inability to negotiate with TBS and abandoned compensation 
council discussions.  They preferred to finalize the association after the October 2000 Kaplan 
award could be used to sell lawyers on the power of collective action, and, once established, 
position the association to capitalize on the federal government’s imminent revamp of the legal 
framework governing federal public service labour and employment relations.   
 
5.3.2 Labour Reforms in the Broader Federal Public Service 
Beyond LOAC Committee Report recommendation #14 acknowledged that non-
management DOJ lawyers enjoyed rights of freedom of association and could work to eliminate 
their exclusion from the PSSRA.  This recommendation gained traction in October 1999, after the 
Secretary of the Treasury Board appointed a nine-member advisory group that was chaired by 
John Fryer (and so called the Fryer Committee) with an eighteen-month mandate to review the 
state of labour relations between Treasury Board and civil service unions.
502
  The Fryer 
                                                                                                                                                             
bargaining agents. Furthermore, Delisle confirmed that the Treasury Board did not have to recognize an employee 
association that is excluded under the PSSRA, and, therefore, no legal grounds existed that authorized the AJC to 
assume direct negotiations with the employer.  
500
 Beyond LOAC Report Memorandum, supra note 498 at 165.  
501
 Ibid.  
502
 Other investigators were assessing human resources management practices in the federal public service.  See 
Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 9—Streamlining the Human Resources Management 
Regime: A Study of Changing Roles and Responsibilities” in Report of the Auditor General – 2000 April (Ottawa: 
Auditor General of Canada), online: Office of the Auditor General of Canada <http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/0009ce.pdf> (last modified 11 April 2004). The report called for Parliament to cut 
administrative complexity from departmental policies and reform personnel institutions and practices.  The report 
found several deficiencies with rigid staffing processes and job classification systems characteristic of a dated 
framework unsuitable for managing an evolving bureaucracy within a fluid work environment.  Legislation 
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Committee was to diagnose the system of collective bargaining under the PSSRA and assess 
whether the labour management system effectively served the tax-paying public.  
Recommendations were to help TBS determine whether to propose amendments to the Act.
 
 
 
In May 2000, the Fryer Committee released its initial report.  Committee members 
reviewed history, conducted surveys, and heard from key stakeholders to determine that 
collective bargaining functioned well during its first decade.  They also found that over the next 
fifteen years, periods of unilateral government restraint and retrenchment, made possible by the 
government’s dual role as employer and legislator undermined collective bargaining.503  
Management’s overextension into labour relations under the PSSRA was highly problematic for 
the committee, as was: the Act’s exclusion of significant terms of employment from bargaining; 
haphazard legislative determination of highly complex bargaining units; a convoluted redress 
mechanism; prohibitions on policy grievances; and complex and anachronistic managerial 
exclusions.
504
  In sum, the report concluded that the existing collective bargaining regime in the 
federal public service was unsustainable. 
 
Fryer Committee members prepared their second and final report for an audience that 
anticipated its arrival.  The Liberals won a third federal government and in his reply to the 
Throne Speech of 31 January 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien committed the government to 
modernizing the public service.
505
 An additional call to action came in March, with the Clerk of 
the Privy Council, Mel Cappe, tabling the Eighth Annual Report to the Prime Minister on the 
Public Service of Canada, which called for a fundamental reform of the legislative framework 
                                                                                                                                                             
regulating the staffing process was burdensome and slow, which promoted litigious appeals, and an impractical 
administration.  Staffing reform was called for, as was transforming managing roles and accountability in human 
resources systems.  The report observed that collective bargaining needed changes.  The Fryer committee’s work 
stood to expand the point by identifying whether pressures exerting modernization initiatives in human resources 
management administration carried over to the labour relations arena.     
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2000) at 39, online: Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/fryer/iti-ide-eng.asp> 
(last modified 1 May 2000).  
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2001), online: Government of Canada Privy Council Office <http://www.pco-
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governing human resources management.
506
  On 3 April 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien fulfilled 
his commitment by announcing the creation of the Task Force on Modernizing Human 
Resources Management in the Federal Public Service (Quail Task Force).  Within eighteen 
months, the task force chair, Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, Ranald A. Quail, and an external advisory group were to recommend a contemporary 
policy, legislative, and institutional system for managing human resources in the federal civil 
service.  Proposing new legislation first involved examining current laws, and for that analysis, 
the Quail Task Force looked to the work of the Fryer Committee.  
 
The Fryer Committee released its final report on 13 June 2001 (Fryer Report). The Fryer 
Committee proposal for more harmonious labour relations was to create a new institutional 
framework consisting of: a reformed and modernized PSSRA that would incorporate 
recommendations proposed by the Committee; transferring the PSSRA’s administration to the 
Canada Industrial Relations Board; reconstituting the PSSRB as the Public Service Rights 
Redress Board to adjudicate all grievances; creating a Public Interest Dispute Resolution 
Commission to resolve impasses in collective bargaining; and expanding the role and legal 
recognition of the National Joint Council.
507
  The committee suggested three principles to guide 
labour management relations in the administration of the new regime: embracing collective 
views; recognizing workers enjoy freedom of association to form unions and collectively 
bargain; and committing to cooperative solutions.
508
  Committee members proposed that every 
subject that arises in the workplace is a matter for union-management interaction through a 
“three-C” model of consultation, co-development and collective bargaining.509  The Fryer 
Report’s recommendations, numbers 3, 8, 9, 10, for amending the PSSRA increased the level and 
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scope of worker involvement in determining workplace issues and supported the efforts of DOJ 
lawyers forming an employee association.  Recommendation 3 proposed amending the PSSRA to 
allow for consultation between employer and employee representatives in the development of 
policies; recommendations 8 and 9 advanced the concept of two-tier collective bargaining and 
negotiations of terms and conditions of employment at both the service-wide and departmental 
levels.  In recommendation 10, the Fryer Committee thought to relax the PSSRA’s employee 
exclusions to mirror those of the Canada Labour Code’s less stringent criteria and bar only those 
employees from coverage who performed management functions or were employed in a 
confidential capacity in matters relating to industrial relations.  They reasoned that the PSSRA’s 
current exclusions were restrictive, unnecessary, and “inconsistent with the facilitative, enabling 
approach” the committee sought.510  The Fryer Report was referred to the Quail Task Force for 
its deliberations in a creating a new labour relations framework.
511
 
 
5.3.3 Formalization of the AJC and First Moves  
Set against this backdrop of stirring federal public service labour legislation reform, the 
Beyond LOAC transition team prepared for a referendum to determine whether non-management 
lawyers supported the creation of a professional association.  The Beyond LOAC transition team 
used the 2 March 2001 edition of JustInfo (DOJ Intranet newsletter) to announce the Beyond 
LOAC intranet site featured a proposal and a discussion brief covering compensation, annual 
performance review and employee appraisal, management leave and overtime, promotions, 
grievance procedures, lack of regional rate policy, maternity leave, and term employment as 
issues bolstering the need for an association to monitor them.
512
  As previously foreshadowed, 
the proposal intended to create a professional association to: act as bargaining agent for non-
management DOJ lawyers on all terms and conditions of employment with Treasury Board; 
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enlist third-party binding arbitration as a bargaining dispute resolution mechanism; and use a 
Rand-type formula for collecting membership dues.
513
 The Beyond LOAC transition team 
returned to each regional and departmental legal service unit office to discuss the proposed 
association with audiences.  Lawyers supporting a plebiscite encouraged members of the Beyond 
LOAC transition team to ready a vote.   
 
This period of tremendous progress also saw the Beyond LOAC transition team contain 
internal adversity stemming from the Kaplan award, which caused ninety-five percent of non-
management lawyers at the TRO to form the Ontario Justice Lawyers’ Association (OJLA) with 
the purpose of achieving wage parity with Ontario government lawyers.
514
  In May 2001, OJLA 
renamed itself as the Federal Lawyers’ Association of Greater Toronto (FLAG).  An immediate 
executive decisions facing the FLAG’s Board of Directors was whether to support the AJC’s 
referendum while pursuing its own wage campaign.
515
  The FLAG’s Executive Committee 
determined that it could pursue its mandate by working within a national association, and so 
asked the membership to vote for the AJC (which they overwhelmingly did).  
 
The Beyond LOAC transition team prepared for the referendum.  They secured a voters 
list, decided on a balloting process, recruited volunteers to assist with polling, and advised 
management of their use of JustInfo.
516
  In anticipation of the historic vote, the 21 May 2001 
edition of JustInfo advertised the Key Points of the Association of Justice Counsel, a summative 
proposal for creating a professional association.  From the 18th to 27th of June 2001 non-
management DOJ lawyers voted in an office-by-office referendum: of the 1,452 votes cast, 1,274 
approved of the association.
517
  From the department’s perspective, mass support for the AJC 
occurred because: 
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Over the years, lawyers in Justice have come to feel that they have been disadvantaged in 
their wages and that the Department has not represented their interests adequately before 
the Treasury Board.  Employee relations in the Department have consequently eroded.
518
 
  
AJC executives, Lehmann and Cuoto, however, explained the AJC’s genesis as follows: 
Unlike the vast majority of Federal government employees, Justice counsel are denied to 
be represented by a union and to engage in collective negotiations, because they are 
specifically excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act (PSSRA).  They have formed the AJC to represent their interests, as a 
result of having no access to the normal system for addressing employee concerns about 
terms and conditions of employment and redress process.
519
    
      
The AJC’s goal for a single national salary plan as the cornerstone of its position on 
compensation seemed to have found resonance amongst voters: 
Whatever the reasons for imposing economic segregation, eleven years later it is 
something that still deeply divides the Department: both counsel and management.  In 
both the CAC (Ruth Matte Study) focus groups of 2000 and the AJC cross-country 
consultations of 2001, this came out as a major topic of frustration.
520
   
  
The AJC was voted into existence to increase due process in the workplace, restore external 
market comparability caused by the salary freezes of the 1990s and to address internal imbalance 
from the existence of the Toronto differential.  However, the AJC’s identity as a national 
association was brief once FLAG ended its truce.  Its members initiated the break after 
concluding that their salaries were uncompetitive, that the department would have to raise the 
Toronto differential to prevent another recruitment and retention problem, and that by supporting 
the AJC’s goal of national salary range parity with the Ontario MAG, they prejudiced their own 
prospects since the evidence from the Hay Report substantiated only their claim to increased 
wages.
521
 
 
In July 2001, the AJC’s interim Governing Council drawn from representatives of each of 
the regional and Ottawa area offices, elected Lois Lehmann as president, and filled the positions 
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of vice-president, secretary, and treasurer.  The Deputy Minister assigned Mario Dion to liaison 
with the AJC on behalf of the department.  The AJC’s leadership held discussions with DOJ 
management over TBS recognizing the association and they responded to the Quail Task Force’s 
calls for submissions during its consultations (since unions received only a limited opportunity of 
addressing the committee or presenting reports up to 31 August 2001).
522
  On 29 August 2001, 
Lehmann wrote to the Quail Task Force and outlined the AJC’s position on DOJ lawyer 
exclusion from labour legislation.
523
  In September, when the AJC’s interim executive met with 
Dion and other DOJ officials, they learned: that one of the Beyond LOAC recommendations of 
membership on the Deputy Minister’s Executive Council was unrealizable; of TBS’s openness to 
the AJC as an interest-based association; and of TBS’s request for DOJ management to oversee 
compensation discussions with the AJC.
524
   
 
Notwithstanding the loss of the Toronto base, the AJC continued its membership drive 
throughout the rest of the department in preparation of general elections scheduled from 23 to 25 
January 2002, and also to increase its dues base to cover operating costs once departmental 
funding ended on 30 June 2002.  The AJC’s constitution instructed that, before 31 January 2002, 
elections needed to take place to choose representatives for a first permanent Governing Council.  
Once council members were elected, they were to select a new executive consisting of a 
President, Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer.
525
  In the result, Patrick Jetté, succeeded Lois 
Lehmann as the AJC’s president.  On 28 March 2002, three of the AJC’s four member Executive 
Council consisting of Jetté, Vern Brewer and Denyse Côté had their first official meeting with 
Dion.
526
  Discussions covered the AJC’s Executive Council’s responsibility for arranging the 
organization’s financial and administrative affairs, a process expected to last six months.  To 
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allow the AJC’s executives perform their duties, management planned to provide them with 
release time and the organization with interim office space until it established its own 
headquarters.  The parties agreed to meet bi-monthly thereafter to discuss ongoing matters, such 
as AJC representation of members in grievances and its efforts before the Quail Task Force to 
eliminate the exclusion of DOJ lawyers from legislation.  The immediate priority for the AJC’s 
executive, however, was to monitor the DOJ’s solution to the wage discrepancy caused by the 
Kaplan award after hearing plans that the Toronto differential would be supplemented with an 
allowance.  Several weeks earlier, on 15 January 2002, the AJC had submitted to the DOJ-TBS 
Joint Working Group,
527
 a compensation proposal that critiqued the methodology and data used 
in the Hay Report, and asked for a single national job rate, which would raise the maximum rates 
of pay to the equivalent of the Ontario MAG, and a market adjustment increase of 11 percent.
528
 
 
5.3.4 The Toronto Differential and the AJC’s Pre-Unionization Campaign for Wage Equity  
On 23 November 2001, the DOJ-TBS Working Group achieved tentative consensus on 
supplementing the Toronto salary scale by an additional 8 percent non-pensionable allowance, 
and for allowing an economic adjustment to non-management DOJ lawyer salaries over a three 
year term at levels to match those received by lawyers represented by PIPSC.
529
  The proposal, 
however, was not supported by other TBS representatives who opposed the measure as the 2001 
PwC study showed the Toronto office was not experiencing a recruitment and retention crisis 
(only a potential one) and, therefore, without proof of a severe staffing problem for at least two 
years, no hard criteria existed to justify the allowance.  TBS also hesitated raising the Toronto 
differential because of its effect on wage relativity vis-à-vis other professionals and executives 
working in and around Toronto.
530
  Finally, TBS wanted to avoid increasing the Toronto 
differential to prevent any inference that supported allegations identified in the lawsuit by 
Vancouver lawyers.  
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TBS’s position on the Toronto differential delayed the national Law Group salary 
compensation proposal from proceeding. On 16 April 2002, Deputy Minister Rosenberg met 
with TBS secretary, Frank Claydon, to push for the allowance.  Expediting a resolution weighed 
heavily on Rosenberg who, after evaluating  the Hay Report evidence and the significant wage 
disparity caused by the Kaplan award, determined that without the allowance personnel losses 
were imminent (even though only a few lawyers left the Toronto office after the decision’s 
issuance) and would undermine the DOJ’s mandate in Ontario.531  His support for the 
extraordinary payment influenced Claydon to ease established policy and include the Toronto 
differential adjustment as part of the Law Group compensation proposal submitted to the 
Treasury Board. On 6 June 2002, Rosenberg’s efforts were successful when Treasury Board 
ministers approved the DOJ’s salary submission including the Toronto allowance.532  Described 
by TBS as the “Toronto Market Competitiveness Allowance” (TMCA), the benefit paid lawyers 
in the Toronto office a non-recurring lump sum payment of 8 percent of their base salary as of 31 
March 2002.  TMCA was open for renewal for the 2002-2003 fiscal year depending on the need 
for salary competitiveness with the Ontario MAG.   
 
The TMCA greatly complicated the AJC’s national wage mandate.  The granting of the 
TMCA legitimized the Hay Report findings, which implicitly dispelled the AJC’s premise for 
raising the national salary scale to the level of the Toronto differential (since the role of wages 
causing a staffing predicament was localized to only one regional office).  TMCA forced the 
AJC’s Governing Council members to debate on two separate occasions whether supporting a 
regional salary scheme benefitted its constituents
533
 as the policy fueled the perception of 
management favouring the financial well-being of the Toronto office to the exclusion of 
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others.
534
  The AJC disliked the TMCA for pitting the financial interests of one group of lawyers 
against another and for undermining the AJC’s ability to represent the Toronto office.  This latter 
point was raised by the AJC’s executive in their 28 February 2003 meeting with Mario Dion and 
was addressed by Rosenberg.  They received confirmation that the department planned for the 
TBS to ask the Treasury Board to renew the allowance since the circumstances responsible for 
its introduction did not dissipate within a matter of twelve months.
535
  In response, the AJC wrote 
to the TBS to reiterate its demand for an increased national pay rate at the level of Toronto 
differential and to state its opposition to the TMCA by asking for a redistribution of the $2 
million expenditure to increase payment of annual performance reviews by 1 percent for lawyers 
evaluated at the highest two performance levels.
536
  Treasury Board ministers denying TMCA’s 
renewal for 2003 surprised the DOJ and strained relations between Toronto lawyers and the AJC.     
 
The TMCA’s cessation did not prevent the AJC from continuing to solicit DOJ 
management about a return to a single national salary scale at the level of the Toronto 
differential.   With no legal requirement for the Treasury Board to negotiate with the AJC, its 
written advocacy culminated with the AJC’s Submission on Compensation of February 2004, 
which was prepared by a study committee and addressed the Law Group compensation plan 
expiring on 31 March 2004.  Its rhetoric phrased a single national pay scale at the level paid by 
the Ontario MAG as a basic principle of AJC compensation policy and as a necessity to address 
wage disparity between comparable public sector lawyers based on the principles of interest 
arbitration.  Private sector lawyers and government appointed judges were identified as relevant 
comparators for compensation calculations.  The key features of the proposal called for: lock-
step progression from LA-1 to LA-2A levels after four years; an annual performance review and 
employee assessment increase for 2003-2004; a merger of LA-2A and LA-2B levels to 
restructure pay grids in line with Ontario provincial lawyers (as the historically closest wage and 
workforce comparator) and to remove arbitrariness in promotions; and adding the same 
percentage increase achieved by gains to national salary range to that of the Toronto differential.  
The compensation submission did not prevent Treasury Board ministers from approving typical 
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economic increases to the non-management Law Group salary ranges of 2.5 percent for 2004 and 
of another 2 percent for 2005.  However, the compensation submission served another role of 
outlining the AJC’s position on wages that it could use to build momentum for its organizing 
campaign once new labour legislation became law.     
 
5.4  The AJC’s Campaign for Recognition  
5.4.1 Introduction of the PSLRA  
The work and eventual recommendations of the Quail Task Force led to Bill C-25, the 
PSMA.  Rootham observed that the PSMA ignored many of the Fryer Report’s most sweeping 
recommendations.
537
 Fortunately for the AJC, lawmakers followed the Fryer Committee’s 
guidance on excluding managerial and confidential employees from labour legislation and 
recognized in the PSLRA that all employees under the Act enjoy the freedom to join an employee 
organization and participate in its activities.
538
  On 6 February 2003, President of the TBS and 
Member of Parliament responsible for human resources modernization, Lucienne Robillard, 
tabled Bill C-25 before the House of Commons.  Senior AJC administrator 1 noted that as 
various drafts of legislation were completed, the AJC became privy to them and knew that the 
statutory prohibition on lawyers unionizing would be removed.  The process leading to de-
exclusion was understood by National Capital Region lawyer 1 as an issue of pragmatism, as she 
viewed unionization as a way for Treasury Board to regularize relations with DOJ lawyers.  By 
contrast, National Capital Region lawyer 2 saw the policy shift as a matter of legality: 
I’m sure we had something to do with it, we the lawyers that work inside the department, 
inside the cell block we call the “CALS” (Constitution and Administration Law Section). 
We have a think tank of these legal brains who analyze the Charter.  These people caught 
the Charter and we are sure, I’m sure that they had a lot to do with giving advice to 
senior managers saying we have a problem here, we discovered something that somehow 
we think there’s something wrong with our prohibitions.   
 
On 7 November 2003, the PSMA received Royal Assent.  As a statute intended to be 
implemented over stages, the Governor General in Council delayed the establishment and 
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coming into effect of the PSLRA and its provisions on bargaining agent certification until 1 April 
2005. PSMA’s passage initially allowed the TBS to confirm a relationship with the AJC in 
similar fashion to the one enjoyed with the Association of Professional Executives of the Public 
Service of Canada, but the probability of competing employee organizations vying to become 
certified as bargaining agents forced TBS to rescind the arrangement as of 22 April 2004.
539
  A 
delayed implementation date allowed many months for interested employee associations and the 
DOJ to prepare for the introduction of new labour legislation.  DOJ lawyers could also use the 
time to consider whether joining a union suited them.   
 
Public sector unions typically conduct organizing drives without employer opposition to 
unions, as is common in the private sector.
540
  Section 48 and 49 of Part 5 of PSLRA’s 
transitional provisions set out the certification procedures for DOJ lawyers.  DOJ lawyers were 
not automatically absorbed into the existing Law Group bargaining unit represented by PIPSC.
541
  
The statutory stipulation mandated that any employee organization applying to the PSLRB to 
become certified as a bargaining agent for DOJ lawyers would have to follow the normal course 
of procedures and show, in its application, documentary evidence that it enjoyed the support of a 
majority of employees within a proposed bargaining unit.
542
  In this “card check” type 
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certification system, the PSLRB recognizes employee organizations who can confirm a 
minimum endorsement of “50 percent plus one” among a group of workers. 
 
5.4.2 The Organizing Campaign 
Three employee associations vied to represent the DOJ Law Group: FLAG, PIPSC, and 
AJC.  Each group had their own certification strategy to encourage DOJ lawyers to join.  FLAG 
reconstituted itself as the Federal Law Officers of the Crown (FLOC) and conducted a 
membership drive of lawyers employed at the Toronto office.  Over 90 percent of these lawyers 
signed up, many of whom opposed inclusion in a national bargaining unit, and assisted the new 
organization with a couple of hundred dollars.  On 15 February 2005, FLOC ratified its 
constitution. 
 
FLOC’s executive knew that creating a separate bargaining sub-unit from within a larger 
occupational Law Group based on the receipt of differential salaries was a difficult case to make.  
They prepared for the challenge of setting a legal precedent by retaining the law firm of Paliare 
Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP and by instructing their counsel to prepare a detailed and 
thorough application.  Toronto lawyers were prepared to defend their exclusive entitlement to the 
differential in court against the AJC as an absolutely vital payment that recognized only their 
office operated in a unique labour market, a claim that they believed the Treasury Board would 
use to thwart the AJC’s demands for raising the national salary rates to the level of the Ontario 
MAG.  Ontario Regional Office lawyer 3 explained that the benefit compensated lawyers for 
providing exceptional services in a higher-end legal market.  He illustrated the point by saying 
the calibre of legal work in Toronto attracts a better quality of file handled by a different talent 
pool.  He views Toronto as the centre of immigration work; it is where advocacy groups 
commence their cases; and it is home to big business with resourceful Bay Street lawyers at their 
disposal. 
    
The FLOC’s overwhelming popularity in Toronto left PIPSC and AJC to consider 
organizing those lawyers employed at the DOJ’s other regional and department legal service unit 
offices.  PIPSC’s selling point as the preferred union for DOJ lawyers was their history and 
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experience in representing other federal government lawyers.
543
  Despite the sensible message, 
PIPSC abandoned its recruitment drive after determining that DOJ lawyers had little interest in 
siding with them.  This was because, as AJC negotiating team member 2 recalled, the AJC had 
surveyed its membership as to who they wanted representing them and found that some 96 
percent of those polled voted for “lawyers representing lawyers”.  Other respondents’ 
observations, communicated during interviews as to why PIPSC stood little chance with their 
organizing plans, clarify why the AJC became the logical incumbent for representing DOJ 
lawyers.  Prairie Regional Office lawyer 1 recalled the AJC winning his membership support.  
He backed the AJC because lawyers are professionals with their own special interests, so, for 
him, it seemed a natural fit to be represented by an organization of his own people.  He did not 
recall PIPSC’s campaign materializing in the various offices comprising the Prairie Region.  The 
absence of another contending employee organization automatically bolstered the AJC’s 
viability.  Prairie Regional Office lawyer 2 also believed that the AJC understood the important 
issues facing lawyers, of which another union would be unfamiliar.  She saw this perspective as a 
benefit for lawyers once at the bargaining table because a union with better negotiation power is 
one that communicates the interests of its members.  As this lawyer did not want to be 
commingled in a larger union, it made the AJC the only choice.   
 
Undoubtedly, as a strong national union, PIPSC, had more clout in federal labour 
relations than the upstart AJC.  Atlantic Region Office lawyer 1 did not doubt that PIPSC offered 
quality representation. He realized, though, that he was better off with the AJC for the following 
reason:  
I thought PIPSC, because of their experience and success with other professions, like the 
doctors who got a huge bonus, anyway, I thought they would’ve been able to represent us 
quite well.  But, I think most people felt we would lose our identity and specialization 
within the whole organization.         
 
Other DOJ lawyers also did not see supporting the AJC as involving a trade-off in benefits 
between unions, but as a wise choice directed to maintaining an accepted and established 
occupational community.  National Capital Region lawyer 4 emphasized that being a lawyer 
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entails being part of a professional culture, one that a larger union may overlook based on what it 
believes is important to the membership: 
I think it was definitely a perception that lawyers need to be…and again, this is coming 
the perspective of from what I’ve heard from lawyers who were previously represented 
by a different association. There was a sense that lawyers needed to be represented by an 
association that was familiar with and was looking after lawyer interests, that they 
weren’t being lumped together with other professionals in a variety of areas who didn’t 
necessarily understand.  The person we were talking about before...the fact that lawyers 
were subject already to a set of professional obligations, but also other realities about the 
work of lawyers and things in the collective agreement about providing robes and things 
like that, you know are more easily overlooked when you’re part of a larger association 
dealing with a wide variety of employees.       
  
The common belief of these two lawyers was that a specialized bargaining agent restricted to the 
DOJ, as well as being a familiar entity, offered a better option than another union despite its 
experience representing other lawyers in collective bargaining negotiations with TBS.     
 
Another advantage the AJC possessed, in contrast to the PIPSC, was that it enjoyed an 
established membership base comprised of DOJ lawyers.  The AJC’s time as a professional 
association socialized its members to a common organization with a generally positive 
experience, prompting them to continue supporting the AJC and allow it to make good on 
securing collective bargaining rights.
544
  During the certification campaign, current AJC 
members maintained their affiliation by signing an application or renewal for membership.  They 
(and new members) completed a form that authorized the AJC to apply for certification as their 
bargaining agent, acknowledging that the AJC was their choice for representation as a bargaining 
agent.
545
  A membership fee of five dollars accompanied the application, which encouraged 
broad participation and ensured lawyers signed on their own volition.  Voluntary donations from 
signees were accepted and used to fund the AJC’s campaign expenses.  National Capital Region 
lawyer 1 recalled that many lawyers simply dropped off completed membership forms, which 
was a tremendous boost.     
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As for enlisting undecided lawyers, the AJC engaged in the “low-intensity” organizing 
campaign tactics identified by Juravich and Bronfenbrenner of person-to-person contact, large 
group meetings, and using union literature.
546
  The AJC’s network of representatives sitting on 
the Governing Council situated key personnel in all regional offices throughout the department, 
which allowed them to spread the message of the AJC’s drive.  There were also the volunteer 
organizers who enrolled new members.  National Capital Region lawyer 1 knew of ten or fifteen 
“hard core” people involved with organizing lawyers.  Recruiters’ experience ranged from easy 
to difficult, depending on the audience.  For example, National Capital Region lawyer 1, 
solicited lawyers on maternity leaves and achieved good results.  National Capital Region lawyer 
2 shared his views in candid detail on the importance of demographics when recruiting people:     
That was very difficult signing up people.  People didn’t want to unionize.  People 
thought that if they signed up for a union their job was on the line.  Some people were 
afraid.  What we did is we signed up all the “fogie’s,” all the ones that didn’t give a damn 
if they put them on the street.  They signed.  I was one of them.  That’s funny because 
you’re in a different situation in life.  When you’re 25 years old you’ll think about it.  But 
when you’re in 50’s, if they want to fight we’ll fight it.  It’s a very different philosophy.  
You’ve been there.  You’ve done that.  So most young people wouldn’t dare sign.  So we 
signed up a lot of the old people.  Guess what, there’s a lot of older people.  They’re the 
majority still.  So yeah, signing up was not easy, not easy at all and remains difficult 
today.     
 
When this same lawyer was asked how the AJC was able to run a successful organizing 
campaign, he considered that one’s tenure with the DOJ was a key factor:  
The successful drive was caused by the need, by the pain, by the absence of perceived 
fairness.  Once you’ve been around long enough, maybe five years, then you see it.  Then 
you say, yeah, this needs to be improved.  That was the answer to the problem— 
unionization.   
 
The efforts of organizers supplemented President Jetté’s executive campaign of raising the AJC’s 
profile to undecided lawyers.  Senior AJC administrator 1, a lawyer knowledgeable about the 
organizing drive, recognized the importance of Jetté’s work: 
We did telephone meetings and informal information sessions—Q & A’s—but I think the 
clincher was, after we did that, we got the president to travel across the country from 
office to office, do a presentation, indicate what the goals of the union were, highlight the 
shortcomings of LOAC, what LOAC had not been able to establish, what we hoped the 
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union, with the authority and clout of the union could do, that LOAC could not do.  And 
again, have the president there to answer questions of concern, to canvass the issues that 
people felt uncomfortable with and to identify how it would try to resolve conflicts in the 
workplace through the union that perhaps had not been successfully done under LOAC.  
And that included things like discipline matters, people being placed on probation, risked 
being dismissed because of performance issues, heavy-handedness by management on 
certain files, those kinds of things, all of which the union could intervene in either to 
prepare arguments or to provide for a presentation to somebody who’s being disciplined 
and none of those things could properly happen in the LOAC days, because again, there 
was no mechanism or structure to address those things.   
 
As a good organizer, Jetté focussed on the traditional issues of grievance procedures and job 
security during his meetings, which operated to emphasize the worth of a union to workers.
547
  
 
The impression of strong leadership channelled through an effective communications 
platform, either through print, website, or in-person, raised the perception that the AJC could 
satisfy its stated objectives and resonated with the interests of lawyers.  The AJC had a strong 
communication plan.  One of its slogans encouraged lawyers to “Sign up and give us the power 
to do more”.  In the case of Vancouver Regional Office lawyer 1, the legacy of Treasury Board’s 
mismanagement of the Toronto differential raised the AJC’s efficacy in correcting a disliked 
policy.  Before the AJC’s literature swayed him, this lawyer felt that a union was unnecessary.  
The Treasury Board ignoring lawyer demands for addressing the Toronto differential made the 
decision all the more easier for him, and other office colleagues, to back the AJC.  The AJC may 
have lacked a track record of improving wages, but they created a prospect of future success that 
outweighed the belief in the Treasury Board reversing its refusal to increase the national salary 
rate to the level of Toronto’s.  For another Vancouver lawyer, however, supporting the AJC was 
about combating the employer in a different forum after the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
dismissed the plaintiff lawyers’ case in Babcock: 
Well I think so in the sense that if the lawsuit had been successful, then I’m sure there 
wouldn’t have been any interest in going to a formal professional association, union type 
thing. I think that after the lawsuit was unsuccessful that it was well, what choice do we 
have? We have to somehow get to the bargaining table and we didn’t know how to get to 
the bargaining table.
548
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After roughly eight months of campaigning among non-management DOJ lawyers, the efforts of 
the AJC’s cross-country membership drive (with the exception of the Toronto office) netted a 
membership of 1,482 lawyers (from a possible 2,500 candidates).
549
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
  This chapter detailed the historical process of LOAC developing from a staff committee 
into a professional association to emerging as a front-runner for certification as a union by the 
PLSRB.  The direction taken by the AJC diverged from the pre-campaign route common in most 
workplaces, where either a small group of workers surveys the situation and then enlists a union 
to coordinate the organizing campaign, or, a union targets an employer, assesses the level of 
employee interest, and then determines whether to launch an organizing drive.
550
  For this 
reason, the sources of available data were looked at to pinpoint fundamental elements that 
accounted for LOAC’s rise as an in-house employee agent capable of assuming a representative 
function with respect to both grievances and pay.  The Toronto differential was therefore studied 
in relation to its origin and eventual catalyst for non-management Beyond LOAC members 
generating a popular mandate for becoming a professional association and resolving a source of 
employee dissatisfaction at work.  When the PSLRA was introduced (the context and details 
responsible for DOJ lawyers obtaining recognition under the Act were also presented in this 
chapter), the AJC reacted much more like any other prospective union and prepared an 
organizing campaign around the core economic issues of pay equity and increase, benefits, 
grievances, and promotions that appealed to the interests of various lawyers within the workplace 
(who were either existing AJC members or new recruits).  These were the advantages lawyers 
could potentially receive through collective bargaining if the AJC was certified as their 
bargaining agent. Before it was tested on delivering its campaign promises during first contract 
negotiations with TBS, though, the AJC first needed to obtain legal status as an employee 
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organization, so that it could force the employer to the bargaining table.  The following chapter 
details the outcome of the AJC’s and FLOC’s certification applications before the PSLRB.     
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   C H A P T E R 6:  First Collective Bargain—Long Road Ahead  
 
6.1   Introduction  
On 1 April 2005, the Association of Justice Counsel (AJC) and the Federal Law Officers 
of the Crown (FLOC) marked the first day of the PSLRA coming into effect by each filing their 
Form 1, Application for Certification with the Public Service Labour Relation Board’s (PSLRB) 
busy registry office.
551
  FLOC applied to become certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for a 
unit of 315 non-management lawyers and articling students who were employed across Ontario 
at the DOJ Toronto, and satellite offices in Brampton, Kitchener, Newmarket and London.  
FLOC maintained that its proposed bargaining unit was appropriate as its people shared a 
community of interest based on geographical location, litigation emphasis, receipt of the Toronto 
differential, and employee wishes, which were demonstrated through the overwhelming evidence 
of membership support.  By contrast, the AJC vied to become the certified bargaining agent for 
all legal officers employed in the DOJ Law Group (except for those who were not employees 
within the meaning of subsection 2[1] of the PSLRA) given that all lawyers in its proposed 
bargaining unit shared a community of interest and that the unit was consistent with the 
occupational group established by the Treasury Board.  Registry staff set 11 May 2005 as an 
initial closing date for FLOC and AJC to intervene in each others’ matters and as the Treasury 
Board’s deadline to reply to both employee organizations’ applications.  The date also marked 
the minimum time frame the PSLRB allowed the Treasury Board to post copies of the notice to 
employees of an application for certification at affected worksites.  The notice instructed that 
lawyers, who were opposed to the proceedings, to file with the PSLRB a Form 4, Statement of 
Opposition.   
 
The Treasury Board replied to FLOC’s application by outlining the unacceptability of its 
proposed bargaining unit for excluding other DOJ and the Professional Institute of the Public 
Service of Canada (PIPSC) lawyers, which, it argued, disrupted the Law Group occupational 
structure.  Similarly, the Treasury Board’s response noted that the AJC’s proposed bargaining 
unit did not include those lawyers in the bargaining unit represented by PIPSC. Instead, the 
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Treasury Board conceded that if the PSLRB established a bargaining unit consisting of DOJ 
lawyers, then it should affirm them as part of a single bargaining unit consisting of all employees 
of the employer in the Law Group as described in Part I of the Canada Gazette of 27 March 
1999.
552
  This consideration spurred the Treasury Board’s plea for an order revoking the PIPSC’s 
certificate as the bargaining agent for the Law Group members outside of the DOJ.  Additionally, 
it asked the PSLRB for an order declaring that positions in the bargaining unit be excluded for 
being managerial and confidential in nature, as pursuant to section 59(1) of the PSLRA.  Now 
provoked, PIPSC applied for intervener status in the proceedings in order to oppose the Treasury 
Board.  With PIPSC’s involvement established, all of the organizations affected by the 
certification applications involving DOJ lawyers confirmed their appearances before the PSLRB.   
 
The PSLRB’s case management system moved the multi-party proceeding towards 
resolution.  On 26 July 2005, both applications for certification, along with the Treasury Board’s 
request for a review of the PIPSC’s bargaining unit, were consolidated.  On 3 November 2005, 
representatives for the parties attended a pre-hearing conference before a Board member so to 
learn the order and location of the proceedings.  An Amended Notice of Hearing confirmed the 
trial dates of November 30th to December 2nd and December 5th to 7th, 2005 at the PSLRB 
offices (located on the 7th floor of the C.D. Howe Building in downtown Ottawa).  Counsel for 
the AJC and FLOC prepared for hearings by requesting, producing, and exchanging books of 
documents and exhibits which included the curriculum vitae of two witnesses for the FLOC, 
(Christopher Leaflour and Fergus O’Donnel) and a witness for the AJC, (Patrick Jetté).  A 
PSLRB panel consisting of Chairperson Yvan Tarte, Vice-Chairperson Sylvie Matteau and 
Board Member Dan Quigley presided over the proceedings.  The trial portion of the hearing 
allowed for the litigants to deliver oral argument, enter documents into evidence and examine 
witnesses.  The PSLRB ordered all four parties to deliver written arguments to it, and each other, 
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by 22 December 2005 with replies due by 13 January 2006.  The panel reserved its ruling until 
28 April 2006, the date of issue for its decision.
553
   
 
The Board members decided the merits of rival certification applications using section 57 
of the PSLRA which outlines the factors the PSLRB considers when determining whether a 
group of employees comprise an appropriate bargaining unit. Namely, sub-section 57(3) of the 
Act requires the Board to establish bargaining units that are co-extensive with the occupational 
group or subgroup created by the employer (unless doing so denies employees within the 
proposed unit satisfactory representation).  Combined with the Treasury Board’s, AJC’s, and 
PIPSC’s support for a bargaining unit of lawyers in the Law Group of which the Treasury Board 
is the employer, this statutory provision directed Board members’ attention to the merits of 
FLOC’s case.  In dismissing the FLOC’s application for certification, but granting the AJC’s, the 
Board followed federal labour relations practice of promoting administrative efficiency by 
preventing the splintering of members of one occupational group across several different 
bargaining units.  The Board rejected FLOC’s argument that a Toronto-centric bargaining unit 
constituted an occupational subgroup based solely on a pay differential, and that inclusion of its 
members in a service-wide bargaining unit would deny them adequate representation.  Since the 
AJC demonstrated that a majority of lawyers in the workplace wished them to be their 
bargaining agent, this allowed the PLSRB to forego a representation vote.  Pursuant to section 64 
of the PSLRA, the AJC was certified as exclusive bargaining agent and representative for a 
bargaining unit consisting of all non-management and non-confidential DOJ lawyers employed 
by the Treasury Board in the Law Group.  This group also included those lawyers previously 
represented by the PIPSC, as the PSLRB annulled its certificate.
554
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On 1 May 2006, the AJC performed one of its first official duties as agent for the Law 
Group bargaining unit by filing notice with the PSLRB that it opted for binding arbitration over 
conciliation in the event collective bargaining negotiations with the Treasury Board failed.  The 
AJC’s purposeful selection of a conservative conflict resolution mechanism was intended to 
placate the union membership and modelled the approach of other professional unions.
555
  
National Capital Region lawyer 1 recalled that her colleagues often discussed striking in relation 
to provincial Rules of Professional Conduct, thereby giving union representatives a sense of the 
bargaining unit members’ tolerance for organized protest.  AJC senior administrator 1 expressed 
that the union’s approach towards job action was “to get around it:” 
When the AJC was organizing lawyers, one of the things that we indicated from the start 
is that, should the AJC be determined through the process under the PSLRA to be the sole 
bargaining agent for the lawyers’ group, that our method of dispute resolution would be 
negotiation-arbitration and not conciliation-strike.  One of the reasons we did that is 
because we realized very early on—and every lawyer understood that—that if we are in a 
dispute resolution mode where strike is one of the options for the resolution of an 
impasse, that striking would place many lawyers in an ethical dilemma. So striking by 
professionals is not unheard of, as only striking by legal professionals is not unheard of.  
But you have to take appropriate steps when you strike to make sure that your obligations 
to the client are not jeopardized. But that would be if you were in a situation where strike 
was your dispute resolution mode.  That’s not the AJC’s mode right now. So we’re 
advancing the interests of the LA Group through collective bargaining, but in such a way 
that we are not in the strike context; we’re in the negotiation-arbitration context.    
         
The chosen protocol for resolving mass employee grievance, therefore, allowed the AJC to 
circumvent a tough-to-implement alternative that would have divided bargaining unit members, 
like former Ontario Regional Office lawyer 2, who disliked: “the union is going to tell me when I 
can come to work, whether I have to go on strike, whether I have to work to rule—etcetera, 
etcetera.  No, no, no, no, no!  It’s like telling a doctor work to rule. No, it just doesn’t fit.”  This 
practitioner’s discomfort towards a group mentality exhibits a lawyer’s trait of avoiding conflict 
of interest situations by exercising independent discretion.  The AJC’s leadership did not want to 
incite dissension amongst union members with less extreme remedies being available, much less 
than pursue a course of action that deviated from third-party arbitration as one of its selling 
points for becoming a professional association.  
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Despite section 106 of the PSLRA imposing an obligation on the union and employer to 
bargain in good faith and exert every reasonable effort to enter into an agreement, the AJC’s 
preference for arbitration expressed their realization that their first contract negotiations could 
break down and exhaust mediation.  A statutory duty to bargain in good faith, of course, does not 
assure negotiations produce a labour contract.  At least theoretically, if the collective bargaining 
reached an impasse, the arbitration could counterweigh the Treasury Board’s intractability on 
contested terms and conditions of employment by empowering an arbitrator to decide on their 
reasonableness.  The October 2000 Kaplan award proved that interest arbitration could yield 
significant wage increases for Ontario government lawyers from an obstinate provincial 
employer. 
 
With the process of collective bargaining dispute resolution resolved, on 10 May 2006, 
President Jetté wrote to the Executive Director of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 
(TBS) (which represents the Treasury Board in collective bargaining) and provided Hélène 
Laurendeau with notice that the AJC had initiated collective bargaining.  The letter thrust the 
AJC into the novel position of replacing DOJ management as the direct negotiator with TBS 
with respect to the terms and conditions of employment covering DOJ lawyers.  The AJC had a 
clean slate on which to improve the employment contract; however, it remained unclear whether 
the union’s gains would come at the expense of management prerogatives.  In any situation, 
achieving a freely negotiated, first collective agreement is a complicated and messy process, and 
the AJC’s accomplishment was potentially overshadowed by the agreement being birthed from a 
polarized union-management relationship.  Ideally, the first collective agreement establishes a 
foundation for future expectations long after its expiry,
556
 and that as the bargaining relationship 
matures the antagonism surrounding a first agreement may lessen and give way to greater 
collaboration between the contractual parties.  This trajectory, unfortunately, is not guaranteed.  
One matter of certainty was that many of the AJC’s negotiating team delegates had high 
expectations heading into collective bargaining as illustrated by member 5’s enthusiasm: “And 
we just wanted...the moon. I mean we wanted the cheese, the whole kit and caboodle that we 
worked on.  And we wanted lots more of these things and lots of that and better language on 
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this.”  They were naturally confident in their abilities to capitalize on opportunities for an 
employment contract moulded by collective bargaining.  
 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to detail the process by which the AJC and the 
Treasury Board reached their first collective bargain.  The analysis is presented as a narrative 
documentary, which is a format used in case studies in order to portray situations through 
illustrative descriptions of key events.
557
  As members of the AJC’s negotiating team were focal 
actors during labour contract negotiations, they were interviewed for their participant 
perspectives.  Their personal recollections and perceptions along with evidence from 
documentary sources, provide a phenomenological and empirical referent for identifying the 
actors, actions, and consequences associated with appointing negotiating team members; 
solidifying a bargaining strategy; exchanging bargaining proposals; meetings; bargaining 
impasse; demonstrations; political lobbying; first contract arbitration; and judicial intervention.  
All of these elements comprise a linear sequence of actions taken in the AJC’s collective 
bargaining experience.  When tied together, these events create an account that argues the AJC 
negotiated a first collective agreement in a contested and mediated model, which resulted in 
arbitration and Charter litigation over wage restraint legislation.  This legislation limited the 
salary gains of the Law Group bargaining unit to roughly the level of inflation over the five-year 
term of their first collective agreement.   
  
6.2  Collective Bargaining Phase 1: Preparation 
6.2.1    Assembling a Negotiating Team 
After confirming the union’s intent to enter collective bargaining, Jetté’s priorities over 
the summer months of 2006 involved coordinating bargaining session dates with TBS, 
assembling a negotiating team and solidifying a bargaining agenda.  He met with the AJC’s 
executive to discuss staffing the negotiating team with people demonstrative of inter-
organizational diversity.  Lawyers drawn from different regional offices, who understood the 
interests of their local constituents, ensured the geographical diversity of the team as well the 
need for bilingual representation.  The AJC also included a cross-section of male and female 
lawyers of different ages and Law Group classification stages.  Ideally, with such diverse 
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representation, the negotiating team members, each with their different legal specialties, could 
best assess the impact of TBS proposals on a variety of practice areas and recommend counter-
proposals that were more reasonable to the interests of lawyers occupying similar positions.    
 
Bargaining unit members applied to fill spots on the negotiating team.  Jetté, in 
conjunction with other AJC executives, selected eleven members from the LA-1 to LA-2B ranks.  
One candidate was selected from each of the Atlantic, Northern, Quebec, Prairie and British 
Columbia Regions, and two members from the Ontario Region were added to the committee.  
The National Capital Region put forward four representatives.  At a Governing Council meeting 
of October 2006, negotiating team member 5 recalled features of the assignment that would 
discourage all but the most interested recruit.  She explained that the mystique of the negotiating 
team solidified her interest in the job: 
Patrick made it clear that we didn’t know going into it whether we would be on a without 
pay basis or not which could result in some people, going without some part of their 
regular salary for some time because we didn’t even know at that point whether the AJC 
could carry us or not.  So, you were effectively, if you were interested in possibly 
volunteering, to do this for free, and also committing your time.  We didn’t know going 
into it how long these sessions would take.  We didn’t know how long you could be 
involved in them.  We had visions of these, crazy all-nighters, week-on-end sort of thing.  
And so you had to be willing to commit your energy, your time and possibly your money 
to this endeavour on a go-forward basis.  And I thought it sounded marvelous, so I put 
my name forward.   
 
Other lawyers committed to the union negotiating team for different reasons.  Jetté, for his part, 
as AJC president, was an ex officio member of all committees.
558
  Negotiating team member 3 
felt compelled to join the negotiating team after no one else from their office displayed any 
interest in the post.  The two representative positions on the negotiating team reserved for 
Ontario Region afforded a place for a member of FLOC’s contingent to participate and keep an 
eye on the AJC’s high-level dealings.  Overall, the AJC’s negotiating team formed an eclectic 
group. 
 
Involvement with the negotiating team meant an indeterminate time commitment for the 
volunteers.  Appendix B of an interim agreement dated 7 November 2006 granted the AJC 
negotiating team members leave to attend preparatory and contract negotiating sessions, albeit 
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without pay.
559
  Negotiating team members still needed to fulfill their daily job duties and their 
workloads grew because of the additional responsibilities imposed on them by assisting the 
union.  Negotiating team member 4 noted that the time involved in preparing for negotiations 
was not compensated, yet there was so much to accomplish.  He and another negotiating team 
member likened their involvement on the union committee as working “two jobs” or performing 
“double duty”.  The AJC’s negotiating team had to spend time identifying bargaining priorities, 
determining the bargaining strategy, and preparing bargaining proposals.  Despite the additional 
workload, negotiating team members flattened the learning curve of bargaining preparations by 
leveraging their skills developed from practice and motivation to climb what remained.    
 
The negotiating team’s importance justified forming an auxiliary committee.  The 
Negotiation Advisory Committee was a forum that offered the negotiating team a breadth of 
additional perspectives on the conduct of negotiations.  Negotiating team member 1 explained 
that this special committee operated to: 
Give even more of a regional spread and representation from different offices, and there 
were all of as many as eight of nine people on it.  It was a group to funnel messages and 
tell things to the negotiation team itself, to drop ideas and say what we think should be 
important or what shouldn’t be important; so, like a committee that fed into the 
negotiation team.
560
   
 
Members of the negotiating team knew of the critical assignment bestowed upon them as well as 
them satisfying a vital role in the AJC’s democratic governance by serving on one of the several 
sub-committees that were tasked with handling union business.  The negotiating team was 
accountable to the union’s decision-makers through the AJC’s Executive Committee and 
Governing Council.   
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Negotiating team members reported to the AJC’s Executive Committee which consists of 
seven officers elected by the AJC’s Governing Council.561  The Executive Committee oversees 
the AJC’s day-to-day administration between meetings of Governing Council—the AJC’s ruling 
and managing body.
562
  Members of the Governing Council assemble at least four times annually 
either in person or through audio/video conferencing, to conduct directorial duties, regulate 
internal affairs, and determine policies.
563
  Representatives from National Capital, Ontario, 
British Columbia, Quebec, Atlantic, Edmonton, Calgary, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Yukon, 
Northwest Territory, and Nunavut Regions comprise the assembly.  Clause 8.3 of the 2006 AJC 
Constitution allotted each regional office to appoint one member to Governing Council for every 
one hundred lawyers.
564
  The large cluster of lawyers working within the Ottawa area requires a 
special formula for calculating the council member representation for the National Capital 
Region. The distribution of positions on the Governing Council allows for proportionate 
geographic representation of bargaining unit members.  When the PSLRB certified the AJC as 
bargaining agent, its Governing Council consisted of forty-three members, twenty-two of whom 
were drawn from the National Capital Region.
565
   The AJC’s governance structure was far more 
democratic and purposefully arranged to create greater and varied executive input than LOAC’s 
previous one representative limit from each of the regional offices.    
 
Given the task at hand for the new organization, the issue of funding was a priority before 
collective bargaining started.  A significant financial worry was lifted for the AJC when it 
attained institutional stability with union security.  Appendix C of the November Interim 
Agreement instituted the Rand Formula.  Whether a card-carrying member of the AJC or not, the 
employer deducted a sum equal to the amount of membership dues from all employees in the 
Law Group bargaining unit as a condition of employment.  That amount was outlined by section 
6.2 of the 2006 AJC Constitution, which quantified membership dues as a deduction of 0.75 
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percent of annual salary.  The union arranged for dues deduction to begin on 1 November 2006, 
but the check-off was not implemented until 10 January 2007.  For lawyers who voluntarily paid 
annual dues in 2004 to 2006 and prior to the AJC’s certification, the AJC’s by-laws entitled them 
to a dues holiday equivalent to 133.33 percent of amounts paid.  Now in control of a steady flow 
of income, the AJC could defray lines of credit that kept the organization afloat while mustering 
the finances to pay for and weather an unknown end to negotiations. 
 
6.2.2 Finalizing a Negotiating Strategy  
The AJC followed general union practice of soliciting bargaining unit members’ views on 
priorities for negotiations through a survey.
566
  Participation by lawyers was highly encouraged, 
and they were invited to continue adding their feedback afterwards through e-mails and phone 
calls to regional Governing Council representatives.  The scope of employee demands identified 
by survey findings illustrated the many complaints about existing work conditions and terms of 
employment.  Having assembled a laundry list of potential bargaining considerations, the AJC’s 
executive consulted their legal counsel to winnow employee demands.  Some requests identified 
by respondents were unattainable.  Section 113 of the PSLRA restricts the scope of bargaining 
issues and sets limits on what negotiations cover.  The hiring, assigning, evaluating and dismissal 
of positions and the control of pensions and workers’ compensation are handled by other 
legislation regulating the administration of the federal public service (and are therefore excluded 
from a collective agreement).  Other concerns identified by the survey related to benefits covered 
by directives issued by the National Joint Council.
567
    
 
Issues such as wages, working conditions, and overtime entitlement are addressed in 
federal public service collective bargaining negotiations.  In particular, the focus of the AJC’s 
membership on the topic of wages was clear: they identified salary parity with Ontario Crown 
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lawyers as their primary monetary issue.
568
  They further highlighted the non-monetary policies 
of annual leave, alternative work arrangements and representation in employee discipline as 
other key matters of concern.  Part of the bundle of professional obligations concerning the 
bargaining unit involved maintaining offices with closed doors as an extension of solicitor-client 
privilege, ongoing education and training opportunities, reimbursement for lawyer expenses, and 
timekeeping.
569
  The scope of the Law Group bargaining unit’s demands followed Kleingartner’s 
findings that public sector professionals are inclined to seek professional goals associated with 
work responsibilities as part of their call for better pay and working conditions.
570
  After these 
bargaining priorities were short-listed, the majority opinion of the negotiating team members 
determined the priority demands received. 
 
Before the start of formal collective bargaining, the AJC’s negotiating team finalized 
their strategy for pursuing an agreement that balanced employee calls for workplace equity and 
better wages with employer demands for efficiencies that warranted the granting of benefits.  
The AJC considered either to adopt and tidy the PIPSC agreement or seek a more tailored and 
distinct product.  Their scrutiny of the PIPSC contract, and of the collective bargains covering 
other public sector lawyers, led them to take the latter option.  While a few standard articles from 
the PIPSC agreement would resolve uncomplicated matters, the stock language and generic 
terms and conditions of employment provided by the PIPSC’s compact mismatched the 
provisions needed for the more comprehensive agreement sought by the negotiating team.  In 
contrast, TBS considered the PIPSC collective agreement that expired on 28 February 2006 as its 
reference point, which reflected a conventional approach of using comparative agreements to set 
a negotiating position.
571
  The precedent offered TBS’s negotiators a model that was consistent 
with the reasonable expectations of past Law Group bargaining units and had the advantage of a 
contract with uniform articles found in collective agreements covering other federal public 
service workers.
572
  The AJC’s negotiating strategy was a calculated gamble, but one they 
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believed would convince a seasoned opponent that their principled demands could not be 
accommodated by a collective agreement developed for a group of one hundred or so lawyers 
outside of the DOJ.  With a resolved bargaining agenda in place, the AJC negotiating team 
foresaw a collective agreement that addressed the interests of bargaining unit members and, 
therefore, it was the one to best recommend as a good deal once completed.  
 
6. 3 Collective Bargaining Phase 2: Negotiations    
6.3.1 Negotiating Team Meetings: Meeting Bargaining Conventions 
The AJC’s negotiating team and TBS representatives met in Ottawa on 22-23 November 
2006 to commence an inaugural round of negotiations.  Toronto labour counsel, Steven Barrett 
represented the AJC at the bargaining table.
573
  TBS’s negotiating committee included its 
Director of Collective Bargaining Operations, another negotiator, and representatives from the 
DOJ, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, and Veterans Affairs.
574
  The parties met and 
exchanged bargaining proposals.  The AJC’s negotiating team addressed salary increases as a 
bargaining priority, but was told that non-monetary proposals would be addressed first.  This 
order of proceedings is typical in labour contract negotiations since agreeing to matters of less 
significance allows the parties to achieve initial gains, and generate an atmosphere of progress 
before broaching controversial terms.
575
  The parties planned a second set of negotiating 
meetings for 23-25 January 2007.  More dates were arranged for 20-22 February 2007 in 
Montreal, followed by additional sittings scheduled for April and June of 2007.  
 
When lawyering for the federal government, the interests of the AJC’s negotiating team 
members were aligned solely with those of the employer. Now, their partisanship had shifted to 
representing bargaining unit members in order to get them the best deal possible.  To participate 
in negotiations, members of the AJC’s negotiating team reproduced bargaining conventions.  
Preparatory discussions were held prior to bargaining sessions with the AJC’s lawyer, and, 
afterwards, the negotiating team members reviewed the plan for future meetings.  
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Representatives formed a cohesive group and they assumed particular roles.  On this point, AJC 
negotiating team member 4 recalled his specific involvement during bargaining sessions:    
We did caucus a lot to try to make sure we were not on different pages to try to be 
together.  My role, I tended not to speak too much, but I sat there and I listened carefully 
and I would sort of pipe in at strategic times.  I think some members might remember that 
I sort of played the role of a second sober thought, is one way to put it.     
    
The efforts of individual negotiating team members bolstered the collective capacities of the 
group.  As bargaining sessions progressed, Jetté asked negotiating team colleagues to conduct 
different tasks and the AJC’s negotiating team members enjoyed empowering responsibilities.  
Bargaining sessions were held in camera, but through the recollection of negotiating team 
member 2, it is possible to create a picture of how their preparation translated to action at the 
bargaining table:  
I was actively involved in all of the negotiations.  I was active at the table and we all had 
a number of things that we did.  We did research on particular and specific areas.  We 
were asked to speak at certain times at the negotiation table about certain topics.  So if 
you can imagine the contract was very large and there were a number of things that 
needed to be looked at.  So there were comparisons that were done to other contracts, 
there were cross-country comparisons done with respect to salaries, with respect to work, 
and different employment situations.  All of those comparisons needed to be looked at.  
We were involved dealing directly, one-on-one with the lawyers that were representing 
us.       
 
During the negotiation sessions between January and April of 2007, the parties discussed 
grievance procedures, education, training and career development for lawyers, vacation carry-
over, sick leave advances, use of video surveillance, court clothing entitlements, leave for union 
representatives and the AJC President, union dues deduction for employees in acting positions, 
and the no discrimination clause.
576
  While the AJC’s envoys came to every negotiating session 
to argue their bargaining proposals, in terms of movement towards a completed collective 
agreement there were few advances that the AJC could report to the bargaining unit.    
 
6.3.2 Negotiating Impasse Sets In 
Despite the efforts of a dedicated AJC negotiating team, obstacles to a settlement 
between the parties emerged once the meetings began dealing with specific details.  The 
employer’s immobile position towards key union demands on monetary and non-monetary 
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proposals became increasingly apparent to AJC negotiating team members after observing 
disciplined conduct from TBS’s negotiators.  Members of the negotiating team perceived that 
their counterparts were intentionally stalling negotiations, which created doubt as to whether 
TBS’s representatives even possessed bargaining authority.  Negotiating team member 4 made 
sense of this particular bargaining conduct as follows:  
The people who make the decisions are not the people who are at the negotiating tables.  
It’s always the messenger that gets sent out and they always have to keep checking with 
their masters.  That’s what my colleagues have learned from the experience of 
negotiating.  They thought they could go in and just basically out-lawyer the other side 
and they just got hit with a wall.          
  
As the passage alludes to, TBS’s practice of subjecting proposals and counterproposals for 
consideration to higher chains of management authority chilled the negotiating dynamic of give-
and-take necessary for spontaneous compromise on important articles.  Katz, Kochan and Colvin 
identify inadequate authority of negotiators as evidence of typical surface bargaining that 
amplifies opportunities for impasse and, as such, is common practice in public sector 
negotiations.
577
  Other employer inactions during the bargaining process made AJC negotiating 
team members wonder if there was the goodwill necessary for meaningful discussions.  On more 
than one occasion, TBS was unprepared at meetings, which hampered a day or two of bargaining 
progress.  The AJC collective bargaining update of August 2007 captured the negotiating team’s 
growing unease with TBS’s tactics.  The document revealed that TBS wanted to replicate 
provisions of the PIPSC agreement, exhibited a general stubbornness to share decision-making 
powers over key employment terms and practices that predated collective bargaining, and did not 
satisfy commitments to produce information or counter-proposals prior to bargaining sessions.
578
  
The AJC considered these attitudes and behaviours of TBS as impediments to negotiations.  
 
For some AJC negotiating team members, their expectations for a successful negotiated 
settlement progressively lowered as a result of TBS’s conduct.  It became apparent to negotiating 
team member 2 that the meetings had lost their usefulness.  The following passage captures the 
mixed motives she believed TBS had for continuing collective bargaining and the trouble that 
this posed for the AJC: 
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Much of those meetings were completely unproductive.  And if they were, there were 
certainly questions about whether the Treasury Board was trying to in fact break us where 
we weren’t making any progress on really any of the issues even though we were in 
agreement on many basic things; just dragging the meetings out.  But I’ll tell you, this 
was not a two-way negotiation.  This was a one-way negotiation with goodwill and good 
faith on the union’s side, really just wanting to get to some solution and to work through 
solutions.  And Treasury Board just taking unreasonable positions and not really having 
discussions with us in any meaningful and reasonable way.  
  
The aloofness of the employer’s agents towards collective bargaining motivated the AJC 
negotiating team members’ efforts to extend nuanced understanding about union proposals to aid 
in advancing discussions.  Union negotiating team member 4 reported the following surprise as a 
result of one such attempt:  
It arose during the course of negotiations.  Treasury Board looked at lawyers as being just 
another category.  I remember directly the negotiator for Treasury Board asking, “Why 
are you so different from CR4s or clerical workers or other professionals, like physicians 
or pilots”?  And we tried to respond in our ignorance that we were unique but we were 
sort of coming up flat against the Treasury Board notion that you were not different from 
other job categories.  So, if we were able to convince that negotiator we would have 
definitely had a different outcome from what we did.       
   
In a similar vein, negotiating team member 5 discovered that the employer maintained pre-
conceptions about DOJ lawyers bargaining collectively.  The gap widening between her 
expectations for the negotiations and the TBS’s actual tendencies led her to the following 
conclusion:  
Well, the difficulty of course was that we didn’t understand and appreciate the approach 
that the Treasury Board took with everybody in negotiations.  Which is, and they actually 
said it to us in one of our sessions with them, that you are not special, you are not 
different, you are not unique even if you are lawyers.  You are still public servants and 
you are governed by a collective agreement that we will impose on you basically just like 
we do on CAPE or PSAC and all the other public servants of the federal government.  
We really went in there thinking they have to appreciate how different we are because we 
are their lawyers.  And I don’t think we really appreciated that until quite a ways, I mean 
almost at the end I think it sunk in that no, they really didn’t think we were different.   
 
The respondent’s perception of the negotiations changed because of TBS’s position: a coalition 
of lawyers did not confer greater bargaining authority or power.  Her belief that collective 
bargaining could compel the employer to reward lawyers for their importance to the department 
was dashed.  This was an unexpected bargaining interaction for her that was made more 
profound by a forced change in awareness about the standing of lawyers.  
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By pursuing a broad spectrum of employment issues, the AJC may have unwittingly 
succumbed to TBS’s negotiating ploy—or at least one member of the AJC’s negotiating team 
thought so.  In particular, she believed the redirected emphasis on non-monetary priorities may 
have depleted negotiating capacities over monetary ones.  Negotiating team member 3 explained 
her view by saying: 
Well, I had different view than many of the members of the bargaining team and my view 
didn’t prevail.  My view was that the real issue to be addressed should be money.  That’s 
really what people signed up for.  They weren’t happy as you said because provincially 
employed lawyers were making more money.  There was perceived unfairness.  So the 
real impetus, at least in my region, was the bottom line, which was compensation, 
monetary compensation.   
 
Apparently, in some of the other regions, this is just that I’d heard, maybe they weren’t so 
unhappy about monetary compensation because you’re being paid relatively well.  So, 
you might have some other concerns about how many sick-leave days am I going to get?  
So there was some other issues and many, many, other issues.  I mean it got down to the 
minutia of how many court shirts could you buy for the year? Could you have a cell-
phone paid for?  
 
It just got into every single area and it seems that many in the bargaining unit wanted to 
re-invent the wheel from the beginning and have a very comprehensive first agreement 
where every issue was argued between the AJC and the management committee and not 
just compensation.  Whereas my view was why don’t we just sort of agree that all the 
terms and conditions as status quo, accept all of them that we’ve been living with and just 
say the real issue is money.  And that’s not what happened. 
 
Bargaining a long list of demands, article by article, seemed to have surprised the employer’s 
negotiators.  As TBS’s chief negotiator noted, the union’s position that all terms and conditions 
were open to negotiation, as well as the rejection of many standard articles contained in other 
collective bargains in the federal public service, led to proposals on most, if not all, aspects of the 
employment arrangement.
579
  As a result, the greater number of demands raised, the more 
interests needed to be discussed during meetings, which in themselves only allowed for a small 
window of opportunity to settle matters face-to-face.  
 
Without question, the AJC’s negotiating team faced a steep and uphill struggle in having 
TBS accept its salary and overtime bargaining demands.  The AJC’s compensation proposal of 
2004 provided the basis for requesting salary gains in the amount of 35 percent for the LA-1 and 
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LA-3B pay scales, 40 percent for the LA-3A pay scale and a 45 percent pay increase for a 
merged LA-2 level pay scale.
580
  As negotiating team member 1 relayed: “We were seeking 
parity with Ontario and we wanted to make a lot of headway in that regard.  We probably would 
have settled for something shorter but that was the number one goal.”  The AJC`s bargaining 
chip was that the wages paid to federal government lawyers were grossly undervalued and 
uncompetitive due to the legislative freezes of the 1990s and yearly economic advances of 
roughly 2.5 percent for LA-1 and LA-2A lawyers thereafter.  During bargaining, the AJC’s 
negotiating team could point to the health of the Canadian economy as a factor justifying wage 
demands, and, perceptively, the Treasury Board’s ability to pay fairly.  Canada’s economy and 
finances were unusually strong in 2005-2006, with the federal government projected to enjoy an 
$8 billion budget surplus.
581
  The union anticipated that a high starting position on wages would 
at least stir some compromise.  Instead, the employer’s opening proposal denied overtime 
entitlement
582
 and was silent on a salary proposal.
583
    
 
It became obvious that the TBS was simply not interested in meeting the AJC’s wage 
demands and moving towards what Chaykowski calls a “zone of agreement” and the common 
ground necessary for agreement.
584
  Instead, settling wage and overtime demands started as and 
remained a battle of wills between bargaining camps that favoured the much stronger Treasury 
Board.  According to negotiating team member 4: “We knew the Treasury Board was not going 
to agree with us, especially with—it turns out—salary demands being quite high, according to 
Treasury Board.  So there was no backing down from that position throughout.  It was quite 
consistent from day one.”  The AJC’s salary proposal typified distributive bargaining by 
attempting to secure as high as a wage increase as possible.
585
  If successful, it would alter the 
employer’s practice of benchmarking DOJ salaries to a national median wage by replacing it 
with the norm the province of Ontario paid its lawyers.  Faced with this proposition, the TBS’s 
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negotiators were content with a strategy that held the AJC’s wage demands in check.  For the 
first seventeen months of bargaining, TBS stalled on delivering a counterproposal to the AJC’s 
salary demands, which delayed the costing out of other monetary and non-monetary proposals.  
Negotiating team member 1 recounts his view on TBS’s stand towards salary rate increases:   
We were really trying to negotiate our own agreement and not just sort of add to the one 
already in place.  As well, I’m reading into the mind of the other side, but Treasury Board 
very much wants to not allow our salaries to go up and to fight us tooth and nail to ensure 
that didn’t happen.  The reason why I say that is there’s this huge document about the 
salaries in the federal public service. And it lays out the whole structure of how it all 
works.  They would sort of line us up against a certain level of executives and say, okay 
this is what these guys’ salaries should be.  That’s the way they set our salaries before.  
 
So the long and the short of it is if we were to get a significant pay increase, like the 30 or 
40 percent we were seeking to get parity with Ontario that would put immense pressure 
on the entire upper part of the triangle of the central public service.  Because they all will 
say, hey wait a minute here, in our big graph here these guys are equivalent and now they 
make 30 percent more than us, so give us all a 30 percent pay increase.  I think that was 
an immense barrier to us.    
    
The guideline this negotiating team member may have had in mind was the Treasury Board’s 
Policy Framework for the Management of Compensation (Employer’s Policy Framework), 
which outlined specific principles and methodology for managing compensation in the federal 
civil service.  The framework dictated that wage decisions for occupational groups are 
determined by external comparability, internal relativity, affordability and individual/group 
performance.
586
  The employer saw the principles of the Framework on Compensation as an 
objective standard that demonstrated that compensation for the Law Group was fairly sufficient 
as it stood and the AJC wage demands were wholly unreasonable.
587
   
 
At the close of negotiations on 26 September 2007, the slow progress of discussions 
alarmed both the union and the employer, forcing them to consider mediation.  On 15 October 
2007, the AJC and TBS decided on third-party mediation through the PSLRB.  The first of 
several meetings with noted labour arbitrator Kevin Burkett proceeded with one-day sessions on 
14 November and 19 December 2007, with mediation continuing on 19 and 20 January 2008.  
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Sessions facilitated resolution of a few non-monetary matters.
588
  At the third mediation meeting 
of 29 March 2008, the AJC received TBS’s proposal on compensation.  The offer proposed  
adopting standard language for generic terms and conditions of employment as necessary, an 
annual economic increase to salary ranges of 1.5 percent over three to four years, retroactive to 
April 2006, and rejecting any change to the pay structure.
589
  TBS’s proposal struck a chord with 
the AJC’s executive: they characterized the tender as an offer designed for rejection.  
 
TBS’s unsatisfactory offer marked an end to conventional negotiations.  In retrospect, 
negotiations between the AJC and TBS faltered because expectations for a first collective 
agreement prevented the two parties from yielding concessions on chief monetary and non-
monetary proposals.  Negotiating positions started far apart and remained that way.  The AJC 
attempted to craft a contract responsive to the financial, professional, and practical demands of 
bargaining unit members that conflicted with the TBS plan for re-circulating the PIPSC 
agreement.  TBS engaged in positional bargaining through its inaction on numerous key article 
proposals, which consumed the limited meeting time for resolving the extensive issues, while 
subtly informing the AJC that wages were non-negotiable.  With bargaining at a standstill, the 
AJC realized that it had to initiate binding arbitration through the PSLRB.   The AJC could 
satisfy the requirement of sub-section 135(b) of the PSLRA that it had bargained in good faith, as 
well as meet the Act’s other condition under sub-section 137(2) that it negotiated sufficiently and 
seriously with respect to the matters in dispute, but still could not reach agreement with TBS.  
The parties disagreed over all monetary issues and only minimal progress was made on key non-
monetary matters of closed doors, time keeping, and access to education and training.   
 
6. 4   The Dispute Goes Public: Federal Lawyers Deserve Justice  
The aborted negotiations did not undermine the credibility of either the AJC or TBS too 
much because neither party conceded defeat at the bargaining table.  The possibility of an 
independent arbitration board imposing terms and conditions carried incentives for both sides to 
continue to refine and settle matters they preferred not to leave to third-party resolution.  An 
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arbitration board, though, first needed to be struck that consisted of either a single member by 
agreement of the parties, or, at the request of either group, a tripartite committee consisting of a 
chairperson and one representative each appointed by the union and employer.
590
  Even in the 
process of selecting a chair for the arbitration board, the TBS and AJC disagreed.  This impasse 
illustrated the skepticism the union and employer had in the judgment of the other, which was 
likely exacerbated by the protracted negotiations.  The AJC preferred an impartial arbitrator 
selected by the parties or through an independent procedure; the TBS wanted a chair who was 
familiar with collective bargaining in the federal public service.
591
  An arbitrator being selected 
by the PSLRB’s chairperson disquieted the AJC because that position was tied to a Governor in 
Council appointment.   
 
With no deadline looming for reaching and entering a first collective agreement or the 
rendering of an arbitral award, the AJC was saddled with managing the expectations of a 
bargaining unit of intelligent professionals who were desirous of a contract with significant 
salary increases, but who instead saw their wages frozen as of May 2006 by the start of collective 
bargaining.  As could be expected with a large and diverse group spread across Canada, member 
interest in the union ranged from an understanding majority to an impatient minority.  Sporadic 
negotiation sessions that yielded marginal progress created an information vacuum and 
management dilemma for the AJC.  The problem of satiating bargaining unit member curiosity 
in collective bargaining was compromised by the union and employer agreeing to negotiate in 
confidence and on legal advice received by the AJC that instructed them to keep the contents of 
negotiations private.  For these reasons, the AJC’s release of information bulletins regarding 
bargaining sessions was limited, and, when published, reported redacted news.   
 
The informational needs of a bargaining unit new to the tribulations of first collective 
agreement negotiations became apparent to negotiating team members who were singled out by 
office colleagues as beacons for information.  Negotiating team members 2 and 4 tried to fill the 
information void by holding meetings to inform attendees about negotiations without, of course, 
revealing prohibited details.  Negotiating team member 1 recalled dealing with lawyers telling 
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him how to advance negotiations. He found informing inquisitive colleagues using ambiguities 
challenging, and reveals the feeling as follows: 
We tried to keep the word out there that we’re working.  But part of the problem also is 
that lawyers are kind of difficult clients.  Many of them are extremely supportive, 
wonderful, but you get a real mix.  And with lawyers, when someone has a disagreement, 
doesn’t like a particular way something is going, we’re trained to be fairly vocal about it.  
We put the strongest argument we can to somebody to say, hey fix this problem—I don’t 
like this.  And so, from a perspective of somebody on the negotiating team when you get 
these e-mails or phone calls they can be really intimidating in a way because they’re 
really well put.  Even though you know it’s not going to be that we’ll turn and do 
whatever this person is saying.  Still, they do a good job of telling us what they think.  
And that puts a lot of pressure on you.   
 
So, the other thing is that they have high expectations.  Not that many federal lawyers 
deal with labour relations law.  And so a lot of them completely misunderstood how the 
process works and how much you can sort of drive the process from the side of the union.  
In other words, they thought we should be bringing all these amazing applications in to 
the board to do this and to do that and force the employer to speed up everything.  And 
meanwhile the advice we were getting from our lawyers was no, this is the way it 
works—it’s a slow process.  If we rush off to the board with that we’ll just get shot back.  
It’ll slow things down even more, you shouldn’t do that.  So, we were kind of between a 
rock and a hard place.      
 
This description illustrates that lay bargaining unit members expressed opinions without full 
knowledge of the dispute resolution procedures of collective bargaining.  Three negotiating team 
members conceded that the AJC did not inform the membership as early, and with enough 
information as they could have.  The slow, filtered information left lawyers less apprised about 
the bargaining process and developments; this was the uneasy course the AJC initially took to 
prevent the errant disclosure of information that could inadvertently jeopardize strategic 
positions on contract terms.
592
  
 
The union’s leadership sensed that with little to tout and show about negotiations, the 
transition to arbitration unnerved the constituency.  At the time, bargaining unit morale was 
“very low” according to negotiating team member 2.  The AJC faced a bargaining unit full of 
frustrated members who complained about the length of negotiations and hold-up in receiving 
economic increases, disapproved of the wait in pursuing arbitration to determine salary increases, 
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and questioned why salaries were not the only focus for negotiations.
593
  Further impediments 
and delay in arbitration threatened to raise the bargaining unit’s perception of the AJC’s 
weakness.  Faced with an imminent problem that, if left unattended, could unravel the union’s 
legitimacy, negotiating team member 5 spoke about the AJC’s idea for a workable solution: “Our 
members were mad as hell and we tried to think of something to do that would help.  You, know, 
sort of re-energize them and bring more of a positive collegiality, if you will; or, a positive group 
mentality.”  The AJC’s leadership mulled a campaign to heighten employee solidarity.  One 
theme of the effort was to hold the Treasury Board accountable for the economic hardships 
caused by low pay rates.  Another theme was to awaken the bargaining unit to the employer’s 
role in undermining the completion of a freely negotiated collective agreement.  In a way, a 
united expression of employee discontent would demonstrate the bargaining unit to be an active 
group involved in, and concerned with, the determination of a speedy and fair arbitrated 
resolution.  After careful deliberation, the union’s leadership adopted the slogan of “Federal 
Lawyers Deserve Justice” to capture the AJC’s cause.  News of the campaign circulated 
throughout regional offices on memorandums, stickers, and buttons.  Naturally, the strength of 
the campaign depended on bargaining unit members buying into the idea.  
 
On 13 May 2008, the “Federal Lawyers Deserve Justice” campaign went public. Patrick 
Jetté planned an outdoor brown-bag luncheon between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. in the courtyard of 
DOJ headquarters located at the East Memorial Building on Wellington near the corner of Kent 
Street in downtown Ottawa.  Every AJC member in the NCR was invited to the luncheon as was 
Justice Minister Rob Nicholson and Treasury Board president Vic Toews.  Bargaining unit 
members in regional offices who obviously could not attend the luncheon were asked to display 
their support by posting stickers and wearing blue buttons at work that day.  Jetté planned to 
address the audience on the state of first contract negotiations, and, hopefully, achieve some 
headway in resolving their dispute with TBS.  Negotiating team member 1 spoke of advice 
received that involved other federal public employees faring well once their labour dispute with 
the government garnered publicity.  Particularly, negotiating team member 2 recalled talk about 
how financial administrators silently paraded on Parliament with pencils in the air and achieved 
their goal of a raise shortly after their demonstration.   
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Jetté and the other lawyer attendees were dressed in business attire and totting empty blue 
legal size folders, distinguishing them from other protestors, which, at that time, included 
demonstrators denouncing Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan.   An oversize white 
placard in front of, and adjacent to a plaque of Henriette Bourque, (the first female lawyer 
employed by Department of Justice), created a focal point for Jetté’s speech.  The union sign 
featuring the bilingual motto “federal lawyers deserve – Justice – pour les juristes du fédéral” in 
black print, set against the AJC’s blue proprietary logo, dressed the speaker’s pulpit.      
Negotiating team member 4 recalled his experience as an attendee:   
Well, I was surprised at the turnout. We didn’t have a big space to do it in.  Initially we 
thought about going out to the street corner and get on the lawn and we were advised 
we’re not able to do that.  Us being lawyers, we followed the advice.  So, they told us that 
that place was available, the courtyard in front of the East Memorial Building.  And I 
know—I remember it was almost like a party because I was just running into all of my 
colleagues that I knew personally there and they were just chatting away.  Our president 
gave a real good speech.  I don’t know if the Deputy was listening or not, in his 4th floor 
office.  But, I doubt he’d be there. 
 
Jetté’s speech enlivened his audience.  In covering the event, the newspaper The Lawyers Weekly 
reported on the show of camaraderie among an estimated three to four hundred lawyers who 
waved their blue folders on the president’s call to symbolize their frustration with an elusive 
collective agreement.
594
  The protest encouraged the President of the Treasury Board to write to 
the AJC with interest in discussing the union’s request for appointing an independent chair to 
head the arbitration board.
595
  In an atmosphere of benevolent rhetoric, the parties agreed (with 
the help of Kevin Burkett) to try to mediate the selection of a mutually acceptable nominee.  
 
After the rally, the AJC’s executive enacted another strategy for better engaging the 
membership: they adopted a new communication platform to report on union dealings.  Over the 
summer of 2008, the AJC released “All the details,” a rebranded and slick looking newsletter.  
The communiqué was posted on the AJC’s website, the union’s communications pipeline, and 
distributed through electronic subscription to members.  Going forward, developments in the 
negotiation and arbitration process were reported more promptly and in greater detail.   
                                                 
594
 C. Smitz, “Federal Crowns protest stalled salary talks: The union has opted for binding arbitration to achieve its 
first contract” The Lawyers Weekly 28:4 (23 May 2008) at 17.   
595
 AJC, All the details. 1:2 (August 2008) 1, online: AJC <http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/01_-_August_2,_2008.pdf.> 
(date accessed  1 March 2012).     
166 
 
6. 5  Collective Bargaining Phase 3: Conclusion  
6.5.1 Bill C-10  
On 24 September 2008, TBS’s senior negotiator wrote to the PSLRB with an application 
to establish an arbitration board and request that the empanelling process be left to procedures 
under the PSLRA as the parties could not settle on a mutually acceptable chair.  The TBS and 
AJC moved closer to interest arbitration, the next stage of third-party dispute resolution available 
to them.  A completed first collective agreement would now result from the adjudicators 
determining terms and conditions of employment, which, judging by the Treasury Board’s 
application, entailed their significant intervention.  Negotiations and mediation resolved clauses 
across seventeen articles; however, twenty-eight articles, some of which included work force 
adjustment policy and the contentious issue of pay, remained in dispute and were referred to 
arbitration.
596
  The AJC submitted its proposed articles for terms and conditions of employment 
that remained contested to the arbitration panel as well.  
 
The holdup incurred by FLOC’s certification application (that initially favoured the 
AJC’s wage demands at the start of negotiations with TBS due to the government’s healthy 
budget surplus) destabilized the union’s position heading into arbitration.  Canadian federal 
public service collective bargaining negotiations underway at the time were not immune from the 
financial crisis emanating in America as of August 2007.  By December 2007, stock, lending, 
banking and housing markets crashed, causing industrialized economies uncertainty, insecurity, 
and turmoil in what is now called the “Great Recession” (which lasted until June 2009).  In 
Canada, politics momentarily overtook the economy in the news with federal elections on 14 
October 2008, which produced a minority Conservative government.  Election results affected 
the course of collective bargaining negotiations in the federal public service.    
 
One month later, on 15 November 2008, TBS proposed the AJC reconsider discussions 
and possible settlement involving its salary demands in light of the Conservative government’s 
immediate fiscal priorities.
597
  Accordingly, on 18 November 2008, the AJC received TBS’s final 
wage offer that indicated the Law Group bargaining unit would receive: a 2.5 percent economic 
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increase for 2006-7, and increases of 2.3 percent for 2007-08 and 1.5 percent over the next three 
years respectively.  The AJC’s consideration of TBS’s offer swiftly came to a head with 
Governor General Michaëlle Jean’s speech to the throne of 19 November 2008, which opened 
the first session of the 40th parliament with a regimented plan for Canada’s uncertain post-
recession recovery.  The speech declared an economic policy of fiscal prudence by shoring up 
the balance sheet with spending restrictions directed at the familiar pairing of government 
operations and federal public service compensation.  In particular, it promised legislation aimed 
at “responsible fiscal management of public sector compensation,” as well as the Minister of 
Finance, Jim Flaherty, delivering in a week’s time the government’s Economic and Fiscal 
Statement.
598
  The spectre of imminent and aggressive legislation pushed the collective 
bargaining committees of certain employee groups belonging to the Canadian Association of 
Professional Employees and the Public Service Alliance of Canada to reluctantly sign tentative 
collective agreements; the AJC negotiating team had to ponder a similar outcome to its 
negotiations.  On 27 November 2008, Minister Flaherty’s Economic and Fiscal Statement 
outlined the details of legislation that limited annual public service wage increases for 2007-2008 
at 2.3 percent and for the following three years at 1.5 percent.
599
  On 1 December 2008, the AJC 
responded to the Treasury Board’s latest wage offer, which provided little more than what had 
been previously on the table.  In the eyes of the union, this was an offer so low and disparaging 
that the AJC stood tall by rejecting it. 
 
On 4 December 2008, Governor General Jean granted Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 
request to suspend Parliament that was designed to evade a non-confidence motion in the 
minority Conservatives planned by opposition parties upset with Minister Flaherty’s Economic 
and Fiscal Statement (and unafraid of toppling the sitting government in order to replace it with 
their own coalition rule).
600
  After Parliament reconvened, the first order of the chastened 
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Conservative government’s business was to present its revised budget to the House of Commons 
on 27 January 2009.  On 6 February 2009, the omnibus Bill C-10
601
 received first reading in the 
House of Commons and contained at Part 10, the Expenditure Restraint Act
602
 with its provisions 
for implementing federal public sector compensation restraint.  The ERA intended to freeze pay 
rates and cap maximum salary increases for any collective agreement or arbitral award before 8 
December 2008 at rates noted in finance Minister Flaherty’s Fiscal and Economic Statement.603  
However, entitlement to performance pay allowing for an annual bonus remained unaffected 
during the period of restraint that lasted from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2011.  Sections 34 and 
54 of the ERA detailed specific rules as to the ERA’s application regarding a negotiated or an 
arbitrated award, as well as the terms and conditions of employment covering the Law Group, 
and it made no exception for the AJC as the only group in the federal public service negotiating a 
first contract within the restraint period.  The negotiated settlements of the Canadian Border 
Service Guards and employees in both the Ships’ Officers and Operational Services Group, 
however, were excluded from section 23 of the ERA’s provisions prohibiting pay range 
restructuring.  The legislation also preserved Treasury Board’s ability to change existing pay 
allowances associated with a modernization initiative for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
  
With the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance planning to review Bill C-
10, the arbitration process involving TBS and AJC continued on its own track.  The PSLRB’s 
chairperson determined that a hearing should clarify and set terms of reference for the arbitration 
panel in light of TBS opposing the AJC’s proposals on terms and conditions of employment that 
it referred to arbitration.  The hearing was held on 15 and 16 December 2008, and on 12 
February 2009, Vice-Chairperson Ian Mackenzie released his decision.
604
  The Vice-
Chairperson’s legal analysis involved vetting the content of the AJC’s proposals against section 
150 of the PSLRA, which sets parameters on the terms and conditions of employment an arbitral 
award can determine.  Vice-Chairperson Mackenzie found the AJC’s proposals on key 
bargaining issues of time keeping, filling vacancies, promotion from LA-1 to LA-2 after four 
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years of service, requirement for at least 30 percent of lawyers in the bargaining unit being 
classified at level LA-2B or higher, and incorporating the existing Performance Review and 
Employee Appraisal Policy into the collective agreement conflicted with the Act and were 
therefore excluded from the arbitral terms of reference.  The ruling redeemed TBS’s strategy of 
denying the AJC’s impugned bargaining demands by using statutory norms as a buffer.  
 
Bill C-10 becoming law spurred the AJC to once again venture into the public realm.  
This time, the AJC planned political intervention by retaining the public relations firm Earnscliff 
Strategy Group to lobby federal political parties about the Act’s impact on the AJC’s first 
contract arbitration.
605
  In his role as president and spokesperson for the AJC, Jetté appeared on 
23 February 2009 before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance’s deliberations 
and study of Bill C-10.  He argued for: reprieve from the provisions of the ERA directed at the 
Law Group; advised on wage discrepancies between federal and provincial counsel leading to 
retention issues in the public prosecution service and low morale at the DOJ; urged members to 
consider the constitutionality of the legislation given its discriminatory and disproportionate 
effect on lawyers; and answered questions from politicians.
606
  His presentation lasted fifteen 
minutes.  In the end, the AJC’s request for Bill C-10 being amended was more consultative than 
persuasive.  On 12 March 2009, Bill C-10 received Royal Assent, and when that caused the 
Budget Implementation Act
607
 to become law, so too did the ERA come into force.    
 
Undeterred, the AJC’s politicking continued.  Responsible for the ongoing campaign was 
the AJC’s newly appointed President, Marco Mendicino.  On 25 April 2009, the succession from 
Jetté was executed by the Governing Council unanimously approving a motion tabled to appoint 
                                                 
605
 AJC, All the details 1:5 (24 November 2008  AJC) at 1, online AJC < http://ajc-ajj.net/files/library/05_-
_November_24,_2008.pdf> (date accessed: 1 March 2012); C. Smitz, “Federal lawyers slam wage restraints: 
disappointed judges seek pay hike when economy recovers” The Lawyers Weekly  28:38 (20 February 2009) at 1 
[hereinafter “Federal lawyers slam wage restraints”].  
606
 “Federal Lawyers Appear before House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Citing Injustice on the 
Part of the Federal Government” CNW Newswire (23 February 2009), online: CNW 
<http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/480411/federal-lawyers-appear-before-house-of-commons-standing-committee-
on-finance-citing-injustice-on-the-part-of-the-federal-government> (last modified 23: February 2009); Parliament of 
Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Finance, Presentation to The House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Finance by the Association of Justice (23 February 2009) (Video presentation on file with 
the researcher).   
607
 Budget Implementation Act, 2009, S.C. 2009, s. 2  [hereinafter Budget Implementation Act, 2009]. 
170 
 
Mendicino as acting president.
608
  His ascension to the post during a tumultuous arbitration 
process magnified the responsibilities demanded of an already tough assignment, but Mendicino 
was capable of leading the bargaining unit flock.  Like his predecessor, Mendicino’s calling was 
driven by a desire to improve the lot of federal government lawyers.  Gritty, articulate, and 
affable, the federal crown from Toronto was no stranger to high-pressure roles.  He prosecuted 
sensitive and complex anti-terrorism charges as part of Canada’s post-9/11 national security 
regimen.  Within short course, his advocacy was showcased before proceedings of the Standing 
Senate Committee on National Finance regarding Bill C-10.  Not one to miss a critical 
opportunity for promoting the AJC, President Mendicino called upon the senators to tell the 
Treasury Board that in future collective bargaining it should better value its lawyers and treat 
them fairly on compensation and non-monetary terms.
609
 
 
6.5.2 Arbitration Hearing and Judicial Review 
As arbitration neared, the AJC replaced Sack Goldblatt Mitchell with the Ottawa law firm 
of Nelligan O’Brien Payne to represent them in the upcoming hearings set for June 8-10, and 24-
25, 2009.
610
  The AJC and TBS recommended their appointees to the arbitration board, which 
would then nominate a third person to serve as chairperson, or, in the event the nominees 
disagreed, allow the Chairperson of the PSLRB to appoint the third member.  Preparations 
ramped up with the parties delivering briefs to the arbitration board and to each other, which 
contained proposed models for monetary and non-monetary contract articles.  These briefs 
illuminate the extent of division that prevented negotiators from reaching a collective agreement.  
Particularly, the AJC’s brief disclosed where the AJC sourced its non-monetary article proposals.  
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Contract terms and language informing proposals were drawn from labour contracts between 
lawyers and the provinces of Ontario,
611
 Manitoba,
612
 British Columbia,
613
 and Quebec.
614
  Other 
influences were terms and contract language from the PIPSC collective agreement,
615
 legislated 
standards,
616
 Provincial Rules of Professional Conduct,
617
 National Joint Council directives,
618
 
and extant terms governing the employment contracts of DOJ lawyers.
619
  The proposed articles 
illustrate the negotiating team’s use of precedents to establish favourable terms and conditions of 
employment while still viewing lawyers as distinct professionals (rather than as “ordinary” 
white-collar civil servants).  They also underlie the AJC’s legal argument that an arbitral award 
should yield a contract containing terms and conditions of employment that are common in 
agreements covering other collectivized public sector lawyers. 
 
On the side of management, TBS opposed the AJC’s proposals on the grounds that the 
proposed changes could impact any one of the twenty-six collective agreements between the 
Treasury Board and other federal public sector unions.
620
  TBS’s argument on twenty-three 
disputed articles invoked the stock phrase of: “The Employer proposed 
provision/definition/language is consistent throughout almost every collective agreement to 
which the Employer is a party.  This provision was contained in the previous collective 
agreement applicable to the LA employees previously represented by PIPSC.  These provisions 
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have not proved to be problematic in that context”.621  The Treasury Board clearly strove for 
conformity in its collective agreements including the one intended for the AJC. 
 
The parties continued seeking agreement on clauses referred to arbitration but on which 
they were close to a resolution.  Senior AJC administrator 2 discussed that administrative clauses 
were resolved before the start of hearings because of compromises at the “eleventh hour” as the 
parties realized that their interests were best served by settling less contentious issues.  
Arbitration commenced with mediation absorbing the first three days of hearings.  Two days of 
oral hearing were reserved for the Board to determine disputed contract articles.  Employer and 
union counsel made their arguments on proposed articles in light of section 148 PSLRA, which 
outlines the factors arbitrators consider in the making of an arbitral award in the federal public 
service.
622
  As for pay and remuneration (notwithstanding the salary caps provisions of section 
16 of the ERA) the AJC argued that section 34(1)(a)(iv) of the Act allowed for the awarding of 
additional remuneration for a particular position level.  They reasoned that the ERA defined 
additional remuneration as a differential, which they maintained characterized the Toronto rate.  
Union counsel urged the panel to award a salary increase to the level of the Toronto differential 
to all lawyers at level LA-2A and above not receiving the pay, but cap increases beyond the 
amount at rates imposed by law.  TBS countered the union’s arguments through its interpretation 
of the factors set out by section 148 of the PSLRA.  
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On 26 October 2009, the PSLRB released the arbitral award, and with it, the AJC reached 
a milestone.  The Treasury Board’s proposals on: representatives, leave with or without pay for 
association business or other activities under the PSLRA, membership dues, designated paid 
holidays, other leave with or without pay, and sick leave found favour with the arbitration panel, 
while the AJC’s proposals won out on existing benefits, overtime and travelling time for LA-1s 
and LA-2As, reimbursement of meal expenses and court clothing.  The panel sided with 
proposals drawn from both parties on management rights, information, standards of discipline, 
and overtime for LA-2B and LA-3 lawyers and vacation leave.  As for the AJC’s argument on 
salary increases, the award deferred to section 16 of the ERA.  The panel returned matters of pay 
administration back to the parties to resolve.  The question of office space was determined 
through an article detailing a joint-consultation provision.  The arbitrator’s order permitted a 
ninety-day implementation period for the award, except for overtime and travel time, which was 
set at 120 days.  The arbitral award was made effective as of 1 November 2009, and its term 
lasted until 9 May 2011.  A provisional first collective agreement between the AJC and Treasury 
Board was now in place on decided matters, wage adjustments and retroactive salary entitlement 
effective to 10 May 2006.  Finalizing the collective agreement, however, depended on the 
outcome of a potential judicial review of the arbitral award, and the AJC and Treasury Board 
resolving matters returned to them by the panel.  Indeed, the AJC believed the arbitral board 
exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a 120-day implementation phase for overtime and travel 
time when, without an agreement between the parties, it was under a mandatory ninety-day 
implementation period; so, it appealed the ruling by filing a notice of application to the Federal 
Court of Canada.
623
  On 3 December 2009, the employer filed their own judicial review of the 
award’s ruling on overtime, travel time, meal allowances, and court clothing.  Final resolution of 
these collective agreement provisions was left in the hands of a federal court judge.   
 
The arbitral award confirming the ERA’s disposition on salary increases disappointed the 
AJC’s leadership, but they were prepared for the outcome.  Undermined at the bargaining table, 
unsuccessful within the political realm, and wedded to an arbitration process with a fixed wage 
result, the AJC considered recourse to the courts to vindicate lost rights.  The AJC requested a 
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 Canada (A.G.) v. AJC, supra note 306 (Applicant’s Application Record, Appendices A and B at 30, para. 10).  
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legal opinion on the potential of a constitutional challenge to wage-restraint legislation.
624
  In 
August, the Governing Council caucused during a special meeting dedicated to addressing the 
merits of a suit.
625
  Ultimately, the decision to initiate Charter litigation proceeded by a vote of 
the Governing Council in consultation with bargaining unit members.  On 23 December 2009, 
the AJC announced news of an impending action against the Attorney General of Canada.
626
  
Despite this move, imminent litigation still could not bring the parties together to finalize and 
sign a collective agreement as a lingering impediment was the TBS confirming insurance and 
disability coverage for articling student bargaining unit members.  A meeting between 
Mendicino and Treasury Board President Day seemed to have overcome the roadblock.
627
  
Finally, on 27 July 2010, the AJC’s negotiating team and TBS’s representatives signed a 
monumental first collective agreement.  With an expiry date of 9 May 2011, the question of 
whether the lifespan of a settled labour contract would overlap with outstanding provisions 
depended on the speed of the federal court determining judicial review applications.  
  
With the Treasury Board withdrawing their initial claims for reimbursement of court 
clothing and meal expenses before the start of judicial review proceedings, its case involved 
overturning the arbitral award regarding overtime and travel time.  The employer argued that the 
arbitral award rendered overtime duplicative remuneration considering that the extant DOJ Law 
Group performance pay plan already rewarded lawyers for performing additional work hours.  
Under this logic, section 34(1)(a)(iii) of the ERA
628
 prohibited overtime because the section 
required arbitrators to maintain the same performance plan in place as of 9 May 2006.  A second 
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extension of the argument sourced section 34(1)(a)(v) of the ERA,
629
 which disqualified overtime 
and paid travelling time as additional remuneration akin to a performance bonus or pay.  A 
further claim proposed that the overtime award upset sections 148(b)(c)(d)(e) of the PSLRA
630
 
for reasons ranging from overtime being unusual in the practice of law, creating pay 
discrepancies favouring LA-2A counsel over LA-2B, and ignoring the status of Canada’s 
economy.  In Justice O’Keefe’s ruling of 6 May 2011,631 he first rejected TBS’s argument on 
section 34(1)(a)(iii) of the ERA by finding that no equivalency existed between working 
additional hours and performance assessment resulting in increased pay.  To support his point, he 
noted that the DOJ’s system for rewarding additional hours was through management leave, a 
system separate from the performance pay plan.  Second, that the arbitral award on overtime and 
travel time did not provide for payment that exceeded rates in place as of May 2006 (as provided 
by the PIPSC collective agreement) was not contrary to section 34(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.  Third, 
the court dismissed the argument regarding section 148 of the PSLRA since the arbitrator’s 
reasoning contemplated the principles raised by the section.  For its part, the AJC failed to 
convince the court to shorten the 120-day implementation period for overtime and paid travel 
time provisions after the award became binding.  Neither party appealed the ruling.  
 
6.6 Conclusion: Negotiating Lessons Learned from the Bargaining Table 
A collective bargain is a living document.  The terms and conditions by which the Law 
Group bargaining unit members provide legal services to the federal government and its 
departments and agencies will evolve in subsequent rounds of contract renewal negotiations.  
Just as in the past, a ruling government’s legal policies, budget constraints, and civil service 
reforms loom over the AJC attaining salary parity with Ontario government lawyers.  Other 
bargaining priorities may surface from time to time with the union reviewing terms that worked 
better in theory than in practice.  Insight from AJC’s negotiating team members’ reflections on 
collective bargaining signals a maturation of knowledge about the process that, when applied to 
future practice, will better equip the negotiating capacities of the union. 
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In their roles as the representatives of the AJC, the negotiating team members were 
enlightened about the assumptions they carried into collective bargaining.  Negotiating team 
member 2 realized that a vibrant negotiating team requires diverse representation from the 
people it serves and embraces differences in regional representation, gender, culture, areas of 
legal practice, and union experience.  Negotiating team member 6 described how the assignment 
required dealing with the practical realities of bringing a team together, reconciling competing 
interests and finally realizing that not everyone’s needs could be satisfied.  Negotiating team 
member 4 echoed similar appreciation for working as a collective:  
And so, it really taught me how to sort of work with a disparate group of people in terms 
of a bargaining committee.  This is different from when I did bargaining for Canada 
where we all—it was just one voice.  It was basically the negotiator; we support the 
negotiator and that’s it.  In negotiating in the union, you have to work with a bunch of 
different interests, come to some kind of resolution to provide points of position contrary 
to what the employer was saying.  So, that’s a lot of work.       
        
These observations suggest bargaining team members developed relationships with one another 
to effect orderly and effective bargaining.  Over the course of bargaining and interest arbitration 
the composition of the AJC negotiating team members changed.  Some team members took other 
posts within the department, while others bowed out due to other commitments, and were 
replaced by new individuals.  There is enough experience imparted between past and present 
AJC negotiating team representatives to instruct pragmatism as a guide for advancing 
negotiations.   The interests of bargaining unit members are best represented by progress at the 
bargaining table. 
 
Uncertainty about what bargaining with TBS holds has passed.  A wiser negotiating team 
will conduct contract renewal negotiations.  Negotiating team member 5 sees the experience of a 
first round of collective bargaining as creating a window with a view on their opponent’s 
practices.  Gone is the naivety bargaining team members first possessed with their lofty contract 
demands and belief in the good faith intentions of TBS.  The AJC negotiating team members 
learned through trial and error, that stalemate is an enemy in collective bargaining 
notwithstanding the fact that in first contract negotiations there will always be more terms and 
conditions of employment to determine than when renewing a collective agreement.  The focus 
now is to judiciously weigh areas that improve the collective agreement.  Negotiating team 
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member 5 continues by identifying pursuable terms and conditions as those that are crucial to a 
better labour contract, putting aside those of less urgency as future possibilities.  Bargaining 
demands that improve fringe benefits and salaries will be pursued in relation to whether they can 
yield gains from the employer.  This can mean that in future negotiating sessions, the AJC will 
have to overcome the TBS’s adherence to standard contract articles used in other public service 
collective agreements and have it accept demands deriving from the unique needs of the 
members in the bargaining unit.  Negotiating team member 1 expresses that learning process is 
ongoing when he says:  
So, there are some areas where we realize having gone through the process, that yeah, we 
can actually say fine whatever, we’ll settle for that.  Even though we thought it was 
important, we’ll settle for that.  But there are others that don’t work that way and we 
really want to kind of change the way Treasury Board looks at everything to get 
something custom tailored.  So again, that’s kind of the learning from a filter process of 
what’s important and what isn’t worth fighting for.   We’ve learnt an awful lot in our 
negotiations about where we ought to be in the future.    
 
This bargaining team member perceives that assessing future goals should be done in relation to 
past experiences.  Overall, this individual reflection that, when pooled together with the thoughts 
of other negotiating team members, reveals germane perspective on what collective bargaining 
with TBS entailed.  
 
The end result of first contract negotiations is the establishment of terms and conditions 
of employment for members of the Law Group bargaining unit within a unionized workplace.  
These first contract negotiations have also modelled a paradigm for the AJC’s negotiating team 
to follow in future rounds.  They will attempt to bargain in a style consistent with the 
professional goals and ideals that resonate with bargaining unit members.  Negotiating team 
member 7, a newcomer to the committee, comments that: “We don’t want to be caught doing 
things that we’re accusing the employer of doing.  We don’t want to be caught being accused of 
surface bargaining because that’s not our intention, so we do try the principled negotiation 
approach.”  Thus, the AJC will demonstrate the standard its wants emulated during negotiations 
with TBS. Ultimately, the success of this idealized approach depends on the AJC’s negotiating 
capacities to deliver on improvements to the collective agreement. 
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      C H A P T E R 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 This dissertation investigated the phenomenon of DOJ lawyers unionizing.  Chapters 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 6 each added a different component to the inquiry by respectively introducing the 
study, canvassing doctrinal studies and social scientific theories on lawyer unionization, 
outlining case study methodology, describing the history and application of the legal framework 
governing non-unionized human resources practices at the DOJ, detailing the context for lawyers 
supporting the AJC, and documenting the union’s involvement with collective bargaining and 
the courts.  Chapter 7 aims to synthesize the findings of earlier chapters in order to assess some 
key implications that arise from having addressed the study’s two research questions.  Another 
goal is to reflect on what the future may hold for labour relations between the Treasury Board 
and the AJC given that federal Conservative government austerity hinders DOJ lawyers 
exercising employee voice.  The chapter concludes with a “slice-of-life perspective” drawn from 
the perceptions of AJC bargaining unit members on practicing law under a labour contract.  I 
include their views to question the belief that collective bargaining by lawyers is 
“unprofessional”—an assumption that prevents employed counsel from considering the viability 
of unionism. 
 
7.2 DOJ Lawyers Unionizing: Proletarianized Employees or Rational Actors  
The findings from this case study allow for some interesting parallels to be drawn 
between federal public service staff associations obtaining collective bargaining rights (with the 
PSSRA’s enactment in 1967) and the AJC’s start as a bargaining agent (after the PSLRA became 
law in 2005).  As touched on in chapter 4, the staff associations’ frustration with the hollow 
association-consultation practice fueled their demands for collective bargaining legislation and 
direct negotiations with the government over terms and conditions of employment.  Similarly, 
while functioning without the benefit of labour legislation, non-management Beyond LOAC 
members also determined that collective bargaining was the only meaningful way to influence 
the employment contract.  Another connection involves the political promises of past Liberal 
Prime Ministers as the penultimate steps for formal committees and task forces attaining 
mandates either to investigate the introduction of collective bargaining or to provide 
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recommendations for its overhaul.  Finally, the access to collective bargaining of both federal 
public servants and non-management DOJ lawyers’ came about through new labour legislation 
designed to quell civil servant unrest (though three-and-half decades apart) and, ostensibly, to 
improve employer-employee relations.  These historical similarities were discovered by studying 
a change in employment systems at the DOJ.   
 
The AJC’s creation was explained using inferences about behaviours that were context-
bound (hence the descriptive orientation of the analysis).
632
  I assessed the motivations for initial 
associational activity and union formation with a fundamental premise derived from the research 
literature: a professional employee’s decision to support a union unfolds at the individual level 
and in relation to job dissatisfaction.
633
  Job dissatisfaction served as a construct for filtering the 
events that comprise the narrative presented in chapter 5, with its goal of addressing the first 
research question of understanding what led DOJ lawyers to unionize with the AJC.  The 
analysis advanced in that chapter can now be revisited in order to analyze the theoretical 
implications of the AJC’s establishment and emergence as a union using the processual model 
concepts of: (1) salary and working conditions; (2) employee leadership; and (3) appropriate 
environmental conditions.
634
  
      
To recognize the initial moves towards unionization, employment relations between the 
DOJ and its unrepresented lawyers were studied as a flashpoint for employee dissatisfaction.  It 
was discovered that the introduction of the Toronto differential (and its extension by a legislative 
freeze) was a Treasury Board decision that situated wages as a paramount employment concern 
and influenced employee perceptions of workplace inequity.
635
  The department’s treatment of 
lawyers under an individual employment regime precipitated a grassroots, employee-driven 
movement that incrementally developed in response to policy adjustments affecting the 
department’s management of its staff.  Professionals will support an association or union based 
on its relevance, which, in turn, flows from its perceived utility.  DOJ lawyers abandoned LOAC 
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and formed the AJC for the purpose of having formal representation in grievances and dealings 
with management along with using collective bargaining to improve wages and working 
conditions.    
 
This project’s interview and documentary evidence uncovered few signs to support an 
argument that lawyers’ dissatisfaction and corollary interest in unionization was tied to an over-
bureaucratized workplace (with feelings of a lack of professional autonomy and control 
associated with such ideological proletarianization).  In their interviews, in fact, four DOJ 
lawyers commented on the quality of work at the department.  Two of these respondents, and 
most of the other lawyer interviewees, noted that they supported unionization to gain better 
salaries, transparent promotions, and recognition for overtime.  Their responses did not suggest 
that collective bargaining’s other function of taking wages out of the competition factored as a 
consideration.  A more quantitative assessment of perceived economic improvements in terms 
and conditions of employment achievable through collective bargaining supports the lawyers’ 
primary interest in improved pay and promotion rates—roughly three-quarters of the DOJ lawyer 
population is designated at the LA-1 and LA-2A ranking, with majority located at the latter 
stage.
636
  With the DOJ’s management not addressing pay discrepancies between the Toronto 
and national salary scales, those directly affected by employer indifference realized that inaction 
came at an appreciable cost to finances and morale.
637
  Suing the employer over the Toronto 
differential appealed to only several dozen or so of the most displeased counsel situated at the 
Vancouver Regional Office, leaving other DOJ lawyers eager for a more moderate redress 
mechanism: the AJC.  Supporting the AJC was a calculated choice for DOJ lawyers based on the 
perceived need for employee representation relative to federal labour legislation restricting the 
agent’s powers.    
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  This study exposed the importance of a strong leadership organizing their fellow 
employees, a construct that is also central to mobilization theory.
638
  LOAC’s non-management 
members advocating for a new organization marked an embryonic stage for the AJC.  They 
executed an ambitious plan for fixing LOAC’s deficiencies by demanding a new organizational 
format that Deputy Minister of Justice Rosenberg conceded warranted further investigation.  A 
core three-person transition team lead by Lois Lehman assumed the task of seeing the Beyond 
LOAC process to fruition.  This group was able to clearly articulate to their cohort the benefits of 
employee representation that was similar to models used by Ontario and British Columbia 
government lawyers.  The AJC’s transitional leadership adopted a plan, monitored progress, and 
modified strategies to seize a propitious environment for instituting the AJC that was triggered 
by the Kaplan award dispelling comparability between Ontario MAG rates and the Toronto 
salary scale.
639
  Lehman enjoyed an active and crucial tenure overseeing the AJC’s formation, 
which was a solemn responsibility that Patrick Jetté carried on as her replacement.  Jetté’s work, 
aided by a small executive, subsequently increased when he was called on to coordinate a 
certification drive, prepare for collective bargaining, and oversee first contract negotiations.  
Negotiating team member 6 who worked with Jetté during the early stage of his presidency 
poignantly remarked how: “The president worked unbelievably hard. He really gave his life and 
soul to the AJC and I think he felt that responsibility not as just as the president, but because he 
was being paid and he knew that the rest of us were volunteers”.  Jetté fulfilled his duties, 
making up for limited institutional resources available to the AJC once departmental funding ran 
out and fundraising and voluntary dues from association members kicked in. 
 
Enabling collective bargaining legislation is crucial to processual model analysis for 
proposing that professionals, like other workers, will unionize when it suits their interests.  This 
is not to say that workers will not force coverage where excluded from a federal or provincial 
labour statute, but the risk-to-reward calculation of law suits and political campaigning are other 
considerations a group must weigh.  The capacity of the AJC’s initial leadership to obtain 
collective rights clearly depended on the Treasury Board voluntarily recognizing them as a 
                                                 
638
 J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism, and Long Waves (London: Routledge, 
1998) at 35. 
639
 A.H. van de Ven & M.S. Poole, “Explaining Development and Change in Organizations” (1995) 20:3 The 
Academy of Management Review 510 at 516.   
182 
 
bargaining agent, which the Treasury Board did not do because of the PSSRA’s prohibitions.  To 
overcome this legislative inadequacy, the AJC lobbied the Quail Task Force on Modernizing 
Human Resources Management for inclusion under new labour legislation, and by conducting an 
organizing campaign of lawyers to prepare for an eventual change in the law.  As the AJC’s 
experience shows, where restrictive legislation prohibits professionals from collective 
bargaining, it also becomes a site for various activities directed at changing prevailing 
exclusions. 
 
7.3 The AJC’s First Contract Negotiation and the Law of Collective Bargaining 
The second research question posed by this dissertation was to detail the AJC’s 
experience in negotiating a first collective agreement.  Chapter 6 addressed this goal by noting 
union preparations for bargaining, providing insight on the conduct of negotiations, detailing the 
reasons for an impasse in negotiations with TBS and its impact on relations between the union 
and its members, as well as by detailing the process of resolution, which involved court battles to 
both uphold the arbitrated first collective agreement, and challenge its statutorily imposed wage  
limits  Chapter 6’s empirical presentation of collective bargaining negotiations stands as its own 
social scientific depiction of the process, in addition to offering a rich account that supplements 
the predicate facts reported by Ontario Superior and Court of Appeal judges in their reasons for 
judgment on the AJC’s case.640  The AJC’s involvement before the courts warrants attention 
because for the new AJC to have dedicated the time, expenditure, and energy to launch a Charter 
challenge (and willingness to engage the Attorney General of Canada in high-stakes litigation all 
the way to the Supreme Court of Canada) was a long-shot strategy with very significant 
ramifications if successful.  The AJC’s application tested the legality of the state’s unilateral 
conduct of overriding collective bargaining negotiations to engineer compliance with a tough 
budget that accounted for economic recession and uncertainty.  Had the outcome favoured the 
AJC, the ruling would have rebuked legislatures for drafting overbearing legislation, demanded 
more care from them in the future by instilling a greater respect for collective bargaining, and 
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established a persuasive legal precedent aiding other unions in their suits against the government 
for imposing the ERA’s wage caps.641   
 
The cycle of federal public servants having to the bear the economic burden of legislated 
wage controls was regularized in 1982 with Trudeau’s Liberals implementing the Public Sector 
Compensation Restraint Act, which suspended collective bargaining and striking by extending the 
wage plans and arbitral agreements of all federal collective agreements for two years, and by 
fixing wage increases by 6 percent in 1982 and 5 percent in 1983.
642
  The Public Service Alliance of 
Canada put the constitutionality of this controversial Act before the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which concluded, nonetheless, that no freedom of association rights protected by the Charter 
were violated since the law did not restrict the union’s role as employee representative.643  What, 
then, made the AJC’s Charter challenge to the ERA noteworthy?  The case seems to confirm a 
scenario predicted for collective bargaining where legislatures impose temporary restrictions at 
will.
644
  It would also suggest the federal government uses economic instability to introduce 
legislation that effectively resolves collective bargaining disputes.
645
  The whole background 
leading to litigation also casts a negative light on the apparent goodwill surrounding the PSLRA’s 
introduction that was intended to erase past attitudes and stoke fresh approaches for more 
equitable dealings in labour relations.  Certainly, the AJC’s Charter challenge to the ERA 
contributes to an emerging dialogue unions have opened between the courts and legislatures on 
the legality of restraint legislation and the utility of the courts, rather than the political process, 
for upholding new freedom of association protections for collective worker activities.    
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Collective bargaining is an exercise of negotiating power, advanced through institutional 
resources, and tempered by a statutory duty to bargain in good faith.  The law acknowledges that 
any party that exercises more strength and resources between the negotiating table and shop floor 
(or office) to impose contract terms than its adversary is simply leveraging their might and will 
not attract censure.
646
  A different claim arises, however, when a negotiating party infringes their 
obligation through actions and proposals on standard contract terms that show no intent for 
reaching agreement.
647
  Likewise, not complying with requests for disclosure during negotiations 
is actionable for bad faith in an unfair labour practice complaint, as progress occurs only through 
adequate information sharing on which proposals originate and counter-proposals are 
assessed.
648
  The AJC’s Charter application put into issue the legality of whether the employer’s 
negotiating tactics of dilatory disclosure, unproductive bargaining sessions, and stalled salary 
proposals denied the union procedural fairness during collective bargaining in light of the 
important precedent established by the case of Health Services.
649
  This June 2007 Supreme 
Court of Canada decision partly reversed two decades of the court’s own jurisprudence laid 
down in the “Labour Trilogy,” which had excluded collective bargaining and striking from 
freedom of association protection.
650
  Health Services determined that a procedural right to 
collective bargaining (but not a substantive or economic outcome) has constitutional protection 
under section 2(d) of the Charter and correspondingly obliges a government employer to bargain 
in good faith.
651
  The ruling implies that collective bargaining negotiations should be devoid of 
substantial state interference in the form of laws or state actions that usurp discussion, 
meaningful negotiations, and consultation over key working conditions.
652
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Based largely on their assessment of Health Services’ ratio, lawyers for the AJC believed 
that their client did not get the full benefit of the law during first contract negotiations with 
Treasury Board’s representatives.  They were partially correct.  At the application stage of the 
hearing, Grace J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice agreed with the AJC’s lawyers’ 
contention that for the 2006-2007 fiscal years, sections 16(a) and 34(1)(a) of the ERA infringed 
their clients’ rights under section 2(d) of the Charter and failed the minimal impairment test 
under section 1 of the Charter.
653
  A monumental victory, it was celebrated only until the Ontario 
Court of Appeal vindicated the employer by overturning Grace J.’s ruling and annulling his 
remedy.
654
  The appellate decision clarifies that government employers can engage in hard 
bargaining and satisfy their good faith negotiating obligations, so long as meaningful discussion 
and engagement occurs with a union prior to the introduction of legislation that resolves the 
impasse.  The reversal of fortunes for the AJC’s bargaining unit is an example of the flaws 
academics cite with Charter legalism. Their observations are that it reinforces a loss of unions’ 
political power;
655
 symbolizes litigation as a defensive, reactive, and narrow response;
656
  and 
places faith and confidence in judges who are expected to interpret formal abstract principles in a 
linear fashion to produce legal precedents that sequentially improve worker protections.
657
  
When called upon, appellate judges understand very well the balance of power the law affords 
unions and employers under Wagner-styled collective bargaining legislation,
658
 and, as Tucker 
argues, will read down earlier decisions to scale back overbroad legal entitlements benefitting 
unions.
659
  Consider that in AJC v. Canada (A.G)
660
 the Ontario Court of Appeal relied on the 
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Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser.661  Fraser, a 
constitutional challenge to the Ontario Agricultural Employees Protection Act,
662
 refined the test 
for assessing a breach of section 2(d) of the Charter to require that an impugned law or state 
action must make it impossible to act collectively to achieve workplace goals, thereby ratcheting 
down protections established by Health Services. 
 
Sharpe J.A. writing for a unanimous court (Armstrong and Peppal JJ.A. concurring) 
determined Fraser was dispositive law for determining the AJC’s appeal.663  Sharpe J.A. also 
referred to Mounted Police Association of Ontario, released twelve days before the hearing of 
the AJC’s appeal.  In that case, Juriansz J.A.’s interpretation of the derivative rights inquiry from 
Fraser confirmed that a duty on a government employer to bargain in good faith is imposed 
when legislation makes it effectively impossible for employees to act in concert and pursue 
collective goals.
664
  Having outlined the guiding case law, Sharpe J.A. turned to analyzing the 
facts of the case, and the ERA’s impact on collective bargaining between the AJC and TBS.  
Sharpe J.A. used Fraser to confirm that constitutional protection in the collective bargaining 
milieu guarantees a basic process, but not a result.  Accordingly, the court confirmed that section 
2(d) of the Charter is not violated if negotiations do not yield a collective bargain, nor does 
Fraser offer a constitutional right to an arbitrated settlement in the event of failed negotiations.   
In sum, the Attorney General of Canada won its case before three judges of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal because they found that the ERA’s removal of wages from the arbitration process did not 
preclude the AJC from meaningfully engaging in a collective bargaining process or prevent TBS 
from considering its demands in good faith.  The upshot of the appellate ruling is that it 
maintained the acceptability of the ERA restraining negotiations or arbitration from 
independently determining lawyers’ salaries.  The AJC’s Charter application received the first 
appellate determination on the constitutionality of the ERA.
665
  By virtue of this distinction, the 
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ruling also became the first case involving the constitutionality of the ERA that the Supreme 
Court of Canada declined to hear.
666
    
 
The AJC’s Charter challenge reflected the union’s limited choice for using the courts to 
level the disproportionate bargaining power wielded by the Treasury Board in first collective 
agreement negotiations.  The AJC’s own bargaining strength was diminished after the union 
rejected the option of conciliation and strike, replacing its most forceful weapon with more 
conservative political action and litigation (as typically used by other government unions).
667
  
Despite the AJC supporting a Charter action for both principled and financial reasons, the 
disposition of the Ontario Court of Appeal reinforces the highly speculative nature of litigation 
that is subject to jurisprudence unpredictably changing.  In the final analysis, no matter how the 
AJC’s loss was a significant letdown that thwarted its professed mission for securing significant 
salary gains, and shook union members’ expectations of the courts delivering justice, the 
outcome illustrates that its litigation against the state was an imperfect remedy for counteracting 
legislation that unduly interfered with the collective bargain process. 
 
7.4 Employee Voice at Work under the AJC and its Future Prospects  
Chapter 4, and the first portion of chapter 5, presented an individual employment 
relationship covering non-management DOJ lawyers that the Treasury Board had determined at 
will and then modified in 1990, for example, to remedy the labour turmoil at the department’s 
Toronto office.  In this scheme, the input of DOJ lawyers regarding the terms and conditions of 
work was limited to what, if anything, DOJ representatives choose to relay from LOAC’s reports 
on their consultations and proposals with TBS’s agents.  Once lawyers were determined to 
reform LOAC—and discussed the various reasons for doing so and the necessary measures to 
take—the course of events that followed outline the creation of a new union in the federal public 
service.  As the legally certified representative of 2,600 federal government lawyers, the current 
organization, the AJC, is a small but highly specialized craft union (especially in comparison to 
                                                 
666
 By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the Meredith case involving RCMP employees challenging the 
ERA usurping any employee representations on scheduled wage increase limits.  Expected to be released in January 
2015, the court’s ruling will allow commentators to globally evaluate public sector unions litigating the ERA. 
667R. Hebdon, J.E. Slater & M.F. Masters, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Tumultuous Times” in H.W. 
Stranger, P.F. Clark & A.C. Frost, eds., Collective Bargaining Under Duress: Case Studies of Major U.S. Industries 
(Ithaca: ILR Press, 2014) 255 at 275. 
188 
 
others in the federal public service that represent much larger and more diverse professional 
groups such as PIPSC, whose numbers total 60,000, or CAPE whose members total 12,500).
668
  
By documenting a new entrant to the federal labour relations scene (when current prospects for 
union growth are limited),
669
 this study’s presentation of the AJC’s history, organization, and 
mission provides original insight about a dynamic union.     
 
A third objective of this study was to assess DOJ lawyers’ ability to exercise greater 
employee voice (influence in organizational decision-making) because of their unionization 
under the AJC.  The findings from chapters 4, 5 and 6 satisfied this goal by comparing and 
contrasting the level of employee voice available under the initially ineffective LOAC to that 
afforded by the AJC.  Dissatisfaction at work as the precursor to DOJ lawyers supporting the 
AJC’s creation and transformation into a union is consistent with Frost and Taras’ assessment for 
workers exercising voice.
670
  Unions both legitimize and optimize employee influence through 
collective bargaining and its purpose of expressing desired employment conditions to the 
employer.
671
  Indeed, the first collective agreement has fundamentally transformed the social and 
cultural environment for lawyers employed at the DOJ (and other places where members of the 
Law Group bargaining unit work) by minimizing some of the authority of management.  
Management reign over how lawyers worked once went unquestioned, and now, job obligations 
and entitlements are distributed across thirty-eight articles and five appendices that comprise an 
enforceable and written record of the rules for providing services.  National Capital Region 
lawyer 2 noted, “I mean if all managers were perfect we would not need any unions...There are 
rules that have not been respected, implicit rules have not been respected and we think that 
through unionization through the collective agreement will guarantee certain rights, at least”.  
Entitlements under the collective agreement assist bargaining unit members of all stripes.  This 
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makes for a more egalitarian workplace.  National Capital Region lawyer 3 expressed, “The 
benefits of being in a union...ensures that lawyers, whether you are incoming first year call or 
somebody who has spent an entire year career, twenty-five—thirty years with the department, 
you’re equally and fairly represented before Treasury Board.”  The respondent continued, “It 
makes a big difference that lawyers are allowed, I wouldn’t say luxury, but we can now be 
focussed on lawyering as it were, and not be taking up matters of benefits and pay and working 
conditions and so on.  We have representatives who act on our behalf.”  This lawyer values the 
certainty of terms of employment being fixed for the life of the collective agreement.  Like her, 
other lawyers will realize the full utility of the collective agreement by guiding their work 
according to principles established by each of its articles.   
 
Bargaining unit member participation in the union is another dimension of employees 
exercising voice in the work context.
672
  The PLSRB certifying the AJC as a bargaining agent 
was a crucial first step in forcing the Treasury Board to recognize the AJC as the exclusive 
representative of the Law Group bargaining unit, granting lawyers access to industrial relations, 
and permitting their involvement in shaping the AJC’s bargaining agenda.  But, in order for the 
AJC to achieve its goals for collective bargaining, the process still demanded skillful negotiation 
from the union’s representatives and lawyers.  The Treasury Board denying the AJC’s salary 
demands forced the union to unite its membership in a common cause that was necessary for 
shifting the battle against the employer from the bargaining table to public, political, and judicial 
arenas.  The union’s attempt at periodic mobilization was designed to dispel member 
complacency and vest lawyers with a direct stake in first contract negotiations.  Its effect has 
been to improve opportunities for member involvement in union activities.   
 
Clearly, the AJC has matured in its information sharing and activist capacities since the 
start of collective bargaining.  Bargaining unit member involvement in union business has grown 
from the early days when lawyers provided survey input in the setting of collective bargaining 
priorities and sourced negotiating team members from within its ranks.  The opening of the 
union’s information network was a culmination of the AJC’s Executive Committee decision in 
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the midst of first contract negotiations to liberalize the content and the frequency of 
communications with members and to satisfy their growing expectations.  Now that it has been 
opened, access to greater knowledge and more in-depth perspective about the AJC’s dealings 
will not be easily shut, and this transparency can be used to encourage lawyers’ input in a 
collective decision-making process.
673
  While a second initiative, the Federal Lawyers Deserve 
Justice Campaign, informed that the AJC, as a newly formed organization, could enlist 
bargaining unit members to exercise collective agency, attempt to influence the determination of 
an arbitration board, and leave, in the process, an imprint of the effort in the public record.  The 
AJC may well have to re-mobilize its members to resist the federal government reducing funding 
to the DOJ that limits its expenditures and invites service and personnel cutbacks.  The current 
political economy pervading the federal public service is marked by a decidedly adversarial and 
confrontational turn in labour relations that threatens employee voice.  A neoliberal approach to 
governance is unlikely to dissipate any time soon.        
 
Several commentators point out that in the wake of the Great Recession, public sector 
unions are channelling employee voice into protest against governments streamlining their 
operations and interfering with collective bargaining.
674
  Amidst Jackson’s plea for the labour 
movement to contest right-wing political ideologies steering Canadian public sector employment 
policies, federal public service professionals are crusading against Conservative federal 
government austerity.
675
  The AJC is one union that solicited its members’ input for affiliating 
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with other employee organizations.  In September 2011, in anticipation of the introduction of 
2012 Federal Budget, with five other federal public sector professional unions, the AJC formed 
the “Professionals Serving Canadians Campaign” with its purpose of using a broad social media 
platform to expose government cuts in the federal public service (as well as forming a 
community outreach of public program and service defenders).
676
  The AJC supported the 
endeavour due to a Law Practice Model hollowing out the DOJ’s operations by eliminating 
$12.5 million from the salary budget and passing increased responsibilities on to junior 
counsel.
677
  Moreover, by 2014-15, the DOJ intends to trim its workforce by 6.5 percent.
678
  
Treasury Board policy has further directed that the DOJ evaluate its litigation branch, and 
consider whether outsourcing its work to private law firms would realize savings.
679
  Labour 
speed-up at the DOJ has escalated for lawyers with billable-hour targets being increased from 
1,300 to 1,400 hours and the results being measured as part of the annual performance review.
680
  
Job intensification and degradation have forced today’s DOJ lawyers to adjust their practice of 
law to pressures far different from those of their predecessors a decade ago (and even more so 
from their predecessors of twenty years earlier).  As the DOJ re-evaluates its spending priorities, 
the AJC’s Governing Council may also wish to reconsider conciliation and strike as a possible 
dispute resolution procedure.  It might be time to contemplate a coordinated withdrawal of 
labour as a means for defending collective bargaining gains.
681
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 During the study’s participant interviews, lawyers were asked to evaluate whether 
tensions exist between adhering to provincial law society Rules of Professional Conduct and 
collective activity.  Ontario Regional Office lawyer 1 highlighted the choices that need 
consideration if the union asked bargaining unit members to take up job action: “it’ll be a 
question for the individual professional to have to determine how he’s going to resolve that 
conflict, and in my mind, you know your profession has to come first.”  This response captures 
the recurring theme of the professional balancing act.  Government lawyers weigh professional 
responsibility as officers of the court and as public servants.  The federal prosecutor is obliged to 
promote the administration of justice rather than secure a criminal conviction.  The government 
civil litigator conducts trials to advance the best interests of the Crown within adversarial 
proceedings.  As a public servant, however, the government lawyer is also required to conduct 
their responsibilities with regard for the public interest, which speaks to observing the general 
welfare of the public at large.
682
 
 
Lawyers spoke passionately about representing the government client, be it the Minister 
of Justice, a department or agency head, or the tax-paying public at large.  Prairie Regional 
Office lawyer 2 indicated that bargaining unit members hold their public service obligations in 
high regard.  For some respondents, the choice between these duelling loyalties is 
straightforward.  Prairie Regional Office lawyer 1 stated that the supremacy of a lawyer’s oath to 
the profession supersedes union loyalties as the obligation imposes a professional responsibility 
to advance and defend a client’s legal interest.  National Capital Region Office lawyer 5 
expanded on this idea by noting that the upholding of professional standards is inherent in the 
provision of legal services since being a lawyer comes first and union membership comes 
second.  Given these responses, if the AJC was to ask bargaining unit members to support job 
action, there would be a great deal of contemplation over reconciling professional interest with 
union solidarity.    
 
From the respondents’ answers, this project suggests that unionization has not interfered 
with the ethics of bargaining unit members during the life of the first collective agreement 
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between the Treasury Board and AJC.  This was mainly due to the AJC opting for arbitration to 
resolve disputes during collective bargaining negotiations.  The measure was to prevent extreme 
circumstances that might force the likelihood of an unpopular labour disruption that could then 
possibly discredit the public service image of the legal profession (which bargaining unit 
members represent).  However, after the tabling of the Budget Implementation Act, 2009, 
President Jetté averred a remarkable change in the AJC’s position to the press: the bargaining 
unit would, if possible, strike to protest the ERA.
683
  Providing that his assessment remains 
accurate, and a disagreement over collective bargaining escalates into a future labour dispute, the 
AJC would determine the muscularity of job action based on its members’ professional 
responsibilities.  The need for compromise is evident in this passage from AJC senior 
administrator 1:   
So if we were in a situation where our efforts to advance our interests by way of 
collective bargaining should that run into a conundrum with respect to our ethical 
obligations or professional obligations to our clients, we would probably have to govern 
ourselves—and would govern ourselves—in a way that allowed us to preserve our ethical 
obligations to our client and still allow us to pursue our legitimate interests by way of the 
collective bargaining process.            
 
The AJC’s Governing Council may have to advise bargaining unit members on the 
appropriateness and ethicality of job action.  Their position will be determined after a careful 
review of the issues involved, interests being affected, careful study of the test cases and 
instructive examples set by lawyers who have conducted previous slowdowns,
684
 and, likely, a 
comprehensive legal opinion that assesses legalities and demonstrates the leadership’s due 
diligence in recommending a position.  The union’s advice to its members would substitute for 
the recently implemented Department of Justice Values and Ethics Code, which is a protocol 
intended to direct lawyers’ ethical behaviour and decision-making in professional activities.  In 
the case of unusual ethical issues or in potential conflicts of interests or duties, lawyers are 
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directed to discuss concerns with their manager.
685
  The sensitive subject of labour protest, 
however, exposes the paradox of this code’s utility, and constrains its normative value.  Law 
review articles have lately debated the correctness of law society Rules of Professional Conduct 
imposing the same ethical and behavioural standards on counsel with no differentiation between 
public or private practice.
686
  These theoretical exercises add little to the job action debate 
affecting DOJ lawyers because they do not conceptualize collective bargaining as a unique 
component of government employment that may even bolster calls for distinct forms of 
regulation (since a collective exercise of a labour right may impact the public interest).  Nor, can 
the AJC look to provincial law societies for guidance as Thornicroft urged them to establish 
policies on the ethics of work stoppages.
687
  The Law Society of Quebec did not take a position 
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between Quebec public sector lawyers and the province during protracted and failed labour 
negotiations that forced lawyers to strike in 2011.
688
  When determined lawyers erected picket 
lines, staged public demonstrations, and walked off the job for two weeks, the province’s 
legislature ordered them back with ad hoc legislation that ended their strike along with granting a 
6 percent wage increase over five years.
689
  
 
Assessing the integrity of service disruption by the AJC bargaining unit thus entails an 
analogous application of principles drawn from Rules of Professional Conduct regarding a 
solicitor–client relationship being terminated by a lawyer withdrawing services.   The competing 
interests at hand propose that the salutary effects of the AJC bargaining unit members exercising 
Charter protected labour activities, such as picketing,
690
 outweigh the deleterious effects 
imposed by ethical guidelines attempting to mitigate the impact of a government client losing 
non-essential legal services.  In any event, whatever job action the Governing Council proposes 
to the bargaining unit, a majority of its members would still need to approve of it in a 
referendum.
691
  Their decision could be swayed by sustained retrenchment that negatively 
influenced lawyers’ psychological affiliation with professional standards and public 
accountability.  A workplace injustice could also galvanize the appeal of militant action.
692
 
 
7.5 Post Script: Practicing Law under a Collective Agreement 
The introductory chapter of this dissertation argued that significant transformations in the 
legal labour process may pique lawyers’ interest in collective bargaining as a defense against job 
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insecurity.  This case study did not formally test whether the deprofessionalization hypothesis 
explains why DOJ lawyers unionized under the AJC (although a cursory assessment suggests 
that the thesis would bear little relevance).  First, the statutory monopoly of the DOJ over the 
provision of legal services to one client—the federal government and its departments and 
agencies—largely shields its practitioners from the competitive pressures tied to an open private 
market saturated with lawyers and budding new service providers.  Second, the study 
documented changes affecting the DOJ’s operations and the PSSRA’s repeal that pre-date the 
onset of outsourcing and information technology threatening lawyer jobs.  In this regard, the 
findings of this case study provide little support for the deprofessionalization paradigm.  
However, given the seeming relevance of deprofessionalization to account for changes in the 
practice of law today, a future study of lawyers unionizing would benefit from testing the 
theory’s application to more contemporary events at hand.  As well, this study did not analyze 
legal solutions for overturning prohibitions contained in Canadian provincial labour statutes, 
such as those in Alberta and Ontario, that exclude lawyers and other professional occupations 
(medical, dental, architectural) from organizing to collectively bargain or belong to a bargaining 
unit with other non-professionals.  The legality of outdated exclusions applying to certain 
professions is a topic for investigation given that the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in 
Health Services that at international law, and under the Charter, collective bargaining is an 
extension of the basic human right of freedom of association.
693
   
 
This dissertation was intended to increase understanding about lawyer unionism in 
Canada. Presenting the AJC’s story helps familiarize unrepresented lawyers with how a 
bargaining agent secures legal recognition, and the probable conduct of a public sector employer 
negotiating a first collective agreement.  The content of the thesis establishes the informational, 
theoretical, and methodological groundwork for conducting further studies on collective 
bargaining by lawyers.  Research has the important role of expanding on this, and other related 
works by assessing the highly variable and contextual dimensions that would motivate a new set 
of employed lawyers to collectivize their labour relations.  Another useful contribution this study 
makes is to reveal the condition of lawyers practicing law under a collective agreement.  This 
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analysis can encourage a qualitative investigation that develops theory on organized counsel 
making sense of lawyering in a non-standard employment situation.     
   
To study unionized lawyers at in action, I observed the prosecution of criminal law by 
members of the AJC’s bargaining unit at the Old City Hall Courthouse in downtown Toronto.  It 
is where the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) staffs a team of about fifteen Crown 
attorneys who conduct federally-prosecuted summary and select hybrid trials under the 
Controlled Drug and Substances Act,
694
 and who also service Drug Treatment, Mental Health, 
and Gladue (Aboriginal offender) Courts.
695
   Prosecution of drug crimes in the city of Toronto 
falls under the jurisdiction of Old City Hall Courts, which makes these the busiest criminal 
tribunals in Canada.  Prosecutors, early in their careers with the PPSC, discussed their work 
during informal interviews.  They reported appearing before different criminal courts—bail, set 
date, plea, federal practice—which is an experiential circuit for them honing their craft.  For 
three respondents who articled with the PPSC (and were then hired in 2009, 2010, 2011, 
respectively), they are familiar with practicing law under a first collective agreement.  When 
asked how belonging to a union affects their daily work, they shared similar sentiments, as did 
two other prosecutor colleagues, who all saw little conflict between their duties and union 
membership given the responsibilities they owe to the court as Crown attorneys.  One respondent 
noted that the collective agreement allowed the AJC to discuss with management new 
accommodations for dealing with an overcrowding of lawyers confined to an inadequate office 
that would allow them to better observe professional standards and uphold their sense that the 
employer cared about the quality of the workplace.     
 
A factor for DOJ lawyers that extends beyond any one regional office or courthouse and 
that affects bargaining unit members is the interplay between professional responsibilities and 
collective bargaining.  During his interview, National Capital Region lawyer 2, noted that 
membership with the AJC did not imply suffering a loss of professional status.  The idea of being 
both a lawyer and a proud union member did not faze this long-standing AJC member.   It was 
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about a change in perceptions, as he remarks: “...It is a sacrifice of perhaps preconceived ideals 
one had when one was entering law school.  No one enters law school saying I’m going to be a 
lawyer, and I’m going to be a unionized lawyer.”  The observation touches on an assumption 
implied from private practice that lawyers’ fortunes stem their “rainmaking” talents and prowess 
for winning big cases that brings them a favourable reputation, paying clients, and a lucrative 
income.  The perspective, however, does not seem to mesh with lawyering in the federal public 
service where success is based on speedy progress along a defined career track, despite the 
current roadblocks to promotion.   
 
The collective agreement has made advances in fashioning the delivery of legal services 
closer to the professional standards desired by the AJC.  Prairie Regional Office lawyer 2 
informed that the first collective agreement allowed the union to reduce terms and conditions of 
employment into clauses that enhance professional values.  Senior AJC administrator 1 noted 
that the first collective agreement confirmed policy and procedure on lawyer entitlement to legal 
professional development days.  For example, Article 20 of the labour contract provides for paid 
leave allowing unit members to attend conference and workshops as part of their career 
development.  The clause responds to the licensure and competency requirements of continuing 
professional development programs administered by provincial law societies that force lawyers 
to complete annual programs of study or suffer summary administrative suspension.  Overtime, a 
welcomed development from arbitration, is another example of how several respondents see the 
collective agreement enhancing professional values.
696
  Lawyers shared different beliefs on how 
that occurs. 
 
National Capital Region Office lawyer 5 explained that daunting files sometimes cross 
her desk, which is an inescapable facet of the work life of a small, federal government agency 
lawyer.  She complained of being under-resourced and disadvantaged when litigating claims 
defended by prominent law firms representing dominant corporations who systematically flex 
                                                 
696
 Between the time interviews were conducted and the case study being completed, the practice of overtime ceased 
as of 1 April 2013.  The policy amendment came about from negotiations for renewing the first collective agreement 
after its expiry on 9 May 2011.  In exchange for overtime and travel time, the second collective agreement (ratified 
by the bargaining unit in October 2012) secured a 15.25 percent salary increase over the course of its three-year 
lifespan, lasting from 10 May 2011 to 9 May 2014.  The practice of management leave, which rewarded lawyers 
working for extended periods of time before the dawn of collective bargaining replaced overtime.   
199 
 
their powerful clients’ resources against a lone government counsel.  These are the types of cases 
that raise a potential ethical dilemma.  Her conundrum is to work longer and harder and satisfy a 
demanding workload, or, otherwise risk generating the impression of file unpreparedness before 
keen judges.  With a collective agreement in place, her additional efforts can be remunerated and 
the extra time invested in preparing for a big file should not be in vain.   Atlantic Regional Office 
lawyer 1 observed that, in the past, a lawyer’s overtime was considered in an annual performance 
review, which induced him to simply produce more work as required.  As he noted, this practice 
was detrimental to lawyers because: “...I think the history we’ve experienced is the employer is 
depending on people...people’s own sense of integrity to pursue and maintain their professional 
values irrespective of the demands put on them and the actions by the employer.”  Overtime 
entitlement ends the practice of forced professionalism guiding conduct.  However, Prairie 
Regional Office lawyer 2 noted, entitlement and receipt of overtime are two different things.  
Management authorization for overtime is difficult in cost-sensitive environments.  The quantity 
and importance of work at hand will guide negotiations between lawyer and supervisor in 
claiming and actually being compensated for their work.   
 
To conclude, case studies are used to build theories about an organization where changes 
in its industry, employees’ interests, and legislative environment activate forces that yield some 
phenomenon which becomes a subject for social research.  This dissertation on DOJ lawyers 
unionizing under the AJC provides one such example.  One can critique the study for describing 
an isolated event and surmise that collective bargaining by lawyers is restricted to the public 
sector.  Law firm associates and corporate counsel will not revolt against their employers and 
risk losing a well-paid job or ruin career advancement.  Surely, a “fight or flight” scenario would 
see most practitioners opt for a peaceable exit by joining another firm, but not those lawyers who 
would want to stay and resolve a conflict.  The fact is that their dissatisfaction would be 
subjective and experienced relative to the wants and attitudes about improving work conditions.  
As Kearney and Mareschal put it, dissatisfaction alone is not enough to establish collective 
bargaining, but it requires workers believing that union representation will achieve valuable 
benefits that outweigh the costs and risks associated with unionizing.
697
  This, then, is the 
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ultimate issue any group of lawyers would need to consider when deliberating on the merits of 
bringing in an association or union to serve as their spokesperson at work.  Researchers of 
professional unions can only hope that another group of lawyers see the inherent value of 
collective bargaining and pursue it. 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR JUSTICE CANADA LAWYERS 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon.   Thank you for speaking with me today and sharing your insight on 
Justice Canada lawyers unionizing.  Your participation allows for research on this subject.  The 
interview seeks your thoughts on why Justice Canada lawyers unionized and the negotiation of a 
first collective agreement.  The interview canvasses five research themes that are explored 
through supplementary questions.    
 
By speaking with you today I assume that I have your voluntary consent to participate in the 
study.  That said, you can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so 
decide.  Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not 
affect your relationship with the researcher, or York University.  In the event you withdraw from 
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed. 
 
Study participation is on a non-attribution basis.  Your confidentiality and anonymity in 
participating in this study is assured.  Your name will not be used in the study.  The interview 
will be digitally recorded, unless you prefer me to take notes of our discussion.  Once completed, 
the interview will be transcribed.  A copy of that transcript is available to you on request.  The 
interview should take about 45 minutes.  Full and frank responses are welcomed and encouraged. 
 
 
Research Issue #1   
Are ethical obligations a concern in the decision to unionize   
1.1 What tensions are there between the rules of professional conduct and collective 
bargaining? 
 
1.2 Do you see collective bargaining as a way to preserve professional values and autonomy? 
 
1.3 Should ethical values such as upholding the public trust influence membership in a union 
(duty to client/employer, withdrawal of legal services, and strikes)? 
 
1.4 Does choosing a union mean sacrificing professional values? 
 
 
Research Issue #2  
Whether DOJ lawyers perceived bureaucratic over-administration as a factor in the decision to 
unionize under the AJC.   If so, what form did this perception take 
  
2.1 Why did you enter the federal public service?  
2.2 What are your perceptions of the DOJ as employer?  
2.3 Prior to unionization, did you notice working conditions deteriorating?   
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2.4 Was management responsive to addressing any workplace concerns prior to the AJC 
being certified as bargaining agent? 
 
2.5 Prior to unionization did management encroach on workplace autonomy or performance?    
2.6 Are there other quality of work issues that made unionization attractive?  
2.7 Do you think that any specific action of management influenced the decision to unionize? 
 
2.8 When did you realize that union representation was necessary in the workplace? 
 
 
Research Issue #3 
Whether DOJ lawyers perceived the prospect of improved wages and benefits associated with 
collective bargaining as a factor in the decision to unionize under the AJC?  If so, what form did 
this perception take 
 
3.1 Was the unionization decision influenced by job security? 
 
3.2 Do you believe that DOJ lawyers are underpaid in comparison to other public sector 
lawyers?  
 
3.3 Were perceived economic improvements in terms and conditions of employment 
achievable through collective bargaining a factor in the unionization decision?  
 
3.4 Were other issues of economic gain important in the decision to unionize, and if so, why? 
 
3.5 What benefits has collective bargaining delivered for DOJ lawyers? 
 
Research Issue #4   
How was the AJC able to conduct a successful organizing campaign among DOJ lawyers 
4.1 How did you first hear about the AJC? 
 
4.2 Why do you think the AJC was selected as the bargaining agent for DOJ lawyers? 
 
4.3 Was the AJC able to get your support? If so, why? 
 
4.4 What other factors do you think were important to the AJC’s organizing drive and why? 
 
4.5 In your opinion, why did DOJ lawyers unionize under the AJC? 
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Research Issue #5 
Has the delay in negotiating a first collective agreement with the Treasury Board altered your 
outlook on the decision to unionize  
 
5.1 Was the membership involved in the process of establishing bargaining priorities? If so, 
how well? 
 
5.2 Why do you think completing the first contract between the Treasury Board and the AJC 
took so long?  
 
5.3 Do you believe that the delay in signing a first contract was an attempt by management to 
undermine the union? 
 
5.4 How did the union keep the membership involved in union activities during first contract 
negotiations?  How well did it do? 
 
5.5 How did you keep up to date on developments from the bargaining table? 
5.6 Do you foresee any further challenges the AJC faces in representing the membership? 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR AJC MEMBERS 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon.   Thank you for speaking with me today and sharing your insight on 
Justice Canada lawyers unionizing.  Your participation allows for research on this subject.  The 
interview seeks your thoughts on the AJC’s experience in organizing DOJ lawyers and 
negotiating a first collective agreement.  The interview canvasses three research themes that are 
explored through supplementary questions.    
 
By speaking with you today I assume that I have your voluntary consent to participate in the 
study.  That said, you can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so 
decide.  Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not 
affect your relationship with the researcher, or York University.  In the event you withdraw from 
the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed. 
 
Study participation is on a non-attribution basis.  Your anonymity is assured and no reference to 
your name will be made in the study.  Unless you direct me otherwise, I’ll audiotape our 
discussion.  Once completed, the interview will be transcribed.  A copy of that transcript is 
available to you on request.  This interview provides the data I’ll be using in my dissertation.  
This may include any direct quotes from the interview or from information recorded in my notes. 
  
Research Issue #1  
Involvement with AJC 
1.1 When did you begin working for the DOJ? What attracted you to this work? 
1.2 Why do you believe the AJC was formed? 
1.3 Tell me about your work with the AJC? How did you become an AJC member? 
1.4 Why did you get involved with the AJC?  
1.5 How do you find time to balance competing obligations between work and the union?   
1.6 Could you speak about the idea behind having AJC representatives in regional offices? 
 
Research Issue #2 
The AJC’s conduct of a successful organizing campaign  
2.1 Why did DOJ lawyers unionize? 
 
2.2 How was the AJC able to conduct a successful organizing drive of DOJ lawyers?  
 
2.3 Why do you believe DOJ lawyers chose to have the AJC as their bargaining agent? 
 
2.4 Is there an employment climate particular to your office that would influence the 
unionization decision either positively or negatively?   
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2.5 Did the introduction of collective bargaining change how you go about your work? 
 
Research Issue #3 
First Contract Negotiation   
3.1 How was the negotiating team selected? 
 
3.2 What was your role on the negotiating team? 
 
3.3 Did you bring the concerns and interests of your constituents to the bargaining table or 
was there a pre-determined agenda? 
 
3.4 Are there challenges of having the office’s concerns voiced within the overall AJC? 
 
3.5 How were bargaining priorities selected, then? 
 
3.6 What is the relationship between the bargaining team and the executive? 
 
3.7 What goals did the AJC pursue in negotiating a first contract? 
 
3.8 Tell me about how the negotiating process unfolded with the Treasury Board?  How did 
the negotiating team prepare for the meetings? 
 
3.9 Did goals change during negotiations? How did you feel about that? 
 
4.1 What were the difficulties in negotiating a first collective agreement? 
 
4.2 As negotiations proceeded how did the AJC keep its membership involved?   
 
4.3 Tell me about the AJC’s website 
 
4.4 I noticed that as the AJC was negotiating its 1
st
 collective bargain with the Treasury 
Board the media took an interest in the story.  How did that came about? 
 
4.5 Why do you think the Treasury Board took the position it did? 
 
4.6 What was the idea behind the AJC’s Federal lawyers deserve justice campaign of 2008? 
 
4.7       What was your reaction to the first collective bargain being referred to arbitration? 
 
4.8 What do you think about the AJC litigating the Expenditure Restraint Act?   
 
4.9 Has your experience in negotiating a first contract taught you about the process of being 
on a bargaining committee? If so, what? 
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   APPENDIX C 
      Telephone:   (613) 952-8361 
                                         Facsimile:    (613) 957-2303 
Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator 
275 Sparks Street, 9th Floor 
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8  
          PROTECTED B 
 
Our File: 
 
January 9, 2013 
 
Mr. Andrij Kowalsky 
 
 
Dear Mr. Kowalsky: 
 
This letter is further to your request of December 18, 2012, filed under the Access to Information 
Act to obtain: 
 
(1) All correspondences between LOAC/Association of Justice Counsel and the Deputy 
Minister of Justice/Attorney General's office between 1998-2005; 
 
(2) Any minutes of meeting of the Association of Justice Counsel, the Department of 
Justice, and/or the Associate Deputy Minister of Justice;  
 
(3) All correspondences between FLAG/FLOC, and the Deputy Minister of 
Justice/Attorney General's office;  
 
(4) All submissions/records maintained and/or produced by the Department of Justice to 
a task force or government body regarding the exclusion of legal officers from 
collective bargaining. 
 
I am pleased to enclose the releaseable documents relevant to your request (17 of 17 pages).  
You will notice that information is exempt from release by virtue of sections 19(1) [personal 
information] of the Access to Information Act. 
 
This completes our processing of your request.  If you have any questions concerning the above, 
do not hesitate to contact 
208 
 
Please be advised that you are entitled to complain to the Informational Commissioner 
concerning the processing of your request within sixty days of the receipt of this notice.  In the 
event you decide to avail yourself of this right, your notice of complaint should be addressed to: 
 
    Office of the Information Commissioner 
    Tower B, Place de Ville 
    112 Kent Street, 7th Floor 
    Ottawa, Ontario K1A 1H3 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Coordinator 
 
 
  
 
          
 
